The legality and necessity of removing the doubt or difficulty clause, also
known as the Henry VIII clause, has been a subject of controversy in several
jurisdictions, one of the recent controversies being the presence of the
Henry clause VIII in the Great Repeal Bill of Great Britain. In the Indian
context, the legality of the Henry VIII broad clause remains an ambiguous
question while the question of the legality of the Henry VIII narrow clause
is decided. Jurisprudence on the old aspect of the Henry VIII clause has
been incorrectly analyzed to a large extent both by academics and in
reputable legal commentaries. Therefore, the authors wish to offer a correct
legal interpretation of the judicial discourse on the issue.
accordance with the political environment that currently exists in the
Indian structure, given the increasing complexity and the considerable
number of legislations which Parliament is called upon to deal with and the
complex composition of the population of India, the narrow as large The
Henry VIII clause becomes a question of necessity even if it can be viewed
with suspicion. Therefore, whether it be the narrow clause or the broad
Henry VIII clause, these clauses should not be declared void per se in the
eyes of the law; rather, the legality of any Henry VIII clause in the main
law should be assessed by the Indian justice system on a case-by-case basis.
Recently, in March 2017, a big debate started about the UK repeal bill which
aims to cut and paste EU laws as they already exist under the law.
Britain's separation from the EU. Furthermore, the existence of the Henry
VIII clause in the bill was one of the most controversial aspects of the
bill. Along with this, once again, the debates surrounding the necessity
and relevance of the Henry VIII clause as a form of delegated legislation
comes into play.
The Henry VIII clause is a provision of a parent law empowering the
executive to modify or repeal one or more laws through the enactment by it
of delegated legislation. It is because of this liberating nature of the
Henry VIII clause for the executive that this clause has been a painful eye
for the judiciary and other stakeholders in countries, including India.
In the Indian context, the context that explains the need for the Henry VIII
clause is that, for example, recently the winter session of Parliament was
made almost non-functional due to opposition protests against the government
of the Center for his demonetization decisions.
Similarly, in the recent
past, there have been numerous cases of interruptions and blockages of the
work of Parliament, whether due to the insensitive comments of a prominent
leader of the ruling party against minority communities, or the suicide of a
student (Rohith Vemula) .In addition, before this current Lok Sabha
mandate, Parliament's operations continued at a lukewarm pace because of the
fragile coalition put in place place under the government of the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA).
Therefore, in these circumstances in India, the role of delegated
legislation becomes more important. It’s one of the most crucial subjects of
administrative law in any country, including India, to correctly identify
the thin line that delimits the gap between authorized and excessive
delegated legislation. It is in this broader question of the permissible
scope of delegated legislation that the legality of the Henry VIII clause
has been a bone of contention.
This article first develops the attributes of the Henry VIII clause and
explains how the clause differs from other cases of excessive delegated
legislation [Part II]. In addition, he explains the different forms in which
this clause can be found [part II] and also the reasons why the Henry VIII
clause is suspected in the Indian context [part III]. In Part IV, the
authors analyze historical judicial verdicts under Indian administrative law
in relation to the validity of the Henry VIII clause, thereby developing the
position adopted in India regarding vires.
Attributes of the Henry VIII clause
A Henry VIII clause refers to the provision of a primary law which empowers
the executive to enact derogatory legislation, incompatible or liable to
change, with primary legislation or legislation .
A historical analysis of the Henry VIII clause tells us that it was
originally contained in the Sewer Statute. At the time, the clause gave the
sewer commissioner (the executive) the power to enact rules that have the
effect of legislation, to levy taxes, and to impose penalties for
Later, the proclamation statute provided that the king (the
executive) would issue proclamations having the force of law. Both statutes
were prevalent during the reign of an autocratic sovereign, King Henry VIII.
The king asserted his powers in a purely authoritarian manner and ``
modified '' the provisions according to his subjective understanding .
Accordingly, even today, whenever such broad powers are conferred on the
executive, these are called Henry VIII powers.
