The present article highlights the journey of anticipatory bail provision in India which has not been a smooth one. The article proceeds further analysing the approach of the Courts of India on the nature of an order granting anticipatory bail. Towards the end, the latest law on the subject has been discussed the main source of which is the 2019 Supreme Court verdict.[1]

The article presents an insight on how the concept of anticipatory bail has evolved over a period of time while taking into account the reports of the Law Commission of India, the relevant provisions and the judicial opinion. The present article attempts to present the readers with the understanding of the nature and origin of anticipatory bail in India.

Introduction
Bail comes into purview alongside the arrest and anticipatory bail is not alike. The concept of bail is based on the postulate that a person is to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (a concept derived from the Anglo Saxon law), thus it is a general rule and not an exception.[2] It is a direction given by the concerned court which actually comes into effect as soon as the arrest is made.

The only difference here being that it acts as an immediate relief and saves the beneficiary from the humiliation and harassment associated with arrest. It has been very well described as a pre-arrest order with an intention to provide immunity from confinement or touch associated with arrest as per Section 46(1)[3] of the Cr.P.C. This must not be construed to mean that the police is bound to arrest in situations where anticipatory bail is rejected as it might be a situation where no arrest is required or warranted.[4]

It is no more res integra that an unjustified arrest by the police officials is a blatant violation of the fundamental right of a citizen.[5] The direction is often conditional in practice, however, the year 2005 amendment[6] made in Section 438[7], which listed down conditions to be imposed while granting anticipatory bail, has been kept in abeyance until now for unexplained reason(s).

The provision concerned with the grant of anticipatory bail in India finds mention in Section 438[8] of The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The incorporation of a provision dedicated to anticipatory bail, in the criminal law of India, ensured prevention of arrest until the time the accused is not able to move the appropriate forum with an application of bail.

In every kind of bail, the freedom of an individual is granted on the condition that he will appear to take his trial, as it was observed by Y.V. Chandrachud, J.[9] Though the liberty of an individual being arrested is not to be snatched away easily yet it was observed by the Supreme Court that grant of anticipatory bail is not an essential ingredient of Article 21.[10]

Recently, the hon'ble Supreme Court expressed their fear of such observations being contrary to the law declared by a five-judge bench earlier in 1980[11]. It was reminded that an accused is entitled to all the fundamental rights including the right granted under Article 21 which is the right to liberty.[12]

It must be mentioned here that in the light of recent developments, it would be an indecorous exercise to describe this power as the one to be mandatorily exercised in exceptional cases, yet it must be noted that such a power has only been entrusted to the High Court and the Court of Session. The power exists for anticipating accusation of non-bailable offences as bail is granted as a matter of right in bailable offences, and arrest is often non made there.[13]

The greatest human rights documents of all time, the Magna Carta recognized the concept of freedom from seizure or imprisonment except by the law of the land.[14] This concept of human rights escalated to the extent of granting definite protection from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile[15] post establishment of the United Nations. There exists no rulebook for the grant or cancellation of bail as that is decided from case to case basis and is dependable on the discretion exercised by the judiciary after considering facts and circumstances. It is admitted that there cannot be an inexorable formula[16], the only holy mantra being judicial discretion premised on balancing interests of the liberty of an individual and the security of the state.

Genesis of the anticipatory bail in India

At the very outset, it is stated that the earlier criminal code i.e. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 did not contain any provision regarding pre-arrest bail (commonly known as anticipatory bail). There was confusion and conflict of opinion prevailing among the various courts on the question, whether they had any statutory power to grant pre-arrest bail to an applicant, but the majority of them realized that they do not possess any such inherent power.[17]

It is pertinent to highlight the observation of the various High Courts on the question of pre-arrest bail before the enactment of the provision in the statute book. In Amir Chand v. Crown,[18] the Full Bench of East Punjab High Court categorically held that, when an arrest warrant has been issued against a person, but he is yet to be taken into the custody then in these circumstances bail may be allowed if applicant appears or surrenders before the court.

