Special Leave Petition - How to File SLP

Illustrative Instances of Interference Under Article 136

The scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the Court has already been discussed in sub-chapter (b) above. Since the Court has a wide discretion under Article 136, it is difficult to elaborate all grounds for interference. A few of the grounds on which the Supreme Court may interfere with the orders of the courts below are elucidated hereinafter by way of illustration:
Absence of Speaking Order
In Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Workers' Union, the Court observed that judicial and quasi-judicial authorities from whose decisions an appeal lies to it by special leave under Article 136, should always give reasons in support of their conclusion. The recording of reasons is essential for variousreasons. First, it is calculated to prevent unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching the conclusions. The very search for reasons will put the authority on the alert and minimise the chances of unconscious infiltration of personal as or unfairness in the conclusion. The authority will adduce reasons which will be regarded as fair and legitimate by a reasonable man, and will discard irrelevant or extraneous considerations, Second, it is a well known principle that justice should not only be done, but should also appear to be done. Unreasoned conclusions may be just, but they may not appear to be just to those who read them. A judgment which does not disclose the reasons, will be of little assistance to the Court. The Court will have to wade through the entire record and find for itself whether the decision in appeal is right or wrong.

In Baboo v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court observed that when in a criminal trial a number of accused are convicted of an offence under Section 302 IPC. and there is only one appeal on facts to the High Court, ordinarily it is expected that the contentions raised by the accused would receive serious consideration at the hands of the High Court It is undoubtedly open to the High Court to dismiss such an appeal in limine but it must be by a speaking order.

Similarly, in Rama v. State of Rajasthan, the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136, remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal, when the High Court had affirmed the conviction by merely observing:
"After re appreciation of evidence and re-scrutiny of the record, 1 find that there is no error apparent in the finding recorded by the learned Judge. Therefore there is no reason to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the learned Judge."

Emphasizing the need to give reasons even in case of dismissal of a writ petition, the Supreme Court in Vasudeo Vishwanath Saraf v. New Education Institute, has observed:

It is a cardinal principle of law which governs our policy that the court including Writ Court is required to record reasons while disposing f a writ petition in order to enable the litigants more particularly the aggrieved party to know the reasons which weighed with the mind of the court in determining the questions of facts and law raised in the writ petition or in the action brought. This is imperative for the fair and equitable administration of justice. More so when there is statutory provision for appeal to the higher court in the hierarchy of courts in order to enable the superior court or the appellate court to know or to apprised of the reasons which impelled the court to pass the order in question. This recording of reasons in deciding cases or applications affecting rights of parties is also a mandatory requirement to be fulfilled in consonance with the principles of natural justice. It is no answer at all to this legal position that for the purpose of expeditious disposal of cases, a laconic order like 'dismissed' or 'rejected' will be made without passing a reasoned order or a speaking order. In other fair play and justice demands that justice must not only be done but must seem to have been done"

Interference With Findings of Fact

It has been the practice of the Supreme Court not to embark upon an enquiry into facts and evidence of cases in a special leave petition. The practice which has been followed by the Federal Court and the Supreme Court in respect of the interference with the findings and the appreciation of the evidence has been adopted from the Privy Council in Bibhabati Devi v/s Ramendra Narayan Roy, where it summed up the principles as follows:
(1) The practice applies in the case of all the various judicatures whose final tribunal is the Board.

(2) It applies to the concurrent findings of facts of two courts, and not to the concurrent findings of the Judges who compose such courts Therefore a dissent by a member of the appellate court does not obviate the practice.

(3) A difference in the reasons which bring the Judges to the same finding of fact will not obviate the practice.

(4) In order to obviate the practice, there must be some miscarriage of justice or violation of some principle of law or procedure Miscarriage of justice means such a departure from the rule which permeate all judicial procedure as to make that which happened not in the proper sense of the word judicial procedure at all. The violation of some principle of law or procedure must be such an erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition of law be corrected, the finding cannot stand; or it may be the neglect of some principle of law or procedure whose application will have the same effect. The question whether there is evidence on which the courts arrive at their finding is such a question of law.

(5) The question of admissibility of evidence is a proposition of law, but it must be such as to affect materially the finding. The question of the value of the evidence is not a sufficient reason for departure from practice.

(6) The practice is not a cast-iron one, and the foregoing statement asto reasons which will justify departure is illustrative only, and there may occur cases of such an unusual nature as will constrain the Board to depart from the practice.

(7) The practice relates to the findings of the courts below, which are generally stated in the order of the court, but may be stated findings on the issue before the Courts in the judgments, provided that they are directly related to the final decision of the court.

In Nihar Singh v. State of Punjah, the Court had an occasion to discuss its powers to interfere with the findings of fact and to reassess the evidence in hearing appeals under Article 136. In the words of the Court:

"Article 136 of the Constitution is couched in the widest phraseology. This Court's jurisdiction is limited only by its discretion. It can, therefore, in its discretion, entertain an appeal and exercise all the powers of an appellate court in respect of judgments, decrees, determinations, sentences or orders mentioned thereinBut this wide jurisdiction has to be regulated by the practice of this Court."