The Henry VIII clause is different from the situation where the executive is
conferred by the legislature with the power to extend the statute already in
force in one area to another area with the power to modify which allows the
necessary adjustments to be made. existing law to better meet the
requirements of the new territory .
Indeed, in such cases, modifications
are made to the new functioning of the mother law in the new field instead
of modifying the original law. However, under the Henry VIII clause, the
executive is armed to modify the original statue. In addition, the Henry
VIII clause is also different from the clause in parent legislation which
confers regulatory powers on the executive in order to give effect to the
In addition, the delegation of legislative power which takes
place under of Henry's law Clause VIII must be distinguished from several
other cases of excessive delegated legislation. Indeed, it is sometimes
wrongly presumed that any clause present in the parent statute, conferring
unguided decision-making powers on the executive is a Henry VIII clause; or
that any case of excessive delegated legislation constitutes the Henry VIII
For example, it has often been misunderstood in cases like W.B. SEB
v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh,  and Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd.
vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly
,  that the attribution of arbitrary powers to
executive officials by reason of the presence of a regulation, makes the
regulation the Henry VIII clause.
It should be noted that the Henry VIII
clause is neither equivalent to excessive delegation, nor always an example
of excessive delegation; although it may, as a clause, be more likely to be
an example of excessive delegation. The Henry VIII clause often exists in
the form of a removal of doubt or difficulty clause. The clause can be
found in a plethora of laws in India , including in the Indian
Different forms of the Henry VIII clause
In several scholarly writings and legal commentaries, two types of the Henry
VIII clause have been identified: the broad and narrow clause. The
narrow Henry VIII clause allows the executive to enact delegated legislation
as long as this legislation does not contravene or derogate the provisions
of the Parents Act. However, in the case of a Henry VIII broad clause, the
Executive is authorized to promulgate delegated legislation which derogates
from the provisions of the parent law.
However, the authors suggest that for a better understanding of the Henry
VIII clause, a three-level classification system should be followed: a
wider, broad and narrow Henry VIII clause. The general Henry VIII clause
should imply situations in which the clause present in the parents 'law
empowers the executive power to legislate not only in violation of the
provisions of the parents' law, but also of any other law in force in a
place. ; the only limitation of the regulatory power being that the policy
and essence of the parent law or any other law thereby departed from are not
changed. An example of such a clause can be found in the Constitution of
India under section 372. In addition, there are other criteria for
identifying the different forms of the Henry VIII clauses.
If the objective of delegation is taken as a criterion, the Henry VIII
clause may have the objective of facilitating the transition from old
legislation to new law on the same subject. In addition, the Henry VIII
clause may also aim to allow flexibility in the implementation of any new
law. As a third category, the Henry VIII clause could be a general clause
which exists under the parent law in perpetuity to remove doubts or
that may arise at any time after the promulgation of the
mother law as long as it remains in force .
In addition, if the existence of a deadline is taken into account, the Henry
VIII clause may be of the type limited by duration:
mainly during the first
years of the promulgation of the parent law.  These types of Henry VIII
clauses are also called sunset provisions. However, Henry VIII clauses
cannot have any predefined time limitation.
If the purpose granted is taken as a parameter, then there is a type of
Henry VIII clause which excludes the scope of judicial control from
delegated legislation promulgated in application of the powers conferred on
it, while the other type leaves room for control. judicial. Furthermore, in
some cases, the Henry VIII clause defines the procedure to be followed by
the executive in the exercise of the delegated legislative powers conferred
by the Henry VIII clause.
However, in other cases, such procedural
directives do not are not established by the Henry Clause VIII. In
addition, there is, on the one hand, the Henry VIII clause which requires to
deposit the delegated legislation made in the exercise of the powers
conferred by the Henry VIII clause, before each of the chambers of
Parliament ; and on the other hand, the Henry VIII clause which does not
contain such requirements for presentation before each chamber of the Union
legislator. Finally, there is another basis for classifying the Henry VIII
clause which will be discussed in Part V of the document.
Reasons for Viewing the Henry VIII Clause With Suspicion
Lord Mayor once stated the following regarding the validity of Henry VIII
You can be sure that when these Henry VIII clauses are introduced they will
always be said to be necessary. William Pitt warned us how to treat such a plea
with disdain. Necessity is the justification for every infringement of human
liberty: it is the argument of tyrants, the creed of slaves.
Several reasons have been identified explaining the necessity and the
justification for considering the Henry VIII clause with suspicion. First,
the power to amend or repeal any law is considered an essential legislative
function, and therefore the delegation of that power is considered to be
legally unjustified. Indeed, the delegation of the power to modify or repeal
a statute to the executive can be an unhealthy practice in a democracy,
because it is only through parliamentary debates and discussions that
amendments or repeals must be introduced into any legislation. Furthermore,
it is felt that the executive should not have the power to modify or repeal
because, unlike Parliament, it is not directly accountable to the public and
has not instilled in it fear loss of public support.
In addition, there is
also apprehension against the existence of the Henry VIII clause in the
original legislation because Parliament does not have the power to directly
amend any delegated legislation which has been adopted; neither can
Parliament decide on the duration or entry into force of this delegated
legislation. Parliament can only refuse the continued application of any
delegated legislation; Parliament cannot amend / rectify it.
the time such a discontinuance decision is made by Parliament, much damage
would have already accumulated. In addition, the frequency with which the
Henry VIII clause is revoked by the executive is another concern. Therefore,
it is felt that the Henry VIII clause should not be allowed as a tool of
excuse in the hands of the executive to do the job of legislating poorly,
and then becoming Scottish despite legislation coming into force. poorly
drafted. . These are the reasons identified so far to justify the opposition
to the existence of the Henry VIII clause in the parent law.
However, there is another factor that the authors seek to highlight to
explain the skepticism that exists against the presence of the Henry VIII
clause. Reason has its basis in psychology. The fault lies in the
nomenclature Henry VIII clause
used for the clause present in the mother
legislation and which gives wide discretionary powers to the executive power
to modify or repeal any provision of the mother law. Indeed, given the
history of King Henry VIII's rule, the use of the term Henry VIII clause
not only inadvertently invokes a negative bias, but is also misleading.
The nomenclature is misleading mainly for three reasons:
- First, when Henry VIII was given broad executive powers to modify or
repeal the statute in order to carry out his own will, those powers were
broad enough to repeal all or part of the laws promulgated in his
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the so-called Henry VIII clause
within the limits of current administrative law, generally does not
confer such broad powers on the executive.
- Second, in his time, King Henry VIII has not been prevented from
even modifying the policy or essential features of the parent law or any
other law in force. However, such a limitation usually exists in the
so-called Henry VIII clause of the present day.
- Third, the extensive powers of King Henry VIII during his reign
could not be attributed solely to his powers to modify a status;
instead, it happened because of the simultaneous allocation of judicial
powers to him too.
On the other hand, today's so-called Henry VIII clause does not
generally confer such jurisdictional powers on the executive.
Consequently, an analogy of the clause which gives broad powers to the
Executive to modify or abrogate any status of tyranny that King Henry
VIII exercised during his reign, through this clause, would be
The Validity of the Henry VIII Clause: Examining Case Law
Since the Henry VIII clause exists in the parent law in the form of a
doubt or difficulty raising clause
, the vires of this clause have been
challenged on several occasions before the courts. It is widely accepted
that the Indian judicial system has accepted the legality of the narrow and
broad clauses of Henry VIII. However, according to the authors, the
judiciary has unambiguously accepted the validity of the Henry VIII narrow
clause while clouds of ambiguity reign over the validity of the Henry VIII
broad clauses. In support of their assertion, the authors in this section
analyze the decisive verdicts rendered on this issue.
The first of the most significant cases in this area was Jalan Trading
Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Mill Mazdoor Sabha
, in which section 37 of the
1965 Premium Payment Act was challenged on the grounds that it was a Henry VIII
clause and therefore an example of excessive delegated legislation. Section 37
 conferred on the central government the power to take measures, not
inconsistent with the objectives of the law
remove difficulties or doubts, and this exercise of executive powers could
not be subject to judicial control.
Since section 37 authorized the executive to go so far as to amend the
parent law, section 37 is an example of a Henry VIII clause. The majority
(3: 2) decided in the case that section 37 was not valid because it was a
case of excessive delegated legislation.
The majority judgment was written by Justice Shah. He said:
Condition of applicability of section 37 stems from doubt or difficulty
in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. By providing that the order
made must not be inconsistent with the object of the Act, s. 37 is not saved
from the vice of delegation of legislative power…. The power to remove doubt
or difficulty by amending the provisions of the law would in essence amount
to the exercise of a legislative power and cannot be delegated to an
Section (2) of s. 37, which aims to finalize the order of the central
government, accentuates the vice of sub. s. (1), since, by enacting this
provision, the government becomes the sole judge if difficulties or doubts
have arisen to give effect to the provisions of the law, if it is necessary
or expedient to remove the doubts or difficulties, and if the adopted
provision is not incompatible with the objectives of the Law.  \
This implies that in the Jalan Trading case,
the broad Henry VIII
clause was declared unauthorized by reason of the fact that it constitutes
an example of excessively delegated legislation by its very existence.
Later in Gammon India Ltd. vs. Union of India
) , section 34  of the Indian Contract Labor (Regulation
and Abolition) Act 1970 was challenged on the grounds that it was ''
excessive delegated legislation. Article 34 (Clause of removal of doubt or
difficulty) is an example of a narrow clause of Henry VIII, because it does
not confer on the central government the power to modify the provision of
the mother law, under the pretext of removing the doubt or the difficulty.
The Court, while confirming the validity of section 34, distinguished the
facts of the Jalan Trading case by declaring that, unlike the former case,
section 34 in the present case did not contain the finality clause and did
not allow modification of the provisions of the law on parents or any other
There are therefore two elements that draw attention to the Gammon India
- First, although the bank pronounced the verdict to be the
constitutional bank itself, it did not set aside the decision in Jalan
Trading; rather, he applied the ratio of the Jalan Trading case and
distinguished the Gammon India case on his facts.
- Second, it partially misinterpreted the Jalan Trading case,
suggesting that the latter case had declared section 37 of the Premium
Payment Act invalid for two reasons; that which it conferred the
finality on the decision of the powers of decision of the executive and
secondly that it allowed the executive to modify the legal dispositions.
Indeed, in Gammon, India, the Court meant that, according to the Jalan
Trading report, the mere existence of the Henry VIII clause does not in
itself make the clause invalid, since it is a example of excessive
delegated legislation; it is only when this clause is combined with
other aggravating factors such as the condition of purpose attached to
the broad Henry VIII clause that the clause becomes invalid because it
is an example of excessive delegated legislation.
However, contrary to the interpretation of the majority judgment in the
Gammon India case, the Court in the Jalan Trading case said:
power to remove doubt or difficulty by amending the provisions of the law would
be tantamount to in substance to the exercise of legislative power and that
cannot be delegated to an executive authority. Section (2) of s. 37, which seeks
to make the central government order in such cases, ultimately accentuates the
vice in sub. s. (1).
A careful reading of the quoted part of the verdict of Jalan Trading would
reveal that any allocation of power to remove doubt or difficulty by
allowing the modification of the provisions of the law in itself is
inadmissible and that the presence of a finality clause under of section 37
in that case was only a question of emphasis rather than a causation of
the decision made in the case. Consequently, the correct interpretation of
the Jalan Trading case would be that the general Henry VIII clause is in
itself void since it constitutes an example of excessive delegated
legislation. After the Gammon India case, another historic case on the
question of the legality of the Henry VIII clause is identified as Bengal
Iron Corpn. v. CTO  (hereinafter, Bengal Iron Corporation).