Further, the High courts of Hyderabad[19] and Lahore[20] had also affirmed that the application of bail can be entertained in the situation of an anticipation or apprehension of arrest. The same view was reiterated in the case of State v. Jagan Singh[21] Per contra, in State of M.P. v. Narayana Prasad Jaiswal,[22] the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was of the view that it is unsound to grant bail to a person who is already a freeman or under no such restriction. Moreover, it was observed that mere registration of a case or anticipation is not sufficient to file a bail application before the court.

This conundrum led to a significant reform in our criminal law. There was not even an iota of doubt that the matter involved a fundamental right of the citizens particularly the freedom of movement and liberty. The demands were raised from various sectors in support of the pre-arrest bail in addition to make code more effective and comprehensive[23].

The Law Commission of India, in its 41st report headed by Dr. Justice V.S. Malimath (as he then was) extensively dealt with this subject and underlined the necessity of introducing a new section 497A concerning pre-arrest bail in the old Code. In paragraph 39.9 of the report, the Commission cited the purpose of anticipatory bail being to protect liberty of a citizen against the false initiation or mala fide cases by influential persons includes political rivalry with the intention of dismantling their dignity and trying to put them behind the lock-up for some days.

It was further observed that there is a rampant increase in these cases. Importantly, it was realised that when there are reasonable grounds that the applicant is not likely to flee away or influence witnesses or hamper the investigation, there seems no justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for regular bail.

The Law Commission was of the view that it may not be feasible to avouch straight jacket formula for imposition of conditions on which such a bail can be granted. It was observed that the conditions are contingent upon the circumstances of each case and must be left to the judicial discretion of the High Court or the Court of Session. Undoubtedly, the same should be exercised sparingly and cautiously.

The recommendations of the Commission were accepted by the Central Government which incorporated clause 447 in the Draft Bill of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1970. The Bill was sent to the Joint Committee of the Parliament, which recommended certain inevitable conditions to be mentioned in the clause. Simultaneously, the Government sought the opinion of the Law Commission on certain issues.[24]

The recommendations were as follows[25]:

• The power must be exercised in exceptional cases. In addition to reason shall be recorded while issuing direction.
• The interim order may be granted, however, the final order shall not be pronounced, except previous notice to the Public Prosecutor, and it would be appropriate to issue notice of the interim and the final order to the Superintendent of Police.

However, the suggestions of 48th report[26] did not meet the approval of the Government. The above clause 447 of the Bill, with certain modifications, eventually became Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[27] and the first time in the history of the criminal law of India, the concept of Anticipatory Bail came into existence.

The IGP conference, 1981 proposed to amend section 438 which further stated that such a power should be taken away from the Court of Session and entrust only in the domain of the High Courts. Accordingly, in 1988, the Parliament made an attempt to carry out an aforesaid proposal, i.e. omitting the words or the Court of Session, but did not succeed.[28]

Further, Law Commission of India in its 154th report headed by Justice Jayachandra Reddy referred some suggestions in tune with the 48th Report of the Law Commission as well as the Constitution Bench Judgment[29]. It was proposed that new sub-section (1) shall be incorporated in section 438 and recommended substitution of existing sub-section (1) of section 438 of the CrPC, 1973.[30]

In 2005 the Parliament has undertaken comprehensive changes and passed an amendment which has imbibed the suggestion of the 154th Report of the Law Commission. It is pertinent to note that the effective date of the amendment has not been notified yet. The aforesaid changes in the section did not go well with the legal fraternity and it had been claimed that it hampers the liberty of citizens.

Again, the Ministry of Home Affairs decided to seek the opinion of the Law Commission of India on newly amended sub-section (1) in section 438.

The Commission had considered this issue in a detailed manner in its 203rd Report and made recommendations in the following terms[31]:

1. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 438 shall be omitted.
2. Sub-section (1B) shall be omitted.
3. A new sub-section on the lines of Section 397(3) should be inserted.
4. An Explanation should be inserted clarifying that final order on an application seeking direction under the section shall not be construed as an interlocutory order for the purposes of the Code.

Steering the wheel of justice
Justice P.N. Bhagwati, in the year 1976, described the power of granting anticipatory bail as 'exceptional' in character and exercised only in exceptional cases.[32] This view was, however, rejected in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia[33] later. The latter decision also clarified that to frame an inexorable rule, to the effect that anticipatory bail is only to be granted when the accusation appears to be tainted with mala-fide or that such bail must be granted in case there is no fear that applicant will abscond, would be inappropriate.

The tussle between personal liberty and investigational powers of the police is not new. It was in the year 1980 that a Constitution bench, for the first time, laid down the scope of section 438 in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others v. State of Punjab[34].

A Minister of Irrigation and Power in the Government of Punjab involved allegations of corruption sought anticipatory bail. The Court called it imperative to protect the freedom of a person who is yet to lose it in case of arrest on the accusation of a non- bailable offence, this stage was thought of as one where presumption of innocence principle has to be applied. In regard to imposing conditions on the grant of anticipatory bail, it was settled that the court is entrusted with a discretion wide enough to decide what conditions are to be imposed. With these words, Supreme Court rejected the cast-iron rules formulated by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.

The Court also made it clear that grant of anticipatory bail does not snatch the right of police to investigate and that there is no need for a petitioner to make out a special case warranting the exercise of power under the present section. It was stated that even though it may be said that the power to grant anticipatory bail is of extraordinary character because ordinarily, bail is applied for and granted under s. 437 or s. 439 in case of persons in the custody of police but this was not a valid justification for saying that this power must only be exercised in exceptional cases.

At this juncture, it must be stated that anticipatory bail is granted on the basis of a reason to believe, the belief that the applicant might be arrested on the ground of a proposed accusation is a belief based on reasonable grounds. It was settled decades ago that mere 'fear' is not belief[35] and the proposition was followed in numerous cases later[36]. The conclusion that a blanket order must not be passed flows as a natural corollary to the language of the provision.

Almost fifteen years later, the Court went on to divergent ways in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh[37] and firmly pressed on the importance of approaching the regular court for bail. To ensure this, the Court observed that it is necessary that orders granting anticipatory bail should be passed only for a limited duration because it is generally granted at a time when investigation is incomplete.

What the court meant was that when such limited duration expires, the regular court trying the applicant must become the actual foreperson in the matter of securing or denying liberty to the accused applicant. A new aspect was added to this explanation in 1998 stating that anticipatory bail does not end as soon as the accused is produced before regular court but he may continue to enjoy the protection until the regular bail application is decided.[38]

A 2010 decision in HDFC Bank Ltd. further postulated that on inclusion of name in the charge-sheet, the accused who was under the protection of anticipatory bail has to surrender and pray for regular bail.[39] Keeping these principles in consideration, a person under the protection of anticipatory bail was ordered to surrender his liberty and seek regular bail by way of judgment rendered in the case of Naresh Kumar Yadav v Ravindra Kumar[40].

In Savitri Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra & Anr[41] also, the Court has held while passing relief under section 438 (1) reasonable condition should be imposed as mentioned in section 438 (2) of the Code. Further, the court may restrict time limit operation of the order but not invariably. Much recently, Satpal Singh judgment[42] reiterated the same observation while concluding that protection under s. 438 is limited till the time accused has not been summoned by the court based on the charge-sheet. Such a view, however, stood in stark contradistinction to the view expressed in Aslam Babalal Desai[43].

The decision in Salauddin, though concise in appearance, became a subject of a whole new debate. The burning question was premised on the duration of an order granting anticipatory bail. One view[44] said there is no limit on the duration of the order while the other view[45] believed in limiting its duration so as to let the regular trial court row the boat forward.

The court deviated from its earlier rulings in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra & Ors[46] wherein it was held by way of Paras 122 and 123 that no restrictive condition can be imposed at all while passing an order under section 438 of the Code. Importantly, in Jai Prakash[47], Hon'ble Justice B.S Chauahan (as he then was) emphatically observed that discretion under section 438 must be exercised sparingly with all due care and attention. Incidents of blatant violation of the liberty of citizens are not a subject to be concealed.

The case of Arnesh Kumar[48] is of seminal importance wherein the court has highlighted the misuse of power of police to arrest.

It was further observed that:
Police officers do not arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorize detention casually and mechanically.

The two judge- bench, in a decision[49], comprising of Hon'ble Justice A.K. Sikri (as he then was) and Hon'ble Justice R.F. Nariman emphasized that once the anticipatory bail is granted it may be continued till the conclusion of the trial.

There is no straight jacket formula while considering the application and the same will majorly depends upon the circumstances of each case. In another recent decision the Apex Court has held that anticipatory bail could be cancelled on the failure to follow the pre-requisite condition imposed in a bail order. At the same time cancellation could not be reinstated on the mere assumption that the applicants were guilty.[50]

The aforesaid views were also reflected in earlier rulings of Mahant Chand Yogi v. State of Haryana[51], Padmakar Tukaam Bhavnagare v. State of Maharastra[52] and X v. State of Telangana[53]. It is relevant to note that the appellate or superior court may at later stage, if it thinks fit, set aside the earlier bail order on the ground that it did not correctly appraised material and relevant evidence.[54]

However, the same does not amount to cancellation in terms of section 439 (2) of the Code, 1973.[55] Recently, an issue came up before the Apex Court raising a pertinent question, if anticipatory bail once granted can be reviewed by a court? The Court has issued notice to the State government, the matter is sub judice.[56]

Making a note of the exceptions
The three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. & Anr v. Ram Krishna Balothia & Anr[57] has upheld the constitutional validity of Section 18 of the Act of 1989[58] which elucidates that Section 438 of the Code shall not apply to persons committing an offence under the 1989 Act. The court in Vilas Pandurang Pawar and Anr. v State of Maharashtra and Ors.,[59] held that the 1989 Act forbid to allow an application of Anticipatory Bail unless and until it found no prima facie case in the complaint.

Further, the scope of court in scrutinising the evidences placed on record at the time of hearing court is very restricted. This decision was followed in Shakuntla Devi v. Baljinder Singh[60] Recently, A two judge bench comprising of Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel (as he then was) and Justice U.U. Lalit of the Apex Court in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.,[61] has underlined the incidents of rampant misuse of the provision of the Act, 1989.

Thus, it made it mandatory to take approval of the appointing authority of the public servant and the concerned SSP in case of arresting the accused. Furthermore, preliminary inquiry may be set-up in order to inquire the truthfulness and credibility of the complaint. It is pertinent to note that later part of the judgment was averse to the Constitution Bench ruling in Lalita Kumari's case [62]. Subsequently, Parliament by way of an amendment inserted Section 18A to the Act to nullify the aforesaid ruling of the top Court.

Further, the amendment was challenged in the Apex Court, which duly upheld the constitutionally validity of the amended provision. However, it was observed that court may grant pre-arrest bail if the complaint does not make out any prima facie case against the accused.[63] Similarly, the provision of anticipatory bail does not apply in relation to persons committing an offence under the Act, 1987[64]. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh case[65] has upheld the Constitutional validity of section 20(7) of the Act, 1987.

In addition to that, some State governments (including West Bengal, Maharashtra and Orissa) have made local amendments to the provision of Anticipatory Bail respectively. During the time of Emergency the State of U.P omitted section 438 by the amendment Act, 1976.[66] Its constitutionality was opposed before the Apex Court. In Paras 368 the court observed that the deletion of the aforesaid provision does not infringe Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution and the State Legislature is competent to make law within the limit of the Constitution.[67]

 On several occasion the High Court and the Supreme Court had recommended the State Government of U.P to reinstate the provision in the Code, 1973.[68] Moreover, the State Law Commission also recommended re-introduction of the provision.[69] In pursuant of that, Mayawati Government made an attempt but did not get the node of the President of India. Finally, in 2019 the government led by Hon'ble Chief Minister Sh. Yogi Adityanath has brought the provision back into the Code, 1973.

The final settlement- time period of the order
In January, 2020, the hon'ble Supreme Court gave rest to a long-standing question on the time period of an order granting anticipatory bail. The primary question before the court, in the case of Sushila Aggarwal & ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & anr.[70] was whether the protection granted under section 438 is limited to a fixed period thus making a person surrender with the completion of that period in order to seek regular bail.

The Court also faced the issue as to whether summoning of the accused would mark the end of the protection granted under section 438. The earlier proposition, to the effect that conditions are to be necessarily imposed on the grant of anticipatory bail, was rejected. At the same time, it was also recognised that it is always open to the court to impose conditions owing to circumstances which are peculiar in nature. The Court also noted that anticipatory bail can be granted in respect of all offences except in the offences mentioned in s. 438(4) and special laws which exclude the application of s. 438.

