Review Of Literature:

• Report of the Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990)[1]: This committee, headed by Dinesh Goswami, was established to propose improvements to India's electoral system. Its report highlighted key challenges such as the need for transparency in political funding, reducing the influence of money and muscle power, and ensuring free and fair elections.
  
  It emphasized reforms like a stricter enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct[2], state funding for elections, and measures to address defections among legislators. The committee recommended reducing the role of criminal elements in politics by speeding up legal proceedings and disqualifying candidates with serious charges. It also suggested electoral reforms like holding simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha and state assemblies to reduce the financial burden and electoral fatigue.
   
• Report of the Vohra Committee (1993)[3]: The Vohra Committee Report (1993) focused on the nexus between organized crime, politicians, and bureaucrats but did not directly center its recommendations on electoral reforms. Instead, its findings underscored the influence of criminal elements within the political system, indirectly pointing to the need for reforms in the electoral process to address the pervasive issue of criminalization in politics. The committee highlighted how criminal syndicates were using their financial resources and muscle power to influence elections and gain political control. It implicitly called for measures to ensure that candidates with criminal backgrounds or those involved in organized crime networks could not contest elections. This pointed towards the need for reforms such as stricter scrutiny of candidates, increased transparency in political funding, and more robust mechanisms to prevent the entry of individuals with criminal records into the political arena.
   
• Report of the Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998)[4]: This committee was primarily constituted to make recommendations pertaining to the state funding of elections. The commission's report addressed the rising influence of money in politics and proposed measures to ensure a level playing field for all political parties, especially those with limited financial resources. The commission strongly recommended partial state funding of elections, arguing that it could help reduce the dependence of political parties on large private donations, which often lead to corruption and undue influence on policymaking.
  
  The report suggested that state funding could be initially limited to providing certain facilities, including free time on media channels owned by the state, transportation, and campaign materials, rather than direct monetary support. However, the report emphasized that state funding should be contingent on political parties adhering to internal democracy, transparency, and proper accounting practices.
   
• 170th Report of the Law Commission (1999)[5]: Key recommendations in the report incorporated in this project include banning candidates with serious criminal charges from contesting elections to curb the growing criminalization in politics, and the need for intra-party democracy and transparency within political parties. Other than this, the report also suggested that parties should hold regular elections for internal leadership positions and maintain proper financial records.
  
  The report proposed limiting the expenditure in elections to ensure that there was equal/fair competition between parties possessing varied financial means and recommended measures with the aim of strengthening the Election Commission of India (ECI) to make it more independent and effective in conducting free and fair elections. The Law Commission also addressed the need for stricter enforcement of the MCC during elections and advocated for elections to the Lok Sabha and state assemblies to be held at the same time (Much like today's proposed ONOE) to reduce election-related costs and disruptions.
   
• Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2001)[6]: Some of the key recommendations in the NCRWC report included measures to address the criminalization of politics by disqualifying candidates with serious criminal charges, even before conviction, if the charges were framed by a competent court. The report also called for stricter regulations on political party finances, urging transparency in campaign funding and recommending audits of party accounts to reduce the extent to which monetary-muscle can influence the outcome of elections.
  
  The commission advocated for measures to ensure intra-party democracy including mandatory internal elections for leadership roles. It suggested that candidates and political parties should be required to disclose their assets, liabilities, and criminal records, if any, to allow voters to make informed decisions. Additionally, the NCRWC proposed reforms such as the implementation of a proportional representation system in certain elections. One of their suggestions was similar to the proposed ONOE.
   
• Report of the Election Commission of India (2004):This report was specifically on electoral reforms. Key recommendations of this report included measures to curb the criminalization of politics, such as disqualifying candidates with serious criminal charges that had been framed by a court at least six months prior to the election. Another important recommendation of the report made with the aim of addressing the issue of a low voter turnout was, introducing electronic voting machines (EVMs) across all constituencies, which could simplify the voting process and improve accuracy in counting. It also highlighted the need for a clean electoral roll and greater voter awareness campaigns to encourage participation in the democratic process. The report also vociferously advocated for the establishment of limits on the amount of money spent on election campaigns.

Statement Of Problem
There are far too many loopholes in the rules governing the supposedly free and fair elections conducted in India. It is absolutely imperative for these loopholes to be plugged at the earliest.