In this case, section 42 of the A.P. Act was challenged and it was disputed
that it opened the way to excessive delegated legislation. Section 42 
(Clause of doubt removal) provides that if difficulties arise during the
transition from the old law to the new law, the executive power can
establish rules to remove the difficulty and derogate from the provisions of
the parent (new ) law. However, in all other cases where elimination of
difficulties is required, the executive may establish rules which are not
incompatible with the provisions of the original law. This implies that
Section 42 is an example of the broad and narrow clauses of Henry VIII. The
Court, while confirming the validity of the article, declared that:
However, in a later decision in Gammon India Limited .., it was explained
... that the decision in Jalan Trading was influenced by the words at the
end of section 37 of the premium payment law that the direction from the
government issued under it was final. It is purported to give effect to the
provisions of the law, it was found. Section 42 (2) of the AP law
This therefore shows that the Court in Bengal Iron read the Gammon India
case as if it sought to suggest that it was only the final clause of the
Clause of removal of doubt or difficulty That influenced the court's
decision in Jalan Trading. the case, which, for the reasons stated by the
authors in the previous analysis of the Gammon India case, is a misleading
legal interpretation. Therefore, in the Bengal Iron case, the Court
misread not only the Jalan Trading case, but also the interpretation of the
Jalan Business case in the Gammon India case.
However, it has been established in cases such as the development of the
territory of Punjab , that the ratio decidendi of a previous case can be
further enlarged by the judge before whom the case is cited as precedent
and, in these cases, the he expanded interpretation remains valid until
further development. in law occurs. However, there is no easy answer to the
question of how far such expansion is possible. Faithfulness to the text and
to the fixed gaze would require that such a reinterpretation of the previous
verdict should not deviate too much from the initial judgment .
Given these rules regarding stare decisis and ratio decidendi and the
interpretation adopted in Gammon India and Bengal Iron of the reasoning
given in Jalan Trading, two separate conclusions are possible regarding the
validity of the general Henry VIII clause in the Indian context. First, that
until the Supreme Court in any subsequent case correctly reinterprets the
reasoning given in Jalan Trading to justify the invalidity of the Henry VIII
clause, the reasoning in Jalan Trading reinterpreted in the Gammon India and
Bengal Iron case prevails due to which it can be argued that the broadest
The Henry VIII clause is legal in India. Second, it can be said that the
interpretations of the reasoning given in the Jalan Trading case that the
broader Henry VIII clause is invalid in Gammon India and Bengal Iron are
nothing but obiter.
Indeed, in the latter two cases, the legality of the broader Henry VIII
clause was not an issue; instead, in both cases, the issue revolved around
the legality of the Henry VIII narrow clause alone . When adopting the
second interpretation, it follows that the broader Henry VIII clause is
illegal in India. Several legal commentaries have for the most part adopted
the first approach, but through an extremely superficial  and sometimes
incorrect  analysis. Furthermore, under the Henry VIII clause, power can
only be exercised by the executive to remove the doubts or difficulties
when such doubts or difficulties arise in relation to the parent law and
not outside it; and the existence of such doubts and difficulties should be
Lessons for the Judiciary And For Other Stakeholders
However, this discussion of the legality or illegality of the Indian
judiciary to incorporate a Henry VIII clause into the parent law has become
largely theoretical. The reason is that the legislator has discovered
indirect means of enforcing the broad Henry VIII clause.
This is done in two ways:
- First, the legislator drafts the main law in a skeletal manner .
Therefore, individual arrangements are generally defined. In this way,
the Legislative Assembly ensures that the executive can exercise
significant discretion despite the use of the narrow Henry VIII clause
in the main law in the form of the Suppression of Doubts and
- Second, these days, the subtle and newly emerging manifestation of
the broad Henry VIII clause is the power, under the original law, to
allow the executive to clarify or interpret the meaning of the
provisions given in the original law . the executive to modify the
provisions of the main law whenever the existence of an ambiguity in the
mother law provides for such a scope .
Indeed, the power that the broad Henry VIII clause could possibly confer on
the executive is practically exercised by the executive, whatever the
ambiguity that continues to prevail as to the judicial position taken as to
the legality of the broad clause Henry VIII.
Therefore, it is suggested that the judiciary unambiguously accept the prima
facie validity of the general Henry VIII clause. In addition, the judiciary
should rather decide on the validity of the general Henry VIII clause on a
case-by-case basis, where the decision on validity should be influenced by
factors, such as the nature of the law in which the Henry VIII clause is
incorporated, the form of the Henry VIII clause thus enacted and the scope
of the Henry VIII clause.
Furthermore, it is crucial that the validity of the Henry VIII broad clause
is recognized, because if the discretion conferred by the Henry VIII clause
is not broad enough to allow the executive to modify the provisions of the
law (provided that the essence or the purpose of the law remains unchanged)
then there is a utility independent of the Henry VIII clause will be
The reason for this is that the narrow clause of Henry VIII is in fact
similar to the power to make rules for bringing into force the provisions
of the law . It is because of this nature of the narrow clause Henry
VIII that some scholars refuse to grant Henry VIII Clause status to the
so-called Henry VIII narrow clause.
In addition, the main reason for incorporating the Henry VIII clause into
the parent law is to provide for contingencies of lack of foresight on the
part of the legislator despite the fact that he exercises all reasonable
care and investigations  and contingencies technical and complex details
involved in the new legislation. Therefore, the broad Henry VII clause is a
necessary evil to provide flexibility .
Currently, Parliament has a variety of issues on which to enact laws and it
is overworked with enactment and amendment. It should not be forgotten that
the disturbances in Parliament have become a common landscape  and that
coalition politics are increasing, which has become difficult to reach the
consensus necessary for drafting or amending laws. In light of these
circumstances, the Court should unequivocally legally recognize the broad
Henry VIII clause.
Ambiguity regarding the validity of the broad Henry VIII clause in India
continues to prevail. However, the authors believe that no form of the Henry
VIII clause should be declared ipso facto invalid by the judiciary. Negative
stereotypes related to the Henry VIII clause should be removed. The change
can start by modifying the nomenclature of the clause in the first place.
Ideally, the Henry VIII clause should have certain limits as to its scope.
These constraints may exist in the form of time restrictions, procedural
guidelines, a ban on changing the essence or underlying policy of the parent
law, the obligation to table the delegated law thus promulgated before
Parliament and / or limit the power to modify the provisions of the law to
one or more laws, among other possibilities. Most importantly, the authority
that can exercise the powers of the Henry VIII clause on behalf of the
executive must be carefully chosen.
Consequently, the debate in the field of Indian administrative law must move
from the elementary question concerning the legality of the narrow and broad
clause of Henry VIII to a judgment on the validity of this clause on a case
by case basis. Indeed, deciding on the vires of the Henry VIII clause
without looking at the context of its application is like reading the label
on a pickle bottle which has no meaning in itself unless it is attached to
the bottle on which label is placed.
- Ben Riley-Smith, Theresa May to Unveil Plans for Converting EU Law
Via „Henry VIII Clauses‟ Later This Month, The Telegraph (18-3-2017)
- Patrick Daly, Brexit: Are the Secondary „Henry VIII Clauses' a Step
Too Far?, Grimsby Telegraph (5-4-2017)
- Press Trust of India, BJP MPs Protest Disruption of Parliament by
Congress Members, The Indian Express (5-12-2014)
- PTI, Parliament Continues to be Stalled, Deccan Herald (5-12-2016)
- Rohith Vemula Case A „Virtual Murder‟, Probe into Suicide „Farce‟:
Opposition on Smriti Irani's Reply, Zee News (26-2-2016)
- See Henry VIII Clauses, UK Parliament
- N.A.K. Sarma, Henry VIII Clause in India, 15 Journal of the Indian
Law Institution, 460, 461 (1973)
- M.P. Jain & S.N. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law, 70 (6th edn.,
- C.K. Takwani, Lectures on Administrative Law, 82-83 (3rd edn., 1998)
- (1985) 3 SCC 116
- AIR 1986 SC 1571
- Eg., S. 128, The State Reorganization Act, 1956 (37 of 1956)
- Art. 392, the Constitution of India
- Pratik Datta, Amendments by Stealth MCA Resurrects Henry VIII's
Legacy, 49 EPW. 19, 20 (2015)
- Eg., S. 34, the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (13 of 1985).