It was also reaffirmed that an order granting anticipatory bail cannot operate in respect of a future incident that involves commission of an offence and thus, should not be 'blanket;' order. The Court further declared that the correctness of an anticipatory bail order is open to be considered by an appellate or superior court and the order may be set aside on the ground of non-consideration of material facts and crucial circumstances, doing so does not amount to cancellation of the order but is rather equivalent to setting it aside.[71]

The judgments, rendered in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh[72], Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre[73], K.L. Verma[74], Sunita Devi[75], Adri Dharan Das[76]; Nirmal Jeet Kaur[77], HDFC Bank Limited[78], Satpal Singh[79], Naresh Kumar Yadav[80] including other decisions that followed these decisions, were expressly overruled.

Conclusion
The provision for anticipatory bail was introduced at a time when the human rights movement posed as a challenge to the authorities to ensure that confinement was avoided unless one is declared guilty.[81] The inclusion was looked at as an antidote for preventing detention in false cases. The significance attached to the liberty of person can be very well understood from the following words, 'No accused person shall under any circumstances, be confined in prison before he is convicted' -Book 9 titled Title 3(2), Codex Justinianus (or 'Code Jus')[82]

When the High Court of Punjab and Haryana laid down that serious cases such as economic offences involving blatant corruption do not call for the exercise of discretion under s. 438, the Apex Court brushed away this idea later in its judgment.[83] .With this, it is inexorable to produce what was laid down a few months before the judgment in Sushila Aggarwal was pronounced.

In the case of P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement[84], it was stated that power under s.438 is an extraordinary remedy and in economic offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail.[85] This is not the correct position, considering that the Court, in Sushila Aggarwal[86] again highlighted that the proposition which says that anticipatory bail is not to be granted 'normally' in economic offences is not good law.

All such cases have not been however mentioned to have been repealed by way of Sushila Aggarwal[87] judgment but the latest position is clearly to the effect that mandating the imposition of unnecessary conditions on an order granting anticipatory bail has not been warranted by the statute. Along with this, it would be a fallacy to impose time limit on all orders of anticipatory bail without considering its facts and circumstances. To part ways, it is being again asserted that anticipatory bail order is not a remedy available only in special or extraordinary cases.

End-Notes:

