In the case at hand, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) was in
receipt of references under Section 19 of the Competition Act, 2002 (ï¿½the
Actï¿½) from different railway zones about alleged ï¿½cartelization behaviorï¿½ by
12 companies (ï¿½Opposite Partiesï¿½) engaged, inter alia, in the manufacture
and supply of industrial products including brake blocks. Some of these were
micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).
Tenders were invited for procurement of composite brake blocks for different
railway zones. In every zone, all the Opposite Parties submitted
identical/higher bids in response to the invitation. After subsequent
negotiations, the Opposite Parties offered identical reduction in their
bids. Basis this coordinated behavior of the Opposite parties, the officers
in charge of the various railway zones (Chief Materials Manager, Controller
of Stores etc.) filed references with the CCI alleging the existence of a
ï¿½cartelï¿½ in violation of Section 3(3) of the Act.
On a prima facie analysis, CCI combined the references and directed the
Director General (DG) to conduct a composite investigation.
During investigation, several correspondence amongst the Opposite Parties in
the form of WhatsApp messages, emails, SMSs etc. surfaced. The
messages inter alia revealed that the Opposite Parties held meetings at
different locations for discussions. Call records of the officials also
brought to light that the Opposite Parties were in constant contact with
each other. A few of the Opposite Parties and their officials admitted to
the existence of a ï¿½cartelï¿½. They gave a brief account of the activitiesï¿½
the Opposite Parties made collective decisions about bid value, bid response
along with market allocation.
The Opposite Parties inter alia argued that the Indian Railways owing to its
economic strength negotiated aggressively with them to buy at the most
ï¿½competitiveï¿½ price. Therefore, the acts of the Opposite Parties had no
effect on the pricing conditions of the market and in turn, did not
cause ï¿½appreciable adverse effects on competitionï¿½ (AAEC).
With no actual AAEC, the alleged conduct does not amount to violation of
Section 3(3) of the Act, was the ultimate argument of the Opposite Parties.
The same was rejected by the CCI in its entirety on the following three
- A conduct under Section 3 which has not caused AAEC,
but may potentially cause AAEC is also prohibited.
- Under Section 3(3), a cartel is presumed to cause AAEC.
The said statutory presumption is rebuttable by the parties in light of the
factors provided under Section 19(3) of the Act.
- However, in the instant case, the Opposite Parties have not been able to
rebut the said presumption by leading adequate evidence, for some of the
factors under Section 19(3), such as, how their conduct/cartel resulted into
any accrual of benefits to consumers; improvements in production or
distribution of goods or provision of services; or promotion of technical,
scientific and economic development by means of production or distribution
of goods or provision of services.
The Opposite Parties also submitted that due to onerous clauses introduced
by Indian Railways in the tender documents, only a few of them were
successful in obtaining purchase orders while the remaining were forced to
stay idle. To prevent such situations of under-utilized production capacity
from arising, the Opposite Parties undertook coordinated efforts (in the
form of the alleged cartel) for equitable market allocation amongst them.
The CCI did not accept the justification and held that as a consumer, Indian
Railways should be free to choose its service provider. The CCI added that
the tough bargain by the Indian Railways to achieve the best price from the
Opposite Parties was in turn necessary to accrue benefits to the railway
passengers i.e. end consumers.
In view of the abovementioned, CCI found ten Opposite Parties liable for
violation of Section 3(3) of the Act along with their officials who were
held liable under Section 48 of the Act.
As far as remaining two Opposite Parties are concerned, there was nothing
produced to establish their involvement in the cartel after 20th May, 2009
i.e. the date on which Section 3 came into effect. Therefore, the CCI did
not find any contravention on their part.
The CCI noted that the Opposite Parties offered full cooperation during
investigation. Some of the Opposite Parties even admitted to their conduct
further facilitating the process of justice. The CCI also looked at the
small annual turnover of the parties, some of which were MSMEs. While taking
into account the financial difficulties in the face of the global pandemic,
the CCI emphasized upon several endeavors undertaken by the Indian
Government to provide aid for survival of MSMEs. In light of all these
observations, the CCI refrained from imposing monetary penalties on the
Opposite Parties and their officials. The CCI merely directed them to cease
the cartel behavior with immediate effect and desist from indulging in any
such similar behavior in the future.