- Mirko Picaric, An Old Absolutist Amending Clause as the „New‟
Instrument of Delegated Legislation, 4 The Theory And Practice of
- For example, the requirement of consent of a certain number of
people and of the people specific designation in the Executive before
passing any instruction by way of delegated legislation
- S. 41, the Pondicherry University Act, 1985 (53 of 1985); S. 65, the
Competition Act, 2002, 2003 (12 of 2003)
- Eg., S. 29, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986)
- 1967 SCR (1) 15
- section 37 gave power to the Central Government to make orders, not
inconsistent with the purposes of the Act as may have been necessary or
expedient for the removal of any difficulty or doubt and the order was
- Jalan Trading Co v. Mill Mazdoor Union, AIR 1967 SC 691.
- (1974) 1 SCC 598.
- Power to remove difficulties.- If any difficulty arises in giving
effect to the provisions of this Act, the Central Government may, by
order published in the Official Gazette, make such provisions not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as appears to it to be
necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty.
- 1993 SCR (3) 433.
- 42 Power to remove difficulties:
(1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this
Act in consequence of the transition to the said provisions from the
corresponding provisions of the Acts in force immediately before the
commencement of this Act, the State Government may, by order in the
Andhra Pradesh Gazette, make such provisions as appear to them to be
necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty.
(2) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this
Act (otherwise than in relation to the transition from the provisions of
the corresponding Act in force before the commencement of this Act), the
State Government may, by order make such provisions, not inconsistent
with the purposes of this Act, as appear to them to be necessary or
expedient for removing the difficulty.
- Though the Court in Bengal Iron case reads down the scope of Section
42 of the A.P. Act to be stating it cannot permit the amendment to the
provision of the statute, nevertheless, it did not explicitly base this
assertion on any of the precedents.
- Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh
v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh, 1990 (3) SCC 682.
- 1990 (3) SCC 682
- Applying the principle of validity of broadened or narrowed
interpretation of ratio decidendi by subsequent bench, as laid down in
Punjab Land Development Case.
- Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v Brojo Nath Ganguly, AIR
1986 SC 1571; West Bengal State Electricity Board v Desh Bandu Das,
(1958) 3 SCC 116.
- See TAKWANI, supra note 20; JAIN, supra note 17, at 48-49.
- See TAKWANI, Id., at 20; See JAIN, supra note 17.
- HOVEYDA ABBAS, RANJAY KUMAR & MOHAMMED AFTAB ALAM, INDIAN GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICS 225 (1st ed. 2011).
- Securities And Exchange Board Of India (Settlement Of Administrative
And Civil Proceedings) Regulations, 2013, Regulation 22 (Oct. 2013).
- See Seema Ray, FAQs and Clarifications, India Corp Law Blog, 2014.
- See S. 30 & 31, The Haryana Ceiling On Land Holdings Act, No. 26 of
- Madeva Upendra Sinai and Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 797
- RT. HON. THE LORD RIPON, Henry VIII Clauses, 10 STATUTE LAW REVIEW
205 (1989); CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, The Constitution and Prospective Henry
VIII Clauses, 9 JUD. REVIEW 17 (2004).
- Baijayant Jay Panda, Has The Indian Parliament Lost Its Relevance?,
BBC (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-34992800.