File Copyright Online - File mutual Divorce in Delhi - Online Legal Advice - Lawyers in India

Mathai Mathai v/s Joseph Mary: Mastering Indian Contract Law And Specific Relief

By Siddhanth Durgesh Nadkarni | Views 11191

Review Of Literature
Avtar Singh's "Law of Contract & Specific Relief":
This seminal text has been widely regarded as an essential resource for law students (like the author) and practitioners alike. The book thoroughly covers the principles of contract law, supported by case laws and judicial interpretations. It is well-structured, making complex legal concepts accessible, with a particular focus on the Indian context. The addition of Specific Relief topics enhances its utility, offering a comprehensive guide on the enforcement of contracts and remedies available under Indian law. This book is invaluable for its clarity, depth, and practical insights.

Pollock & Mulla: The Indian Contract & Specific Relief Acts (16th Ed):
This book remains a cornerstone reference for legal professionals and students in India. Renowned for its authoritative commentary, the book expertly navigates Indian contract law, blending foundational principles with contemporary case law updates. Its in-depth analysis of Specific Relief Act provisions, combined with practical illustrations, enriches understanding. The book's comprehensive coverage, clarity, and updated judicial interpretations make it indispensable for both academic and practical application in Indian contract law.

Sir William Reynell Anson's: Anson's Law of Contract:
This book is a classic and authoritative text, highly regarded for its thorough exploration of contract law principles. Known for its clarity and precise language, the book expertly covers topics such as the formation of contracts, terms, discharge, and remedies. It includes critical analysis of case laws, both in English and international contexts. Ideal for students and practitioners alike, the book strikes a balance between theoretical rigor and practical insights, making it an essential guide for understanding the fundamentals of contract law.

Contracts With Minors

Introduction:
A legal bottleneck will inevitably be created in instances where minors become a party to an agreement. This for the simple reason that any contract involving a minor as a party is absolutely void, right from the outset, according to the provision, Sec. 11 of the ICA, 1872. In general cases, it is said that an individual ceases to be a minor, and becomes a major at 18.

However, exclusively in the instances where there has been an appointment of a guardian for the purpose of representing a minor, the minor is said to have become a major only at 21. Therefore, it can be safely said that the relevant law shall ascertain whether or not the person entering into the contract has attained majority. The ambit of parties that are competent to contract has been made amply clear under Sec.10 of the ICA,1872. Sec. 11 tells us that a party, who has not yet attained majority at the time of entering into the contract, shall not be considered by any court, to be competent to contract.

The privilege of being a minor, that declares all contracts with minors null and void, does not apply to a select few types of contracts, such as contracts entered into for goods and services that can be said to come under the ambit of essentials, like food, clothes, educational supplies, so on and so forth. In the eyes of the court, such cases are generally enforceable by the law because the court considers the minor as someone having a capacity equal to an adult.

The rationale behind restricting a minor from entering into agreements is the presumption that minors are incapable of exhibiting proper judgment. It is for this very reason that a minor has been expressly deemed to be legally incapable of deciding for himself while entering into a contract. Therefore, the act also confers upon a minor, certain special shields to safeguard him from his potentially flawed judgment and immaturity.

At the time when a contract is being entered into, the common presumption is that the parties to the contract should necessarily be able to understand the repercussions of the obligations that he would be subject to under the contract on his own interests. The problem is that this very inalienable presumption cannot be said to apply in the case of contracts involving minors.

Competency and Minority:
A contract, in order to have the backing of the law, must necessarily have the valid essentials as laid down under Article 10 of the ICA. One among the four essentials is that the parties entering into the contract must possess the competency to enter into a contract as prescribed by Sec. 11 of the same Act. Since the contract would automatically cease to exist if any of the four essentials are not met, if any of the parties entering into the contract have not attained majority when the contract is entered into, then the contract would obviously be void ab initio.

Exemptions available to contracting minors:
In order to exempt minors from all contractual liabilities and obligations, the court does not apply the doctrine of estoppel on minors that are parties to a contract. Due to the fact that the consent of the minor lacks any sort of validity in the eyes of the court and the law, none of the contracts entered into by them can be said to be backed by the law. Because of this, in India, a contract cannot be converted into a tort to give rise to an action against the contracting minor. In simpler words, a minor cannot be held liable for any contract or tort arising out of the contract that is void ab initio.

"Section 65 of the Special Relief Act of 1963" deals with 'restitution', in order to uphold the principle of prevention of wrongful enrichment, in case one party has fulfilled its obligations established in a contract that is void. This provision of the constitution is used at the discretion of the court in the case of minors, in order to benefit them. In order to do this, the court will apply this provision only in instances where the contracting minor is the defendant.