Hypothesis
Wide ranging electoral reforms, including but not limited to making pre-poll alliances binding, limiting the No. of constituencies that a candidate can contest from, to 1, appointing the Chief Electoral Officer of a state from the administrative cadre of another state, improving and subsequently incorporating the "Voluntary Code of Ethics (2019)" into the "Model Code of Conduct (MCC)", introducing a common electoral roll, making amendments to several sections of the RPA (1951), setting expenditure ceilings for elections to council constituencies and to panchayats, preventing the victimization of officers drafted for election duty, taking steps to ensure the prevention of post-poll violence, are absolutely imperative to ensure that elections held in India are truly free and fair.

Research Questions

1. How can making pre-poll alliances binding, be an effective electoral reform?
2. How can reducing the number of constituencies that a candidate can contest from, to 1, be an effective electoral reform?
3. How can appointing the Chief Electoral Officer of a state from the administrative cadre of another state, be an effective electoral reform?
4. How can improving and subsequently incorporating the "Voluntary Code of Ethics (2019)" into the "Model Code of Conduct (MCC)", be an effective electoral reform?
5. How can introducing a common electoral roll be an effective electoral reform?
6. How can making amendments to several sections of the RPA (1951) be an effective electoral reform?
7. How can setting expenditure ceilings for elections to council constituencies and to panchayats be an effective electoral reform?
8. How can preventing the victimization of officers drafted for election duty be an effective electoral reform?
9. How can taking steps to ensure the prevention of post-poll violence be an effective electoral reform?

Electoral Reform 1: Making Pre-Poll Alliances Binding
It is a known fact that in the past, political parties have joined hands to form a pre-election coalition, taken part in the elections, won by a considerable margin together and have then decided to part company after the election. This has resulted in the causing of immense distrust amongst people who still lay their faith in the concept of an electoral democracy. It is truly tragic that we have had to see a party from an alliance come into an understanding with the parties against whom it contested, purely due to lust for office.

Due to this, the parties which fought against each other in the election form the government and walk away scot-free due to the unavailability of constitutional safeguards. The Maharashtra political crisis of 2019 is a testament to this. Events like that have made the election process a mockery and amount to insulting the verdict of the electorate, because People exercise their franchise in favour of one front or the other, expecting that the winning alliance partners in the front would form the government. However, in practice, this often does not happen.

Hence the author proposes that the definition of a "political party" as given in the 10th Schedule of the Constitution, as given in Para 1, sub-para (c), be discarded and replaced by the following definition:

"political party' in relation to a member of a House, means the political party on whose ticket that member was elected and where such political party is a part of a front or a coalition formed before a general election for contesting such election, such front or coalition, provided that the Election Commission is informed in writing by all the constituent parties in the front/coalition before the commencement of the poll that such a front/coalition has been formed."[8]

The result of this simple replacement would be that if any party that is a member of a pre-election alliance, were to leave the alliance, the particular incident would be treated as an incident of defection thereby resulting in all the elected members of the concerned house, from the defecting party, being disqualified as per the the provisions of the 10th schedule. This is in line with one of the recommendations proposed by the 170th Law Commission in May of 1999.

Electoral Reform 2: Limiting The No. Of Constituencies That A Candidate Can Contest From To 1
It is not uncommon for us to see candidates contesting from two constituencies, winning from both, and then vacating one, thus forcing by-elections there. This is because of the right afforded to candidates by Sec 33(7) of the RPA 1951.

Firstly, due to a 6-month buffer period allowed until by-polls by Sec 151-A, it is highly likely that the vacated constituency may technically go unrepresented for a whole session, for no good reason. Secondly, the multiple-candidature is also discriminatory in nature as it favours wealthier candidates. because candidates with lesser means, would not have enough to contest from 2 constituencies, and will hence have a lower win probability than a wealthier candidate, who gets 2 chances. This is truly unfair. The inevitable by-polls are also a burden on the exchequer and the administration. Even the ECI has expressed adverse views on the provision multiple times. When the SC, in 2023 rejected a plea filed to declare Sec 33(7) ultra vires, it did so while laying the onus of taking a call on the parliament because it held that it was a "policy matter and an issue concerning political democracy". Hence it is the legislators' responsibility to rise up to the occasion and to resolve this issue by amending this unjust provision.

If you are still unconvinced, the author would like to tell you that the very country that India borrowed this provision from, The United Kingdom, has now made it illegal for a candidate to contest an election from more than one constituency. In the author's opinion, there is no reason why India shouldn't.

Electoral Reform 3: Making It Obligatory To Appoint A Chief Electoral Officer (Ceo) Of A State From The Administrative Cadre Of Another State
Most "Chief Electoral Officers" of states are presently selected and appointed from the administrative cadre of the same state. (For instance, Mr. Sanjiv Kumar (IAS) of the Gujarat Cadre, was appointed as the Chief Electoral Officer of Gujarat in 2018). This happens because they are selected from a panel of "senior civil servants" proposed exclusively by the concerned "state government".

Some CEOs more often than not, find themselves unable to effectively discharge their functions owing to legitimate apprehensions that following the conclusion of their term, they would be compelled to work under the very same political authorities over which they exercised their legitimate powers before the conclusion of elections. To ensure that a CEO is able work free from any such apprehensions, CEOs must be appointed from the administrative cadre of a state, different from the one of the one of the concerned state.

Election Reform 4: Improvement Of And Subsequent Incorporation Of The Voluntary Code Of Ethics (2019)" Into The "Model Code Of Conduct (MCC)
The author is of the view that, the "Voluntary Code of Ethics for the General Elections (2019)"[9], recommended by the Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI)[10] to the ECI, must be further worked upon and in the due course of time, even be incorporated into the "MCC (Model Code of Conduct)" prepared by the ECI.

The said code augurs a good beginning to facilitating oversight on content disseminated on social media platforms during the elections only to the extent of ensuring that they are not misused to the end of vitiating the free and fair character of the electoral process of the country. This code has proven to be quite effective in the two states that it was implemented in during the 17th General Elections (i.e. Maharashtra and Haryana).

Social Media Platforms and ECI developed a notification mechanism for the polls by which the ECI could notify the relevant platforms of potential violations of Section 126 of the R.P.A, 1951 and other electoral laws. Over 900 instances of such violations that were reported by the ECI, were successfully dealt with using this mechanism. In addition to this, the code went a long way in encouraging social media platforms to voluntarily undertake information, education and communication campaigns to build awareness about electoral laws among other things.[11] It is rather disheartening to see that the ECI has not yet officially announced that the code has come into effect.

This code however, is still in its nascent stages and it is still only pseudo-regulatory in nature. Due to the rapid advances made in AI technology, and no corresponding amendments being made to the code, it also does not acknowledge the potential misuse of AI technology (ex. Deep-faking, using Predictive Analytics for Voter Suppression, etc.). If work is done on developing this code altruistically, the author genuinely believes that all that will change and that the code will be followed by most social media intermediaries in both spirit and in letter.

Electoral Reform 5: Introducing A Common Electoral Roll
The author would like to opine that the use of two distinct electoral rolls for elections to the Parliament and the various assemblies of state (maintained and prepared by the ECI) and for elections to panchayats and local bodies (maintained and prepared by the election commissions of the respective states) is a flawed exercise. This is because it results in the inevitable duplication of the identity of voters, extra burden on the exchequer, and obviously an extreme dilemma in the voters' minds at the time when the elections are to be held. All of this is completely avoidable if a common and an accurate electoral roll is maintained.

The use of common electoral rolls for all elections has been recommended by the NCRWC's 2001 report, by the Law Commission's 255th report in 2015 and even by the Election Commission in 1999 and 2004. What we need to do, is to sync the requirements of the both the aforementioned electoral rolls and processing the necessary legislation. It is imperative for this to be done with utmost urgency to realise the objective of having a Common Electoral Roll.

Facilitating a Common Electoral Roll was one of the items on the ruling Bharatiya Janta Party's 2019 election manifesto that it has failed to accomplish. The author would like an initiative to be taken on the legislative front, by recommending the amendment of Articles 243K & 243ZA of the Constitution[12] to vest the direction, control and superintendence of preparing the electoral rolls for all elections to the Panchayats and the Municipalities of the nation, in the ECI itself.

Electoral Reform 6: Amendments To Several Sections Of The Representation Of People's Act (1951)
To the end of reinforcing electoral guidelines, the author would like to recommend the following amendments to the Representation of People's Act, 1951. These amendments are as follows:

1. Section 10 (A):
   This section deals with "the disqualification of a candidate for their failure to lodge an account of their election expenses" within the specified period of time, provided the candidate has no valid reason to justify their failure. While this provision is definitely a good initiative to enforce accountability in the candidates, it does not consider the correctness of the account as a ground for disqualification. This loophole would allow a candidate who has incurred an impermissibly huge expense, to falsify the account, submit it before the deadline and face absolutely no repercussions.
   
   This issue can be resolved only through a timely amendment. Amendments to the RPA,1951 to include every single item related to election disclosure in the affidavit and making incorrect declarations in connection with the election with no justifiable excuse to be an electoral offence. Furthermore, the author believes that the "period of disqualification" under this provision, should be changed and increased to atleast five years, so that the disqualified person does not become eligible for the next elections to the house concerned. This is in line with ECI recommendations.
    
