The legality and necessity of removing the doubt or difficulty clause, also known as the Henry VIII clause, has been a subject of controversy in several jurisdictions, one of the recent controversies being the presence of the Henry clause VIII in the Great Repeal Bill of Great Britain. In the Indian context, the legality of the Henry VIII broad clause remains an ambiguous question while the question of the legality of the Henry VIII narrow clause is decided. Jurisprudence on the old aspect of the Henry VIII clause has been incorrectly analyzed to a large extent both by academics and in reputable legal commentaries. Therefore, the authors wish to offer a correct legal interpretation of the judicial discourse on the issue.

Furthermore, in accordance with the political environment that currently exists in the Indian structure, given the increasing complexity and the considerable number of legislations which Parliament is called upon to deal with and the complex composition of the population of India, the narrow as large The Henry VIII clause becomes a question of necessity even if it can be viewed with suspicion. Therefore, whether it be the narrow clause or the broad Henry VIII clause, these clauses should not be declared void per se in the eyes of the law; rather, the legality of any Henry VIII clause in the main law should be assessed by the Indian justice system on a case-by-case basis.

Introduction
Recently, in March 2017, a big debate started about the UK repeal bill which aims to cut and paste EU laws as they already exist under the law. Britain's separation from the EU.[1] Furthermore, the existence of the Henry VIII clause in the bill was one of the most controversial aspects of the bill.[2] Along with this, once again, the debates surrounding the necessity and relevance of the Henry VIII clause as a form of delegated legislation comes into play.

The Henry VIII clause is a provision of a parent law empowering the executive to modify or repeal one or more laws through the enactment by it of delegated legislation.[3] It is because of this liberating nature of the Henry VIII clause for the executive that this clause has been a painful eye for the judiciary and other stakeholders in countries, including India.

In the Indian context, the context that explains the need for the Henry VIII clause is that, for example, recently the winter session of Parliament was made almost non-functional due to opposition protests against the government of the Center for his demonetization decisions.[4]

Similarly, in the recent past, there have been numerous cases of interruptions and blockages of the work of Parliament, whether due to the insensitive comments of a prominent leader of the ruling party against minority communities, or the suicide of a student (Rohith Vemula) [5].In addition, before this current Lok Sabha mandate, Parliament's operations continued at a lukewarm pace because of the fragile coalition put in place place under the government of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA).

Therefore, in these circumstances in India, the role of delegated legislation becomes more important. It’s one of the most crucial subjects of administrative law in any country, including India, to correctly identify the thin line that delimits the gap between authorized and excessive delegated legislation. It is in this broader question of the permissible scope of delegated legislation that the legality of the Henry VIII clause has been a bone of contention.

This article first develops the attributes of the Henry VIII clause and explains how the clause differs from other cases of excessive delegated legislation [Part II]. In addition, he explains the different forms in which this clause can be found [part II] and also the reasons why the Henry VIII clause is suspected in the Indian context [part III]. In Part IV, the authors analyze historical judicial verdicts under Indian administrative law in relation to the validity of the Henry VIII clause, thereby developing the position adopted in India regarding vires.

Attributes of the Henry VIII clause

A Henry VIII clause refers to the provision of a primary law which empowers the executive to enact derogatory legislation, incompatible or liable to change, with primary legislation or legislation [6].

A historical analysis of the Henry VIII clause tells us that it was originally contained in the Sewer Statute. At the time, the clause gave the sewer commissioner (the executive) the power to enact rules that have the effect of legislation, to levy taxes, and to impose penalties for contraventions.

Later, the proclamation statute provided that the king (the executive) would issue proclamations having the force of law. Both statutes were prevalent during the reign of an autocratic sovereign, King Henry VIII. The king asserted his powers in a purely authoritarian manner and `` modified '' the provisions according to his subjective understanding [7]. Accordingly, even today, whenever such broad powers are conferred on the executive, these are called Henry VIII powers.

The Henry VIII clause is different from the situation where the executive is conferred by the legislature with the power to extend the statute already in force in one area to another area with the power to modify which allows the necessary adjustments to be made. existing law to better meet the requirements of the new territory [8].

Indeed, in such cases, modifications are made to the new functioning of the mother law in the new field instead of modifying the original law. However, under the Henry VIII clause, the executive is armed to modify the original statue. In addition, the Henry VIII clause is also different from the clause in parent legislation which confers regulatory powers on the executive in order to give effect to the parent law.[9]

In addition, the delegation of legislative power which takes place under of Henry's law Clause VIII must be distinguished from several other cases of excessive delegated legislation. Indeed, it is sometimes wrongly presumed that any clause present in the parent statute, conferring unguided decision-making powers on the executive is a Henry VIII clause; or that any case of excessive delegated legislation constitutes the Henry VIII clause.

For example, it has often been misunderstood in cases like W.B. SEB v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh, [10] and Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly, [11] that the attribution of arbitrary powers to executive officials by reason of the presence of a regulation, makes the regulation the Henry VIII clause.

It should be noted that the Henry VIII clause is neither equivalent to excessive delegation, nor always an example of excessive delegation; although it may, as a clause, be more likely to be an example of excessive delegation. The Henry VIII clause often exists in the form of a removal of doubt or difficulty clause. The clause can be found in a plethora of laws in India [12], including in the Indian Constitution [13].

Different forms of the Henry VIII clause

In several scholarly writings and legal commentaries, two types of the Henry VIII clause have been identified: the broad and narrow clause.[14] The narrow Henry VIII clause allows the executive to enact delegated legislation as long as this legislation does not contravene or derogate the provisions of the Parents Act. However, in the case of a Henry VIII broad clause, the Executive is authorized to promulgate delegated legislation which derogates from the provisions of the parent law.

However, the authors suggest that for a better understanding of the Henry VIII clause, a three-level classification system should be followed: a wider, broad and narrow Henry VIII clause. The general Henry VIII clause should imply situations in which the clause present in the parents 'law empowers the executive power to legislate not only in violation of the provisions of the parents' law, but also of any other law in force in a place. ; the only limitation of the regulatory power being that the policy and essence of the parent law or any other law thereby departed from are not changed. An example of such a clause can be found in the Constitution of India under section 372. In addition, there are other criteria for identifying the different forms of the Henry VIII clauses.

If the objective of delegation is taken as a criterion, the Henry VIII clause may have the objective of facilitating the transition from old legislation to new law on the same subject. In addition, the Henry VIII clause may also aim to allow flexibility in the implementation of any new law. As a third category, the Henry VIII clause could be a general clause which exists under the parent law in perpetuity to remove doubts or difficulties that may arise at any time after the promulgation of the mother law as long as it remains in force [15].

In addition, if the existence of a deadline is taken into account, the Henry VIII clause may be of the type limited by duration:

mainly during the first years of the promulgation of the parent law. [16] These types of Henry VIII clauses are also called sunset provisions. However, Henry VIII clauses cannot have any predefined time limitation.

If the purpose granted is taken as a parameter, then there is a type of Henry VIII clause which excludes the scope of judicial control from delegated legislation promulgated in application of the powers conferred on it, while the other type leaves room for control. judicial. Furthermore, in some cases, the Henry VIII clause defines the procedure to be followed by the executive in the exercise of the delegated legislative powers conferred by the Henry VIII clause.[17]

However, in other cases, such procedural directives do not are not established by the Henry Clause VIII.[18] In addition, there is, on the one hand, the Henry VIII clause which requires to deposit the delegated legislation made in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Henry VIII clause, before each of the chambers of Parliament [19]; and on the other hand, the Henry VIII clause which does not contain such requirements for presentation before each chamber of the Union legislator. Finally, there is another basis for classifying the Henry VIII clause which will be discussed in Part V of the document.

Reasons for Viewing the Henry VIII Clause With Suspicion

Lord Mayor once stated the following regarding the validity of Henry VIII clause:
You can be sure that when these Henry VIII clauses are introduced they will always be said to be necessary. William Pitt warned us how to treat such a plea with disdain. Necessity is the justification for every infringement of human liberty: it is the argument of tyrants, the creed of slaves.

Several reasons have been identified explaining the necessity and the justification for considering the Henry VIII clause with suspicion. First, the power to amend or repeal any law is considered an essential legislative function, and therefore the delegation of that power is considered to be legally unjustified. Indeed, the delegation of the power to modify or repeal a statute to the executive can be an unhealthy practice in a democracy, because it is only through parliamentary debates and discussions that amendments or repeals must be introduced into any legislation. Furthermore, it is felt that the executive should not have the power to modify or repeal because, unlike Parliament, it is not directly accountable to the public and has not instilled in it fear loss of public support.

In addition, there is also apprehension against the existence of the Henry VIII clause in the original legislation because Parliament does not have the power to directly amend any delegated legislation which has been adopted; neither can Parliament decide on the duration or entry into force of this delegated legislation. Parliament can only refuse the continued application of any delegated legislation; Parliament cannot amend / rectify it.

Therefore, by the time such a discontinuance decision is made by Parliament, much damage would have already accumulated. In addition, the frequency with which the Henry VIII clause is revoked by the executive is another concern. Therefore, it is felt that the Henry VIII clause should not be allowed as a tool of excuse in the hands of the executive to do the job of legislating poorly, and then becoming Scottish despite legislation coming into force. poorly drafted. . These are the reasons identified so far to justify the opposition to the existence of the Henry VIII clause in the parent law.

However, there is another factor that the authors seek to highlight to explain the skepticism that exists against the presence of the Henry VIII clause. Reason has its basis in psychology. The fault lies in the nomenclature Henry VIII clause used for the clause present in the mother legislation and which gives wide discretionary powers to the executive power to modify or repeal any provision of the mother law. Indeed, given the history of King Henry VIII's rule, the use of the term Henry VIII clause not only inadvertently invokes a negative bias, but is also misleading.

The nomenclature is misleading mainly for three reasons:

1. First, when Henry VIII was given broad executive powers to modify or repeal the statute in order to carry out his own will, those powers were broad enough to repeal all or part of the laws promulgated in his jurisdiction. On the other hand, the so-called Henry VIII clause within the limits of current administrative law, generally does not confer such broad powers on the executive.
2. Second, in his time, King Henry VIII has not been prevented from even modifying the policy or essential features of the parent law or any other law in force. However, such a limitation usually exists in the so-called Henry VIII clause of the present day.
3. Third, the extensive powers of King Henry VIII during his reign could not be attributed solely to his powers to modify a status; instead, it happened because of the simultaneous allocation of judicial powers to him too.
   
   On the other hand, today's so-called Henry VIII clause does not generally confer such jurisdictional powers on the executive. Consequently, an analogy of the clause which gives broad powers to the Executive to modify or abrogate any status of tyranny that King Henry VIII exercised during his reign, through this clause, would be inappropriate.

The Validity of the Henry VIII Clause: Examining Case Law

Since the Henry VIII clause exists in the parent law in the form of a doubt or difficulty raising clause, the vires of this clause have been challenged on several occasions before the courts. It is widely accepted that the Indian judicial system has accepted the legality of the narrow and broad clauses of Henry VIII. However, according to the authors, the judiciary has unambiguously accepted the validity of the Henry VIII narrow clause while clouds of ambiguity reign over the validity of the Henry VIII broad clauses. In support of their assertion, the authors in this section analyze the decisive verdicts rendered on this issue.

The first of the most significant cases in this area was Jalan Trading Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Mill Mazdoor Sabha [20], in which section 37 of the 1965 Premium Payment Act was challenged on the grounds that it was a Henry VIII clause and therefore an example of excessive delegated legislation. Section 37 [21] conferred on the central government the power to take measures, not inconsistent with the objectives of the law, to remove difficulties or doubts, and this exercise of executive powers could not be subject to judicial control.

Since section 37 authorized the executive to go so far as to amend the parent law, section 37 is an example of a Henry VIII clause. The majority (3: 2) decided in the case that section 37 was not valid because it was a case of excessive delegated legislation.

The majority judgment was written by Justice Shah. He said:

Condition of applicability of section 37 stems from doubt or difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. By providing that the order made must not be inconsistent with the object of the Act, s. 37 is not saved from the vice of delegation of legislative power…. The power to remove doubt or difficulty by amending the provisions of the law would in essence amount to the exercise of a legislative power and cannot be delegated to an executive power.

Section (2) of s. 37, which aims to finalize the order of the central government, accentuates the vice of sub. s. (1), since, by enacting this provision, the government becomes the sole judge if difficulties or doubts have arisen to give effect to the provisions of the law, if it is necessary or expedient to remove the doubts or difficulties, and if the adopted provision is not incompatible with the objectives of the Law. [22] \

This implies that in the Jalan Trading case, the broad Henry VIII clause was declared unauthorized by reason of the fact that it constitutes an example of excessively delegated legislation by its very existence.

Later in Gammon India Ltd. vs. Union of India (hereinafter Gammon India) [23], section 34 [24] of the Indian Contract Labor (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 was challenged on the grounds that it was '' excessive delegated legislation. Article 34 (Clause of removal of doubt or difficulty) is an example of a narrow clause of Henry VIII, because it does not confer on the central government the power to modify the provision of the mother law, under the pretext of removing the doubt or the difficulty. The Court, while confirming the validity of section 34, distinguished the facts of the Jalan Trading case by declaring that, unlike the former case, section 34 in the present case did not contain the finality clause and did not allow modification of the provisions of the law on parents or any other law.