Name Of The Judgement
Mathai Mathai vs Joseph Mary @ Marykkutty Jopseph & Ors 2015 (5) SCC 622

Background Of The Judgement:

Main Subject Matter of the Case: The main subject matter of the case chosen for critical analysis is the question of whether the appellant, Mathai Mathai, could be said to be a deemed tenant under Section 4-A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, of a piece of land that his deceased mother was the mortgagee of, and as a consequence thereof, the continuous occupant of, for a whopping duration of over 50 years.
What Led to the Case and How: An application filed by the appellant before the "Land Tribunal, Kottayam" in the early 1980s can be said to be the first of the various suits that led to the chosen case. The tribunal ruled in favour of the appellant, holding that he was indeed a deemed tenant and that he was well within his rights to get a certificate of purchase for the land that he asserted that he was a deemed tenant of.

Aggrieved by the tribunal's verdict in the above-mentioned case, the first respondent, Marykkutty Joseph, along with others, filed an appeal against it [2], before the "Land Reforms Appellate Authority, Ernakulam". The appellate authority found that, as per the tribunal's order, any interference was uncalled for as the appeal against it held no water. Hence the first respondent's appeal was dismissed with no costs

This dismissal order of the appellate authority's was further opposed by the first respondent in the HC of Kerala[3]. This time, however, the jury passed a very cryptic judgment that has been widely impugned.

The appellant challenged this very judgement of the High Court's, before the Supreme Court, resulting in the case under study: Mathai Mathai vs Joseph Mary @ Marykkutty Jopseph & Ors

Basic Details Of The Case
Size of the Bench: 2 (Division Bench)

Names of the Judges Comprising the Bench: Justice Gyan Sudha Misra and Justice V. Gopala Gowda
Name of the judge delivering the opinion: Justice V. Gopala Gowda
Names of advocates appearing on behalf of the appellant: Adv. M.T. George & Adv. Kavitha K.T.
Names of advocates appearing on behalf of the respondent: Adv. Roy Abraham & Adv. Himinder Lal

Material Facts Of The Case:

In the original application, filed before the Law Tribunal Kottayam, the appellant said that a deed of mortgage worth 7,000 Chakrams (dowry amount) had been executed by his uncle in favour of the appellant's mother (deceased).
The appellant's mother had not attained majority at the time of execution of the mortgage deed.
The mother continuously occupied the property for a duration of over five decades since the enactment of the KLR Act, till her death.
After the mother's death, the appellant requested permission to be granted for the registration of his deemed tenancy of the land given on mortgage under Sec. 4A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 read with Kerala Land Reforms Tenancy Rules.
In response, the appellant's father summarily rejected/opposed all such assertions and appellant's claims, thus resulting in the impleading of the son.
He argued that according to the amendments made to Sec. 4A of the KLR Act, the appellant's mother (now deceased) did not possess the right. Furthermore, he and the uncle (mortgager) refused to accept that the appellant's deceased mother was not a deemed tenant.
Because of this, the father plead that the appellant has no right to procure a "purchase certificate" because the appellant cannot be considered as a "deemed tenant" of the mortgaged land.
The relevant sections of the KLR Act can be used to conclude clearly that the appellant was well within his rights to receive a certificate of purchase. Also, as far as the question of the purchase of land is concerned, he was very well entitled to the statutory rights of the same that could permit him to qualify the land in question.
Finally, as per the ruling of the tribunal, the appellant was entitled to every right available to a "deemed tenant" and thus also had the right to procure a "purchase certificate".

Key Legal Issues Of The Case

It is but obvious that one cannot try to ratify and enforce any contract that has been expressly declared as void ab initio. This particular case is no exception. The Indian Contract Act of 1872 has very apparently and explicitly made known to us that for a contract to be enforceable under the law, the capacity of the parties desirous of contracting, to enter into the contract is an essential and indispensable factor to ensure that the contract can be enforced by a court of law. Therefore, the important issues to be decided by the court and questions of law to be answered by the court can be formulated as under:

Can the mortgage deed being brought into question in this case, be considered as valid in the eyes of the law?
In case a is answered in the positive, whether or not it is a simple mortgage, or if it amounts to a possessory mortgage in terms of "Sections 58(b) and 58(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882."
Can we consider the appellant's demand for the granting of deemed tenancy for the mortgaged land, to be valid and capable of being upheld under the relevant provisions of the KLR Act, 1963, which was previously executed in the appellant's mother's favour, when she was a minor?
Despite being rendered incapable to contract by the restrictions of Sec. 11 of the ICA 1872, how could the mortgagee be in continued possession of the disputed piece of land for a duration as long as that of five decades? Would the contract not be void right from the outset?

The Contention Raised By The Parties

Below, we go into the details of the claims and arguments made by the plaintiff and defendant, as well as their circumstances.

