"The position which emerges from the above discussion is that the key-words of the second proviso govern each and every clause of that proviso and leave no scope for any kind of opportunity to be given to a government servant. The phrase "this clause shall not apply" is mandatory and not directory.
It is in the nature of a Constitutional prohibitory injunction restraining the disciplinary authority from holding an inquiry under Article 311(2) or from giving any kind of opportunity to the concerned government servant. There is thus no scope for introducing into 214 the second proviso some kind of inquiry or opportunity by a process of inference or implication.
The maxim "expressum facit cessare tacitum" ("when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded") applies to the case. As pointed out by this Court in B. Shankara Rao Badam & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Anr., [1969] 3 S.C.R. 1, 12, this well-known maxim is a principle of logic and common sense and not merely a technical rule of construction.
The second proviso expressly mentions that clause (2) shall not apply where one of the clauses of that proviso becomes applicable. This express mention excludes everything that clause (2) contains and there can be no scope for once again introducing the opportunities provided by clause (2) or any one of them into the second proviso."
"When something is specified in an Article of the Constitution it is to be taken, as a matter of initial assessment, as nothing more was intended. In this case it is the territory of India that is specified by the phrase "for the whole or any part of the territory of India." "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius"- the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
In this case Parliament has been granted powers to make laws "for" a specific territory - and that is India or any part thereof; by implication, one may not read that the Parliament has been granted powers to make laws "for" territories beyond India."
"32. ….It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like "alone", "only", "exclusive" or "exclusive jurisdiction" have not been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference.
The intention of the parties-by having Clause 18 in the agreement -is clear and unambiguous that the courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like Clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another.
By making a provision that the agreement is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner."
"From the foregoing decisions it can be reasonably deduced that where such an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction.
As regards construction of the ouster clause when words like 'alone', 'only ', 'exclusive' and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cass es the maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius'-expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another."
"There is yet an uncontroverted legal principle that when the statute provides for a particular procedure, the authority has to follow the same and cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the same. In other words, where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way and not contrary to it at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden.
The aforesaid settled legal proposition is based on a legal maxim "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius", meaning thereby that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular way, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner and following any other course is not permissible."
"We have already extracted section 42 of the Act and Rule 18 of the Rules. It would be clear that though section 42 envisaged orders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition separately, Rule 18 provides for limitation only in respect of an application under that section in a pro- ceeding where an order was passed.
There is the maxim ex- pressio unius est exclusio alterius--expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. When mention has been made only of 'Orders', the inference would be that preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition are 589 excluded."
"The Defaulting Committee has also the right to recover all moneys, securities and other assets, due, payable or deliverable to the defaulters by any other Trading Member. By expressly providing for these powers in the Committee, it would follow that other powers are excluded on the principle "expressio unius est exclusio alterius". Thus the assets which may be called in or realized or recovered by the Defaulting Committee do not include monies payable under a contract with a third party nor monies the recovery of which are yet to be made."
"The lessee under the abovesaid terms of lease deed is in fact precluded from using the house for any purpose other than residential purpose. This interpretation would be further supported by the phraseology of the relevant clause 1 (vii) of Appendix XIII, cited above, which contains no reference to the word 'residential'.
As a canon of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, what is expressly mentioned in one place but not in another must be taken to have been deliberately omitted. The argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant proceeds on assumption that a house by its meaning and definition is capable of being used exclusively for residential purposes and not for non-residential purposes which is not a correct interpretation of sub-clause (vii) of Clause I of Appendix XIII."
"22. This is a case where the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (meaning whatever has not been included has impliedly been excluded) would apply. In G.O. dated 07th April, 2008, the words "after acquiring postgraduate degree" are specifically included in the column for experience qua eligibility criteria for appointment on the posts of Director of Medical Education and Joint Director of Medical Education/Principals of Medical Colleges, i.e., posts in Branch – I i.e. Administrative Cadre.
If, indeed, it were the intention of the executive that aspirants for the said post of Associate Professor, or, for that matter, for the post of Professor were required to have physical teaching experience in the feeder posts for specified number of years "after acquiring postgraduate degree", it defies reason as to why the same qualification was not included for appointments on promotion to posts borne in Branch – II i.e.
Teaching Cadre but included for the posts borne in Branch – I i.e. Administrative Cadre. The submission on behalf of Dr. Jyotish that posts borne in the Administrative Cadre have responsibilities different from those borne in the Teaching Cadre, though attractive at first blush, pales into insignificance primarily for the reason that insistence of physical teaching experience of a specified number of years with a particular postgraduate or super speciality degree would seem to be more required and demanding for appointment on posts in the Teaching Cadre rather than those in the Administrative Cadre.
We are, thus, minded to hold that the exclusion of the words "after acquiring postgraduate degree" is deliberate and conscious and the contentions advanced by Mr. Chitambaresh, to the contrary, do not commend acceptance."
"According to the High Court, the words expressly mentioned in one place but not in another place must be taken to have been deliberately omitted on the well settled principle of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius."
"When the new Act contains a repealing section mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, the presumption against implied repeal of other laws is further strengthened on the princile expressio unius (persone vel rei) est exclusio alterius. (The express intention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another) as illuminatingly stated in Garnett vs. Bradley [1878] 3 A.C. 944 (HL). The continuance of existing legislation, in the absence of an express provision of repeal by implication lies on the party asserting the same"
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