2. Section 125 (A):
   A timely amendment should be made to Section 125 (A) of the R.P. Act, 1951[13] to ensure that stricter punishment is meted for concealing or for providing incorrect information on Form 26 of Conduct of Election Rules, 1961[14] to a minimum of 2 years of imprisonment and discarding the other punishment of fining the candidate. It is only reasonable for a candidate who cannot be transparent about his criminal past, to be barred from contesting the next elections.

Electoral Reform 7: Setting Expenditure Ceilings For Elections To Council Constituencies & Panchayats
The elections to legislative councils as of today are simply not for the ordinary citizen. This is because there is no cap on the money that can be spent by candidates in these elections, candidates with extremely high financial resources or those backed by bigshots will be highly likely to upset the playing field. Many genuine candidates might even feel hesitant to contest elections because of this.

An example to support this claim, is that of that case of 10 incumbent Congress MLCs from Karnataka who chose to opt out of the 10/12/2021 elections to the state's legislative council due to the absence of an expense ceiling. The case is no different for Gram Panchayat elections as well. The absence of an upper limit on electoral spending in elections to gram panchayats has led to the circulation of a lot of money and inducement offers on innumerable occasions, previously.

It is not like there has been complete inaction on this issue. The EC had written to the law ministry in November 2018, seeking a cap on expenditure on elections to council constituencies.[15] Following this, 5 of the 7 erstwhile "national parties" and 51 "state parties" had supported amending Section 77 and Section 79 of the Representation of People's Act (1951)[16]. This consensus, though awe inspiring, has failed to translate into law thus far.

Electoral Reform 8: Prevention Of The Victimization Of Officers Drafted For Electoral Duties
The author holds that in case any official is called upon, to discharge statutory functions in furtherance of preparing electoral rolls, or in conducting elections, consulting the ECI along with receiving the concurrence of the ECI should be made mandatory prior to the Government of India initiating any disciplinary actions or legal proceedings against the official.

In instances where any official has vacated any electoral positions, consulting the ECI should be made compulsory before initiating any disciplinary action or legal proceedings for a a 1-year duration from the date on which the officer has stopped holding the said position. If this recommendation is heeded, the author believes that it would go a long way in preventing the victimization of officers drafted for electoral duties.

Electoral Reform 9: Prevention Of Post-Poll Violence
The author would like to make a suggestion to the end of curtailing post-poll violence in elections that are conducted on ballot papers, especially in West Bengal.

The recommendation is a change in the method of counting votes caste on ballot-paper in elections like the mayoral and panchayat polls. Votes in these polls must be counted by combing/merging votes from different polling booths/ballot boxes in a constituency. Different secret codes should then be assigned to each ballot box.

The author would like to recommend this measure because he acknowledges that, on multiple occasions in the past, contestants in panchayat polls have resorted to ghastly acts of violence upon realising that they/their party did not get secure a number of votes commensurate to the expenditure incurred on that particular polling booth. In the author's opinion, the simple act of merging votes will render these acts futile and will thus minimize the probability of their occurrence.

Conclusion:
The author simply hopes that his recommendations are not met with legislative inaction, as the suggestions made in various reports have been over the years.

End Notes:

1. https://www.scribd.com/document/465468981/Dinesh-Goswami-Report-on-Electoral-Reforms-pdf
2. https://www.eci.gov.in/eci-backend/public/
3. https://adrindia.org/sites/default/files/VOHRA%20COMMITTEE%20REPORT_0.pdf
4. https://www.rsdebate.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/16614/1.pdf
5. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in//2022082424.pdf
6. https://www.thehinducentre.com/multimedia/archive/03091/ncrwc_3091109a.pdf
7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_Electoral_Officer_(India)
8. Report of the 170th Law Commission in May of 1999
9. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/IAMAI-ECI%20VCE.pdf
10. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_and_Mobile_Association_of_India
11. https://pib.gov.in/pressreleaseiframepage.aspx?prid=1586297
12. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1331638/ and https://indiankanoon.org/doc/13064089/ for the respective provisions.
13. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/147340716/
14. https://www.eci.gov.in/eci-backend/public/api/download?
15. https://old.eci.gov.in/files/file/9237-letter-to-ministry-of-law-justice-dated-29102018/
16. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117675817/ and https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789.pdf (Pg. 40) for the respective provisions.

Award Winning Article Is Written By: Mr.Siddhanth Durgesh Nadkarni

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