Contentions raised by the Plaintiff's Counsel(s):
The deceased mother of the plaintiff, when alive, was given an area of land mortgaged to her benefit by the uncle of the plaintiff. She has been in continued possession of the land so mortgaged to her, for almost five decades. The plaintiff, under "Section 4A of the Kerala property Reforms Act, 1963",[9] because of this particular circumstance, requested an exclusive right be recognized as a "tenant" of the very plot of land mentioned before. The aforementioned provision additionally facilitated him, to receive a "purchase certificate", thereby obtaining legal entitlements, resulting in him being able to purchase a land parcel at some rates established in advance. Additionally, it was when he was a tenant that the property was bestowed upon him by his mother, who died later on.

Contentions Raised by the Defendant's Counsel(s):
The initial action undertaken by the defendants was the submitting of an appeal to the relevant court of appeal for "land reforms", under "Section 102 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act"[10] disputing the ruling of the "Land Tribunal, Kottayam"[11], on a number of law-based and fact-based grounds. The aforementioned authority dealing with appeals, responded to the case in question by indicating that modifications had already been performed on the land concerned in the initial suit. Additionally, farming on the same land has also been undertaken.

A mark was provided by the aforementioned court to the deed of mortgage that had been duly registered. Furthermore, it was decided that the primary respondent possessed neither any legal ownership of the land nor any authorities on the piece of land during any period of time leading up to the suit.

Summary And Reasoning Of The Judgement

The opinion of the SC in the present suit favoured the minority of the mother of the appellant, referring to Indian Majority Act of 1875[12]. Justice V Gopala Gowda, the presiding judge of the case said that it was not necessary to bring up the deceased mother's minority for debate because the same has been considered to be an undeniable fact. To further back this, the very same thing was explicitly stated in the wordings of the very mortgage deed in question (i.e. the one executed by the appellant's uncle).

This is why, when we take into consideration Sec. 11 of the ICA 1872, no doubt remains, regarding the incapacity to contract of the deceased mother. There is an uncanny resemblance between the lines on which this this judgement was delivered and those on which the judgement of the landmark case involving another minor-related contract Mohori Bibi v Dharmodas Ghose[13], was delivered.

Additionally, the possibility of the contract being voidable, under Sec. 64 of the ICA[14], cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be brought into question. For this reason, the judge in his concluding remarks, quoted the Indian Contracts Act, "For an agreement to become a contract, the parties must be competent to contract, wherein the age of majority is a condition for competency".

A mortgage deed can, by no stretch of imagination, be considered a legally binding agreement, and the court will refuse to affirm that a mortgage is legal in case it is registered under the name of the minor. One rare circumstance under which a deed of mortgage executed by a minor signing it may be deemed valid and enforceable by the court is when the guardian of the minor is representing him/her.

A minor's guardian, might be either a court-assigned guardian or a natural one. In addition, the court emphasized that one cannot construe the law varyingly in the event of a minor acting as a mortgagee, and in the event of him/her acting as a mortgagor, since the rights and duties resulting from such a contract pertain to immovable property and would be applicable to both parties. Hence, the court ruled that the mortgage agreement made by a person under the age of majority is considered null and void. Consequently, the appellant will be unable to assert any entitlement under such a mortgage agreement.

Moreover, with regards to the assertion of the appellant of the transfer of possession to the tenant, the court deemed the previous ruling of the Law Tribunal as a legal mistake since it does not address the completion of the duties that were alleged to be carried out by the concerned parties. Additionally, it does not examine the status of the initially requested amount in dowry for which the land was allegedly given in mortgage in the first instance.

Owing to the lack of clarity and proof, the court concluded that it cannot be asserted by the appellant that they are entitled to be presumed as tenants of the land in issue under the Kerala Reforms Act, 1963. Furthermore, the contract specifies that the parties involved will decide whether or not to resort to legal proceedings in order to dispute the right to property ownership. The dispute will be resolved prior to an appropriate authority, and the parties will reach a settlement on the rights of ownership of the disputed piece of land

Personal Analysis And Closing Remarks

The facts that the author has mentioned, coupled with the court's ruling illustrate the rationale of the SC. Furthermore, they highlight the necessity for both the mortgagee and the mortgagor in the event of a minor to have identical legal interpretations whenever such a situation arises. Regarding the court's decision, I find myself disagreeing with its logic and reason because when the situation and the facts of the seminal ruling in Mohiri Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose[15] are considered, it does not immediately exclude minors from being parties to contracts in any situation.

Instead, the ruling outlines the precise terms of exceptions, like in the instance of contracts that have already been executed, agreements for necessities, and contracts that will benefit the minor, such as his schooling. Using the same parallel in this instance, the instant case's facts indicate the appellant's entitlement to the land in question as stated by "Section 4A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963", and that the reasonableness of the completed contracts should be upheld.

The ruling in this case was quite appalling, as some legal scholars have perceived it as a regression without thoroughly examining the facts, especially when the products are necessities, as in the case under discussion and the historic ruling, which both address the minority and the necessary goods with divergent judgements.

End Notes: