Shilpa Mittal v. State of NCT Delhi & Ors.

• Court: The Supreme Court of India
• Citation: AIR 2020 SC 405
• Appellant: Shilpa Mittal
• Respondent: State of NCT Delhi
• Bench: Honorable Justice Mr. Deepak Gupta & Mr. Aniruddha Bose
• Decided On: 9 January 2020

Facts of the Case:

The minor is charged with a crime that falls under Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 304. The minor was between the ages of 16 and 18 when they committed the offense. 

The Children's Court dismissed the lawsuit. Following then, the juvenile and his mother visited the Delhi High Court. The Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 does not apply to the offense, according to the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, because no minimum sentence for the offence has been set or defined. The dead person's sister then filed an appeal with the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.

The following sections address severe, minor, and egregious offenses: 2(33), 2(45), and 2(54). Crimes classified as heinous under the Indian Penal Code or any other applicable law are those for which the minimum sentence/punishment is seven years imprisonment or more. In this case, Advocate Siddharth Luthra, who is representing the appellant, draws the court's attention to the Juvenile Justice Acts' exclusion of some offenses from the fourth category, such as homicide that does not qualify as murder.

The minimum sentence applies to people whose age is less than seven years, or in cases where no minimum sentence is specified but the maximum punishment exceeds seven years. It is very pertinent to the offense in this particular case. He was successful in persuading the Honourable Court to eliminate the phrase "minimum" from the description of "heinous crimes" as stated in section 2(33). As a result, all offenses, save minor and major ones, fell under the category of "heinous offences."

The lawyer for the minor said that the court was unable to amend the Act. The legislature alone had the authority to amend the statute; the court was unable to change it. The respondents' attorney, Mukul Rohatgi, further argued that the legislature's intention could not be taken into consideration for the only reason that this Act excludes the fourth category of offenses.

Statutory Provisions:

The relevant statutory provisions are as follows:

• The Juvenile Justice Act of 2015, Section 2(33): Defines "heinous offences" as those for which a minimum sentence of seven years or more in jail is imposed under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) or any other currently in effect law.
• The Juvenile Justice Act of 2015, Section 14: The Juvenile Justice Board's preliminary investigation of serious offenses is covered in this section. It requires that in order to decide whether to try a juvenile as an adult, the Board must first perform a preliminary evaluation.
• Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2015: The process in cases of serious offenses is described in this section. The case is transferred to the Children's Court if the Board determines that the juvenile should be tried as an adult.
• Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015: This section outlines the steps to be taken and the authority of the Children's Court to try a minor in adult court.

Issues Of The Case:

• Whether the offence prescribed a maximum sentence of more than 7 years imprisonment but not providing any minimum sentence, or providing a minimum sentence of less than 7 years, can be considered to be a 'heinous offence' within the meaning of Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015?
• Is the definition of heinous offences an inclusive one?
• Can the meaning of the words "heinous offences" be expanded by removing the word "minimum" from the definition?

Arguments Of The Parties:
By the appellant:
Counsel Mr. Siddharth Luthra made a point of telling the court that if the definitions of crimes—petty, serious, and heinous—are taken literally, then there is one type of crime that is not included in the Act of 2015.He pointed out to the court that the fourth category of the Juvenile Justice Act has a minimum punishment of less than seven years, or a mandated minimum sentence, but a maximum term of more than seven years, which includes homicide that does not amount to murder (the offense in question). He convinced the court to strike "minimum" from the definition of "heinous offenses," placing all offenses—aside from minor and serious ones—under the category of "heinous offenses.

"Additionally, he asserted that the absence of the fourth category of offenses would lead to absurdity, which was not the legislative body's intention .According to the doctrine of surplus age, he added, everything will fall into place if the word "minimum" is eliminated.

With the knowledge of such offenses. While it is not necessary to list every offense, we may emphasize a few of these. Certain offenses were linked to gambling, but they also included offenses under sections 121A and 122 of the IPC, offenses involving the counterfeiting of currency, homicide that did not amount to murder (as in this instance), betting on the suicide of minors or innocent people, and numerous other offenses.

By the respondent: 
Counsel Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, presenting the juvenile "X," stated that this court cannot rewrite the law. He goes on to say that the legislature's intention cannot be understood by this court solely because a category of offenses has been excluded. If there is a gap in the Act, the legislature should fill it and this court cannot intervene.

Judgement:
While acknowledging Mr. Luther's submission, the court declined to address the gap and make the necessary corrections .The court declared that when the legislative intent is obvious, it may add or remove words from the statute. But when the legislature's intent is unclear, the court cannot add or remove words to give meaning that it believes fits within the overall scheme of things. The court was applying the rule that one must read according to its language and intent. The Act of 2015 aims to guarantee that minors who encounter legal issues receive separate treatment, unlike adults. The wording of the part that deals with severe offenses and stipulates a minimum sentence of seven years in prison is apparent when it says "minimum."

The court dismissed the appeal by providing answers to the arguments and ruling that a crime cannot be classified as heinous if it does not carry a minimum sentence of seven years. Nonetheless, the Act addresses the fourth category of offenses, which are those for which the maximum punishment or the minimum stipulated, are considered "serious offenses" under the Act's definition and are handled appropriately until the Parliament makes the final decision.

Conclusion
The purpose of the Act of 2015 is to make certain that the children coming in conflict with the law are treated separately and not like the act committed by adults. From the statement of objects and reasons in the Bill, it can be clear that the Act is meant to adjudicate and dispose of the case in the best interest of the child. The purpose of classification of these offences in this Act was to check the psychological changes and physical capacity of the child offender while committing the offence, especially of those juveniles between the ages of 16-18 that is the offender treated as an adult. The court has no power to add or subtract the words or read the words which are not in the statute.