There are therefore two elements that draw attention to the Gammon India decision:

1. First, although the bank pronounced the verdict to be the constitutional bank itself, it did not set aside the decision in Jalan Trading; rather, he applied the ratio of the Jalan Trading case and distinguished the Gammon India case on his facts.
2. Second, it partially misinterpreted the Jalan Trading case, suggesting that the latter case had declared section 37 of the Premium Payment Act invalid for two reasons; that which it conferred the finality on the decision of the powers of decision of the executive and secondly that it allowed the executive to modify the legal dispositions. Indeed, in Gammon, India, the Court meant that, according to the Jalan Trading report, the mere existence of the Henry VIII clause does not in itself make the clause invalid, since it is a example of excessive delegated legislation; it is only when this clause is combined with other aggravating factors such as the condition of purpose attached to the broad Henry VIII clause that the clause becomes invalid because it is an example of excessive delegated legislation.

However, contrary to the interpretation of the majority judgment in the Gammon India case, the Court in the Jalan Trading case said:

The power to remove doubt or difficulty by amending the provisions of the law would be tantamount to in substance to the exercise of legislative power and that cannot be delegated to an executive authority. Section (2) of s. 37, which seeks to make the central government order in such cases, ultimately accentuates the vice in sub. s. (1).

A careful reading of the quoted part of the verdict of Jalan Trading would reveal that any allocation of power to remove doubt or difficulty by allowing the modification of the provisions of the law in itself is inadmissible and that the presence of a finality clause under of section 37 in that case was only a question of emphasis rather than a causation of the decision made in the case. Consequently, the correct interpretation of the Jalan Trading case would be that the general Henry VIII clause is in itself void since it constitutes an example of excessive delegated legislation. After the Gammon India case, another historic case on the question of the legality of the Henry VIII clause is identified as Bengal Iron Corpn. v. CTO [25] (hereinafter, Bengal Iron Corporation).

In this case, section 42 of the A.P. Act was challenged and it was disputed that it opened the way to excessive delegated legislation. Section 42 [26] (Clause of doubt removal) provides that if difficulties arise during the transition from the old law to the new law, the executive power can establish rules to remove the difficulty and derogate from the provisions of the parent (new ) law. However, in all other cases where elimination of difficulties is required, the executive may establish rules which are not incompatible with the provisions of the original law. This implies that Section 42 is an example of the broad and narrow clauses of Henry VIII. The Court, while confirming the validity of the article, declared that:

However, in a later decision in Gammon India Limited .., it was explained ... that the decision in Jalan Trading was influenced by the words at the end of section 37 of the premium payment law that the direction from the government issued under it was final. It is purported to give effect to the provisions of the law, it was found. Section 42 (2) of the AP law

This therefore shows that the Court in Bengal Iron read the Gammon India case as if it sought to suggest that it was only the final clause of the Clause of removal of doubt or difficulty That influenced the court's decision in Jalan Trading. the case, which, for the reasons stated by the authors in the previous analysis of the Gammon India case, is a misleading legal interpretation[27]. Therefore, in the Bengal Iron case, the Court misread not only the Jalan Trading case, but also the interpretation of the Jalan Business case in the Gammon India case.

However, it has been established in cases such as the development of the territory of Punjab [28], that the ratio decidendi of a previous case can be further enlarged by the judge before whom the case is cited as precedent and, in these cases, the he expanded interpretation remains valid until further development. in law occurs. However, there is no easy answer to the question of how far such expansion is possible. Faithfulness to the text and to the fixed gaze would require that such a reinterpretation of the previous verdict should not deviate too much from the initial judgment [29].

Given these rules regarding stare decisis and ratio decidendi and the interpretation adopted in Gammon India and Bengal Iron of the reasoning given in Jalan Trading, two separate conclusions are possible regarding the validity of the general Henry VIII clause in the Indian context. First, that until the Supreme Court in any subsequent case correctly reinterprets the reasoning given in Jalan Trading to justify the invalidity of the Henry VIII clause, the reasoning in Jalan Trading reinterpreted in the Gammon India and Bengal Iron case prevails due to which it can be argued that the broadest The Henry VIII clause is legal in India.[30] Second, it can be said that the interpretations of the reasoning given in the Jalan Trading case that the broader Henry VIII clause is invalid in Gammon India and Bengal Iron are nothing but obiter.