1. Sushila Aggarwal v. State (Nct of Delhi), Special Leave Petition (Criminal) NO (s). 7281-7282 of 2017
2. Dataram Singh v. State of U.P, (2018) 3 SCC 22.
3. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
4. M.C. Abraham v. State of Maharastra, 2003 (2) SCC 649.
5. Smt. Nilabati Behera Alias Lalit v. State Of Orissa, 1993 AIR 1960; Joginder Kumar v. State, 1994 (4) SCC, 260; Shri D.K. Basu, Ashok K. Johri v. State of West Bnegal, 1997 1 SCC 416.
6. Subs. By Act 25, 2005.
7. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
8. id.
9. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 565.
10. State of M.P. v. Ramkrishan Balathia, 1995 Cr.LJ 2076 (SC); Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, 2012 (4) SCC 379
11. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 565
12. Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), Special Leave Petition (Criminal) NO (s). 7281-7282 of 2017.
13. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
14. Magna Carta, Clause 39, (June. 04, 2020), available at: https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation.
15. Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948.
16. Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 1 SCC 118; Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, 2017 (13) SCALE 609
17. Law Commission of India, 41st Report on the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 Vol. 1 (1969).
18. A.I.R. 1950 E.P. 53.
19. Muzaffaruddin v. State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1953 HO. 219; Sunder Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1954 Hyd. 55.
20. Hidayatullah Khan v. Crown, AIR. 1949 Lab. 77.
21. AIR. 1952 VJP. 87.
22. AIR. 1963 M.P. 26.
23. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 565.
24. Law Commission of India, 203rd Report on Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as amended by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Anticipatory Bail), (2007
25. Law commission of India, 48th Report on some question under the Code of Criminal Procedure Bill, 1970 (1972).
26. Id.
27. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
28. Law Commission of India, 154th Report on the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (1996).
29. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 565.
30. Law Commission of India, 154th Report on the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (1996).
31. Law Commission of India, 203rd Report on Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as amended by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Anticipatory Bail), (2007).
32. Balchand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 AIR 366.
33. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 565.
34. id
35. id.
36. Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal, 2005 (4) SCC 303; Naresh Kumar Yadav v Ravindra Kumar, 2008 (1) SCC 632; Savitri Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 419; Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), Special Leave Petition (Criminal) NO (s). 7281-7282 of 2017.
37. Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) (1) SCC 667.
38. K.L. Verma v. State, 1998 (9) SCC 348.
39. HDFC Bank Ltd. v. J.J. Mannan, 2010 (1) SCC 679.
40. 2008 (1) SCC 632.
41. 2009 (8) SCC 325.
42. Satpal Singh v. the State of Punjab, 2018 SCC Online SC 415.
43. Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra, 1992 (4) SCC 272.
44. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 565.
45. Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar, 2005 (1) SCC 608; Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal, 2005 (4) SCC 303; Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P., 2004 (7) SCC 558; Naresh Kumar Yadav v Ravindra Kumar, 2008 (1) SCC 632; HDFC Bank Ltd. v. J.J. Mannan, 2010 (1) SCC 679; Satpal Singh v. the State of Punjab, 2018 SCC Online SC 415.
46. 2011 (1) SCC 694.
47. Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, 2012 (4) SCC 325.
48. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 1277 of 2014
49. Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1134-1135 of 2015.
50. Arvind Tiwary v. State of Bihar, 2018 (8) SCC 475.
51. 2003 (1) SCC 236.
52. 2012 (13) SCC 720
53. (2018) 16 SCC 511
54. Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta, (2011) 6 SCC 189; State through C.B.I. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21.
55. Sushila Aggarwal v. State (Nct of Delhi), Special Leave Petition (Criminal) NO (s). 7281-7282 of 2017.
56. Ainul Hoque Molla v. The State of Assam, Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2581- 2582/2020.
57. 1995 SCC (3) 221
58. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) 1989.
59. (2012) 8 SCC 795.
60. (2014) 15 SCC 521.
61. (2018) 6 SCC 454.
62. Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1.
63. Writ Petition (c) NO. 1015 OF 2018
64. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) ACT 1987.
65. (JT 1994 (2) SC 423).
66. Uttar Pradesh Act 16 1975.
67. (JT 1994 (2) SC 423).
68. Kailash Chand Garg v. State of U.P. Crl. Misc. W.P. No. 5011 of 2006; Smt. Sudama v. State of U.P., Criminal Misc Writ Petition No. 5774 of 2006; Som Mitta vs. Government of Karnataka, AIR 2008 SC 1126.
69. U.P. State Law Commission, 3rd Report on Reinsertion of Section 438 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Anticipatory Bail) in its application to Uttar Pradesh, (2009).
70. Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No (s). 7281-7282 of 2017.
71. Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta, (2011) 6 SCC 189; Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, 2012 (4) SCC 325; State through C.B.I. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21
72. Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 1996 (1) SCC 667.
73. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (1) SCC 694.
74. K.L. Verma v. State, 1998 (9) SCC 348.
75. Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar, 2005 (1) SCC 608.
76. Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal, 2005 (4) SCC 303.
77. Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P., 2004 (7) SCC 558.
78. HDFC Bank Ltd. v. J.J. Mannan, 2010 (1) SCC 679.
79. Satpal Singh v. the State of Punjab, 2018 SCC Online SC 415.
80. Naresh Kumar Yadav v Ravindra Kumar, 2008 (1) SCC 632.
81. S.K. VERMA, RIGHT TO BAIL 29 (Indian Law Institute 2000
82. Sushila Aggarwal v. State (Nct of Delhi, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) NO (s). 7281-7282 of 2017, para 38.
83. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 565.
84. P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No. 1340 of 2019, para 76.
85. Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain, (1998) 2 SCC 105.
86. Sushila Aggarwal v. State (Nct of Delhi), Special Leave Petition (Criminal) NO (s). 7281-7282 of 2017, para 69.
87. id.

Written By:

1. Isha Kapoor, Advocate
2. Jai Saini, Advocate