The Court further held that the practice of the Privy Council followed by the Federal Court and the Supreme Court is not to interfere on questions of fact except in exceptional cases when the finding is such that it shocks the conscience of the Court or by disregard to the forms of the legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done.

Although normally the Supreme Court is reluctant to interfere with concurrent findings of fact, if essential ingredients necessary for the finding of a fact have not in fact been found by the courts below, then the Court is bound to examine the question whether injustice or wrong is done. The burden of showing that a concurrent finding of two or more courts or tribunals is manifestly unjust lies on the petitioner. But once that burden is discharged it is not only the right but the duty of the Supreme Court to remedy the injustice.

In another case, the Court has observed:
"It has been ruled in many cases before that this Court will not reassess the evidence at large, particularly when it has been concurrently accepted by the High Court and the court or courts below. In other words, this Court does not form a fresh opinion as to the innocence or the guilt of the accused. It accepts the appraisal of the evidence in the High Court and the court or courts below. Therefore before this Court interferes something more must be shown, such as that there has been in trial a violation of the principles of natural justice or a deprivation of the rights of the accused or a misreading of vital evidence or an improper reception or rejection of evidence which, if discarded or received, would leave the conviction unsupportable, or that the court or courts have committed an error of the law or of the forms of legal process or procedure by which justice itself has failed."

In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, the Court summarized the circumstances when concurrent findings of the courts below in a criminal matter can be reopened by the Supreme Court in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution:
(1) that the finding is based on no evidence, or
(2) that the finding is perverse, it being such as no reasonable person could have arrived at even if the evidence was taken at its face value, or
(3) the finding is based and built on inadmissible evidence, which evidence, if excluded from vision, would negate the prosecution case or substantially discredit or impair it, or
(4) some vital piece of evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the convict has been overlooked, disregarded wrongly discarded."

The Court will not interfere unless the findings are vitiated by errors of law or the conclusions reached by the Courts below are so patently opposed to well-established principles as to amount to a miscarriage of justice. The Court will interfere in a case where it finds that the appellate Court has not at all applied its judicial mind to the appreciation of the evidence and grave injustice has resulted therefrom. Where the Court is satisfied that the findings are vitiated by errors of law or that the conclusions reached by the courts below are so patently opposed to well-established principles of judicial approach, that they can be characterized as wholly unjustified and even perverse, it will reassess the evidence and interfere.

In a case where there were suspicious circumstances regarding execution and attestation of a will noted by the High Court and some difference in the approach of the two Judges composing the Bench of the High Court existed, the Supreme Court allowed the counsel of the parties to go into the entire evidence so that it could ascertain whether the High Court reached the right conclusion or not.

In Indira kaur v. Sheo Lal Kapoor, the Court observed that there are no fetters on the powers of the Court under Article 136 to re-examine the finding and if the Court is satisfied that great injustice has been done it is not only the right but also the duty of the Court to reverse the error and the injustice and upset the finding, notwithstanding the fact that the same has been affirmed thrice. It is not the number of times that a finding has been reiterated that matters; what really matters is whether the finding is manifestly an unreasonable and unjust one in the context of evidence on record. The Court observed:

"Article 136 of the Constitution does not forge any such fetters expressly. It does not oblige this Court to fold its hands and become a helpless spectator even when this Court perceives that a manifest injustice has been occasioned. If and when the court is satisfied that great injustice has been done it is not only the 'right' but also the 'duty of this Court to reverse the error and the injustice and to upset the finding notwithstanding the fact that it has been affirmed thrice. There is no warrant to import the concept of the conclusiveness of divorce on the utterance of Talaq' thrice in interpreting the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136. It is not the number of times that a finding has been reiterated that matters. What really matters is whether the finding is manifestly an unreasonable, and unjust one in the context of evidence on record. It is no doubt true that this Court will unlock the door opening into the area of facts only sparingly and only when injustice is perceived to have been perpetuated. But in any view of the matter, there is no jurisdictional lock which cannot be opened in the face of grave injustice".

Sometimes, what amounts to a question of fact has itself been a subject matter of dispute.

Whether the witness should or should not be believed is prima facie a matter for courts of fact to determine and it is a question of fact. Whether a particular accused is guilty of criminal conspiracy along with the other for the commission of the offence is a question of fact. Whether the parties have entered into any wagering transaction is a question of fact.

Whether the appellants are hereditary tenants or not is a question of fact and the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts.53 Whether the consideration mentioned in a deed of sale had been paid or not is a question of fact, and also whether there was sufficient nucleus of joint family property for acquiring new properties by the manager of a joint Hindu family is a question of fact.

Whether a deity was not merely a family deity in which the public had no interest, and that the properties given, to the deity constituted a religious and charitable endowment of a public nature are findings of fact. The Court further held that a mistaken inference from documents is no less a finding of fact if there is no misconstruction of the documents. Whether at a partition between members of a joint Hindu family certain property was left undivided is a question of fact. The finding that the plaintiff had attained majority more than three years prior to the suit is one of fact.