Indeed, in the latter two cases, the legality of the broader Henry VIII clause was not an issue; instead, in both cases, the issue revolved around the legality of the Henry VIII narrow clause alone [31]. When adopting the second interpretation, it follows that the broader Henry VIII clause is illegal in India. Several legal commentaries have for the most part adopted the first approach, but through an extremely superficial [32] and sometimes incorrect [33] analysis. Furthermore, under the Henry VIII clause, power can only be exercised by the executive to remove the doubts or difficulties when such doubts or difficulties arise in relation to the parent law and not outside it; and the existence of such doubts and difficulties should be objectively verifiable.

Lessons for the Judiciary And For Other Stakeholders

However, this discussion of the legality or illegality of the Indian judiciary to incorporate a Henry VIII clause into the parent law has become largely theoretical. The reason is that the legislator has discovered indirect means of enforcing the broad Henry VIII clause.

This is done in two ways:

1. First, the legislator drafts the main law in a skeletal manner [34]. Therefore, individual arrangements are generally defined. In this way, the Legislative Assembly ensures that the executive can exercise significant discretion despite the use of the narrow Henry VIII clause in the main law in the form of the Suppression of Doubts and Difficulties provision.
2. Second, these days, the subtle and newly emerging manifestation of the broad Henry VIII clause is the power, under the original law, to allow the executive to clarify or interpret the meaning of the provisions given in the original law [35]. the executive to modify the provisions of the main law whenever the existence of an ambiguity in the mother law provides for such a scope [36].

Indeed, the power that the broad Henry VIII clause could possibly confer on the executive is practically exercised by the executive, whatever the ambiguity that continues to prevail as to the judicial position taken as to the legality of the broad clause Henry VIII.

Therefore, it is suggested that the judiciary unambiguously accept the prima facie validity of the general Henry VIII clause. In addition, the judiciary should rather decide on the validity of the general Henry VIII clause on a case-by-case basis, where the decision on validity should be influenced by factors, such as the nature of the law in which the Henry VIII clause is incorporated, the form of the Henry VIII clause thus enacted and the scope of the Henry VIII clause.

Furthermore, it is crucial that the validity of the Henry VIII broad clause is recognized, because if the discretion conferred by the Henry VIII clause is not broad enough to allow the executive to modify the provisions of the law (provided that the essence or the purpose of the law remains unchanged) then there is a utility independent of the Henry VIII clause will be completely absent.

The reason for this is that the narrow clause of Henry VIII is in fact similar to the power to make rules for bringing into force the provisions of the law .[37] It is because of this nature of the narrow clause Henry VIII that some scholars refuse to grant Henry VIII Clause status to the so-called Henry VIII narrow clause.

In addition, the main reason for incorporating the Henry VIII clause into the parent law is to provide for contingencies of lack of foresight on the part of the legislator despite the fact that he exercises all reasonable care and investigations [38] and contingencies technical and complex details involved in the new legislation. Therefore, the broad Henry VII clause is a necessary evil to provide flexibility [39].

Currently, Parliament has a variety of issues on which to enact laws and it is overworked with enactment and amendment. It should not be forgotten that the disturbances in Parliament have become a common landscape [40] and that coalition politics are increasing, which has become difficult to reach the consensus necessary for drafting or amending laws. In light of these circumstances, the Court should unequivocally legally recognize the broad Henry VIII clause.

Conclusion
Ambiguity regarding the validity of the broad Henry VIII clause in India continues to prevail. However, the authors believe that no form of the Henry VIII clause should be declared ipso facto invalid by the judiciary. Negative stereotypes related to the Henry VIII clause should be removed. The change can start by modifying the nomenclature of the clause in the first place.

Ideally, the Henry VIII clause should have certain limits as to its scope. These constraints may exist in the form of time restrictions, procedural guidelines, a ban on changing the essence or underlying policy of the parent law, the obligation to table the delegated law thus promulgated before Parliament and / or limit the power to modify the provisions of the law to one or more laws, among other possibilities. Most importantly, the authority that can exercise the powers of the Henry VIII clause on behalf of the executive must be carefully chosen.

Consequently, the debate in the field of Indian administrative law must move from the elementary question concerning the legality of the narrow and broad clause of Henry VIII to a judgment on the validity of this clause on a case by case basis. Indeed, deciding on the vires of the Henry VIII clause without looking at the context of its application is like reading the label on a pickle bottle which has no meaning in itself unless it is attached to the bottle on which label is placed.

