The literal rule is a principle of statutory interpretation that directs courts to
interpret the words of a statute according to their ordinary, natural meaning,
regardless of the consequences or any broader legislative intent. Under this rule,
if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply the
law as it is written, even if this leads to an outcome that appears unjust or
contrary to the purpose of the statute. This approach prioritizes the legislative
intent as expressed through the precise wording of the law, assuming that the
legislature's choice of words is the best indication of its intent. The literal rule
provides a structured and predictable method of interpreting laws but can
sometimes result in rigid or unsatisfactory outcomes when applied to complex
or unforeseen circumstances.
Introduction:
A "Statute" is the will of the Sovereign Legislature according to which the
Governments function. The executive must act and the Judiciary in the course of
Administration of Justice must apply the law as laid down by the said legislative
will. Very often occasions will arise where the courts will be called upon to
interpret the words, phrases and expressions used in the statute. In the course of
such Interpretation, the Courts have, over the centuries, laid down certain
guidelines which have come to be known as "Rules of Interpretation of
Statutes".
More often than not the Statutes contain "Statement of Objects and
Reasons" and also a "Preamble" both of which provide guidelines for
Interpreting the true meaning of the words and expressions used in the Statute.
Judges have to interpret statutes and apply them. The judges frequently use this
phrase true meaning or literal or plain meaning. Literal Interpretation of a
statute is finding out the true sense by making the statute its own expositor.
Background:
Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the
word is Understood. The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language
is not a question of law. According to Gray, the process by which a judge
constructs from the words of a statute book, a Meaning which he either believes
to be that of the legislature, or which, he proposes to attribute To it is
interpretation. Salmond describes interpretation or construction as the process
by which Courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the
medium of authoritative forms In which it is expressed.
Literal Rule Of Interpretation:
Interpretation of statutes is of two types –they can de distinguished as
"literal" and "functional".The Courts have laid down that the Interpretation of
the statutes must be in Accordance with the literal meaning of the words and
expressions read in the light of the "Statement of Objects and Reasons and the
Preamble" of the Act".
The Primary Rule of Interpretation of Statutes is called
"Literal Interpretation" or "Literal Construction". It is also Known as "Plain
Rule of interpretation". In this form of interpretation the "words" used in the
Statute are construed according to their "literal" meaning or according to the
popular and Dictionary meaning of the term, in other words its plain sense.
Chief Justice Jervis in Abley Gale has explained the expression 'literal
meaning'. He points out that "if the precise words Used are plain and
unambiguous, in our judgment we are bound to construe them in their Ordinary
sense even though it too leads in our view of the case to an absurdity or
manifest Injustice.
The words of a statute are to be first understood in their
natural, ordinary or popular Sense and phrases and sentences are construed
according to their grammatical meaning, unless That leads to some absurdity or
unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the Statute to suggest
the contrary. The tendency is that by doing so, the courts give effect to the
Intention of the Parliament and the presumption is that the words themselves do,
in such a case it Is best to declare the intention of the law giver.
Present Position In India:
In
Kanai Lal v/s Paramnidh the court said:
"it must always be borne in mind that
the first and Primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature
must be found in the words Used by the legislature." It also added-"When the
material words are capable of two Constructions, one of which is likely to
defeat or impair the policy of which is likely to defeat or Impair the policy of
the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the
Said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction."
This
case basically Dealt with the ejection of the ka tenants under provisions of
Calcutta Theka Tenancy Act, 1949.
Conclusion:
Literal rule of interpretation is the primary rule. Under this rule of
interpretation the Courts Interpret the statutes in a literal and ordinary sense.
They interpret the words of the statute in a Way that is used commonly by all. It
is incumbent on the court to use the grammatical meaning. The statutes should
be construed in such a manner as though there is no other meaning except the
Literal meaning. It is an old and traditional rule of interpretation. It is used not
only in England Where it originated but also in India.
The Courts while
interpreting statutes have to keep few Things in mind. It must realize that a
provision is ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase Which has more
than one meaning. If the interpretation is open to different meanings in one
Context it is ambiguous but if it is susceptible to different meaning in different
contexts it is Plain. The art of correct interpretation would depend on the ability
to read what is stated in plain Language, read between the lines, read 'through'
the provision, examining the intent of the Legislature and call upon case laws
and other aids to interpretation.
Bibliography:
- Maxwell, P. (1985). On the Interpretation of Statutes.
- Zander, M. (2015). The Law-Making Process.
- Millett, L. (2011). The Interpretation of Statutes: A Historical Overview. Law Quarterly Review, 127, 250–276.
- Elliott, C. & Thomas, R. (2017). Public Law. 3rd ed. Oxford University Press.
- Salmond, J.W. (1924). The Law of Tort. 11th ed. Stevens & Sons.
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