A finding of the authority hearing objections to a scheme under Section 68-F of the Motor Vehicles Act that there was due service of notice on objectors was a finding of fact. The finding that the appellant put the signatures of his father, who was already dead, on the relevant documents attested them and got the securities transferred in the name of the father and received the money from the Post Office are findings of fact. The question whether there was a go-slow during a certain period is a question of fact, and where the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that there was a go-slow during the period, ordinarily the Supreme Court will not go into the findings.

Interference With Exercise of Discretion of Courts Below:
(a) In the matter of sentence or fine
though nothing prevents the Supreme Court from interfering with the sentence or fine imposed by the lower courts, it does not easily do so. As a matter of practice, the Supreme Court does not grant special leave where the question is only one of excessive sentence or fine by the lower courts, but if e facts and circumstances of a ease-justify, it may interfere. In Adamji Umar Dalal v. State of Bombay, it was held that:

"It is not the practice of this court to interfere by special leave in the matter of punishment imposed for crimes committed, except in exceptional cases where the sentences are unduly harsh and do not really advance the ends of justice."

In this case, the Court reduced the sentence on the ground that the fines imposed were very heavy and also quite disproportionate to the offences.

In Lalit Mohan Das v/s Advocate General on an appeal by special leave under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, the Court, on the facts and circumstances of the case, interfered with the disciplinary action taken by the High Court and reduced the punishment imposed. The Court stated that it would be reluctant to interfere with the order of the High Court in respect of disciplinary action to be taken against a member of the Bar who had been found guilty of professional misconduct. However, in view of two mitigating circumstances in the case, viz. that the Munsif recommended suspension of practice for one year only and the legal practitioner had filed a written apology, the punishment imposed by the High Court was held to be excessive and the period of suspension was reduced to the period of three years.

In Pandurang Tukia v. State of Hyderabad, the Supreme Court converted the death sentence imposed by the High Court into that of life imprisonment. The Court held that:

"the sentence should be reduced to transportation mainly because of the difference of opinion in the High Court, not only on the question of guilt, but also on that of sentence. In saying this we do not intend to fetter the discretion of Judges in the matter, for a question of sentence is, and must always remain, a matter of discretion, unless the law directs otherwise. But when appellate Judges, who agree on the question of guilt, differ on that of sentence, it is usual not to impose the death penalty unless there are some compelling reasons."

In a recent case, the Supreme Court has, on an appeal by the State, sentenced a person to death holding that the exercise of discretion by the High Court in interfering with the sentence of death imposed by the Trial Court was not proper.

In State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, the Court interfered with the sentence of unusual facts, i.e. the accused had undergone a major part of the sentence of one year's imprisonment imposed on him by the trial court till he was acquitted by the High Court in appeal and he also remained in imprisonment for some months till the decision of. the Supreme Court on account of his failure to furnish bail. The Supreme Court interfered with the sentence by reducing it to the period already undergone.

The observations of Bhagwati, J. in Surendra v. State of U.P. sum up the principles followed by the Court in respect of interference in sentence in an appeal by special leave:
The imposition of sentence is always a matter of discretion and unless this Court finds that the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or on unsound principles or that the Sessions Court or the High Court has not taken into account any relevant factors in imposing the sentence, this Court would not be justified in reducing the sentence, merely because it feels that a lesser sentence might well have been imposed,"

In the case of Ali Mohamad Pyarji Momin v/s State of Gujarat, where
the appellants had been convicted of offences under various sections including that of 406, 477-A, 420, 120-B IPC and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, in the light of the fact that the incident was of the year 1972 and the appellants had been facing proceedings for twenty years the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone.

In another case, six persons were tried for various offences. Five persons were convicted for offences under Sections 302/149 and 325/149 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The other accused person was sentenced to ten years RI under Section 304, Part II. On appeal to the High Court conviction of four accused stood altered to one under Section 304, Part I, but the life sentence was maintained. The four accused persons preferred appeals by special leave. The Court while maintaining the conviction reduced the sentence to seven years RI: The Court held that the benefit of the reduced sentence should also go to the other accused person who had not preferred any appeal due to poverty or any other reason.

(b) Other areas of exercise of discretion
In Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothen Joseph, the Court stated that the Supreme Court would not lightly interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution with the concurrent exercise of discretion of the Courts below under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Before it can justly do so, the appellant must satisfy the Court, on the relevant facts referred to by the Courts below, that the exercise of discretion was in a manifestly unreasonable or perverse way, which was likely to defeat the ends of justice.

The Court has also held that the award of the costs and special costs are within the jurisdiction of the trial court and unless weighty reasons exist, the Supreme Court would not unsettle the costs awarded by the trial court or the High court.

In United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Secy, U.P. Bank Employees Union, it was held that whether a discharged employee must be reinstated in service or compensation would be an adequate relief is a matter of discretion. The Tribunal considered reinstatement proper and on appeal the Appellate Tribunal agreed with this view. That being so, there was no reason for interference by the Supreme Court with the decision arrived at the exercise of that discretion by awarding compensation