References:

1. Ben Riley-Smith, Theresa May to Unveil Plans for Converting EU Law Via „Henry VIII Clauses‟ Later This Month, The Telegraph (18-3-2017)
2. Patrick Daly, Brexit: Are the Secondary „Henry VIII Clauses' a Step Too Far?, Grimsby Telegraph (5-4-2017)
3. Press Trust of India, BJP MPs Protest Disruption of Parliament by Congress Members, The Indian Express (5-12-2014)
4. PTI, Parliament Continues to be Stalled, Deccan Herald (5-12-2016)
5. Rohith Vemula Case A „Virtual Murder‟, Probe into Suicide „Farce‟: Opposition on Smriti Irani's Reply, Zee News (26-2-2016)
6. See Henry VIII Clauses, UK Parliament
7. N.A.K. Sarma, Henry VIII Clause in India, 15 Journal of the Indian Law Institution, 460, 461 (1973)
8. M.P. Jain & S.N. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law, 70 (6th edn., 2007)
9. C.K. Takwani, Lectures on Administrative Law, 82-83 (3rd edn., 1998)
10. (1985) 3 SCC 116
11. AIR 1986 SC 1571
12. Eg., S. 128, The State Reorganization Act, 1956 (37 of 1956)
13. Art. 392, the Constitution of India
14. Pratik Datta, Amendments by Stealth MCA Resurrects Henry VIII's Legacy, 49 EPW. 19, 20 (2015)
15. Eg., S. 34, the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (13 of 1985).
16. Mirko Picaric, An Old Absolutist Amending Clause as the „New‟ Instrument of Delegated Legislation, 4 The Theory And Practice of Legislation (2016).
17. For example, the requirement of consent of a certain number of people and of the people specific designation in the Executive before passing any instruction by way of delegated legislation
18. S. 41, the Pondicherry University Act, 1985 (53 of 1985); S. 65, the Competition Act, 2002, 2003 (12 of 2003)
19. Eg., S. 29, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986)
20. 1967 SCR (1) 15
21. section 37 gave power to the Central Government to make orders, not inconsistent with the purposes of the Act as may have been necessary or expedient for the removal of any difficulty or doubt and the order was made final
22. Jalan Trading Co v. Mill Mazdoor Union, AIR 1967 SC 691.
23. (1974) 1 SCC 598.
24. Power to remove difficulties.- If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, make such provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as appears to it to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty.
25. 1993 SCR (3) 433.
26. 42 Power to remove difficulties:
    (1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act in consequence of the transition to the said provisions from the corresponding provisions of the Acts in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, the State Government may, by order in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, make such provisions as appear to them to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty.
    
    (2) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act (otherwise than in relation to the transition from the provisions of the corresponding Act in force before the commencement of this Act), the State Government may, by order make such provisions, not inconsistent with the purposes of this Act, as appear to them to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty.
27. Though the Court in Bengal Iron case reads down the scope of Section 42 of the A.P. Act to be stating it cannot permit the amendment to the provision of the statute, nevertheless, it did not explicitly base this assertion on any of the precedents.
28. Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh, 1990 (3) SCC 682.
29. 1990 (3) SCC 682
30. Applying the principle of validity of broadened or narrowed interpretation of ratio decidendi by subsequent bench, as laid down in Punjab Land Development Case.
31. Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v Brojo Nath Ganguly, AIR 1986 SC 1571; West Bengal State Electricity Board v Desh Bandu Das, (1958) 3 SCC 116.
32. See TAKWANI, supra note 20; JAIN, supra note 17, at 48-49.
33. See TAKWANI, Id., at 20; See JAIN, supra note 17.
34. HOVEYDA ABBAS, RANJAY KUMAR & MOHAMMED AFTAB ALAM, INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 225 (1st ed. 2011).
35. Securities And Exchange Board Of India (Settlement Of Administrative And Civil Proceedings) Regulations, 2013, Regulation 22 (Oct. 2013).
36. See Seema Ray, FAQs and Clarifications, India Corp Law Blog, 2014.
37. See S. 30 & 31, The Haryana Ceiling On Land Holdings Act, No. 26 of 1972.
38. Madeva Upendra Sinai and Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 797
39. RT. HON. THE LORD RIPON, Henry VIII Clauses, 10 STATUTE LAW REVIEW 205 (1989); CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, The Constitution and Prospective Henry VIII Clauses, 9 JUD. REVIEW 17 (2004).
40. Baijayant Jay Panda, Has The Indian Parliament Lost Its Relevance?, BBC (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-34992800.