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From Aadhaar To Privacy: The KS Puttaswamy Case And Its Constitutional Significance

KS Puttaswamy Case

Facts Of The Case
Even after the Act passed in 2016, the Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations, 2016, the PML (Maintenance of Records) Fifth Amendment Rules, 2017, and all notifications issued under Section 7 of the Act, which made Aadhaar mandatory for various benefits, have all been challenged in court. A major criticism of the Aadhaar programme and Act was that they violated privacy.

Because it did not require a Rajya Sabha vote, the Act's adoption as a Money Bill under Article 110 of the Constitution of India was questioned together with the substantive privacy issue. 'Unique Identification for BPL Families' was an Indian government project. A project committee was formed. The project committee proposed a Unique Identification database.

Three phases were chosen for the project UIDAI was notified by the Planning Commission of India in January 2009. The Commission approved the National Identification Authority of India Bill in 2010. In November 2012, retired Justice K S Puttaswamy and Mr. Parvesh Sharma filed a Supreme Court PIL Writ Petition questioning Aadhaar's validity. The system was challenged for violating fundamental rights. The programme violated Indians' Article 21 privacy rights.

Following this writ petition, orders were issued. Aadhaar was passed in 2016. The petitioners filed another writ suit contesting the Act's vires. Once combined, both writ petitions were regarded as one. Former Union minister and Congress leader Jairam Ramesh petitioned Supreme Court in May 2017. He opposed treating the Aadhaar Bill as money.

The Supreme Court declared privacy a Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution on August 24, 2017. Supreme Court heard Aadhaar Case on 17 January 2018. The Supreme Court questioned the Centre on connecting Aadhaar to mobile on April 25, 2018. On September 26, 2018, the Supreme Court upheld Aadhaar but ruled down required connection with cellphones, bank accounts, and school admissions.
Object based on two cases

M.P. Sharma v. Union of India , Sharma v. Satish Chandra and Kharak Singh v. Uttar Pradesh focused on the fact that the Indian Constitution has no clear safeguards for citizens' Right to Privacy.

Issues Before the Court

Is the Freedom to Privacy a legally guaranteed right?
If a legally guaranteed right exists, would it have the character of a self-contained basic right or would it derive from the existing provisions of protected rights such as existence and personal liberty?
Is the Supreme Court's ruling in M.P. Sharma & Ors. vs. Satish Chandra, DM, Delhi Ors., as well as Kharak Singh vs. The State of U.P., that there are no such basic rights, a valid expression of the constitutional position?
Is the Aadhaar Act, as specified by Article 110 of the Indian Constitution, a Money Bill?

Decision Of the Court:
Chandrachud J - The plurality judgement issued by Chandrachud J. places a lot of stress on how "Right to Privacy" is a crucial component of a person's dignity and should not be an 8 alienated right. Privacy should be included among the liberties protected by "Part III of the Constitution" since it encompasses all the information related to one's dignity and capacity to uphold his or her ideals. He also discusses the value of privacy in the digital age, its effects, and the critical need for data protection regulations.

He also brings up the good and negative aspects of privacy, arguing that while the former allows the government to respect people's private without their permission, the latter requires it to establish a legal framework to stop other people from doing the same. Bobde J shared his belief that the two most significant characteristics of basic rights are the limitation of legislative authority and the establishment of particular needs or conditions to be met for the development of the individual.

The three fundamental components of the "Right to Privacy", according to Chelameswar J. and Nariman J., are repose, sanctuary, and intimate decision.
The "Right to Privacy" is further broken down into three categories: Chelameswar J. and Nariman J. define the "Right to Privacy" as relaxation, refuge, and personal decision. Three categories make up the "Right to Privacy":

State invasion of physical integrity;
Unauthorised use of private information;

Choice privacy, or sovereignty over essential personal choices." However, Kaul J believes that digitalization, surveillance, and technology's pervasive data collection make it necessary to protect personal data from state and non-state actors. As in the Preamble, Sapre J. concludes with liberty, dignity, and brotherhood. Chelameswar J's guidelines apply to future human rights and privacy disputes.

Article 19 covers privacy breaches by public order, obscenity, and others. He thinks that many privacy claims will meet Article 21's just, equal, and rational criteria and gain significance due to government privacy infringement. Nariman J.'s work shows that privacy restrictions should be considered with comprehensive rights violations. Instead of a standardized test, the assessment will be based on legal precedent for the fundamental right. Sapre J.'s view is unique. He said the government can limit "Right to Privacy" for social, religious, and important public interest while maintaining the law. Free speech and expression do not recognize public interest as a legal restraint, hence Justice Sapre's criteria may violate the Indian Constitution.

The relationship between Chelameshwar J's "compelling state interest" and "physical, legal, and compelling public interest" is unclear. It defines the Article 19 restriction criterion, which varies by right infringed. He claims that European law requires three proportionality-based criteria for every life or liberty infringement to balance rights and interests. Legitimacy and national security are justified. Achievable resource and revenue management goals. Kaul J.'s "proportionality" differs from Chandrachud J.'s three European standards: legality, need (limited tailoring), and quantification. The fourth element, (d) procedural safeguards against rights violation, coincides with Article 21's legal process requirement.

The nine justices ruled that privacy is not a right but that infractions must be treated more seriously. Privacy concerns will be evaluated using statute or judicial criteria across constitutional rights categories. Proportionality test substance and applicability will be determined by future rulings. Dubious behavior must be fair, rational, and just.

Cases Referred In Puttaswamy
Judgements Overruled:

M P Sharma v Satish Chandra[1]
Following the lodging of a First Information Report (FIR), a search and seizure operation was carried out at the behest of the District Magistrate on the premises belonging to the enterprises affiliated with the Dalmia group. The issue was contested and brought before a panel of eight judges at the highest court. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the issue at hand pertained to the constitutional provisions of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 20(3), and recognised that these provisions encompass the protection of privacy for the party involved.

Nevertheless, the court asserted that the framers of the Constitution did not deem it necessary to impose constitutional restrictions on such regulations by acknowledging a fundamental right to privacy, similar to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Therefore, there is no valid reason to incorporate it into a distinct fundamental right through a convoluted interpretation. The Puttaswamy judgement has rendered this lawsuit invalid due to its explicit violation of the right to privacy.
Kharak Singh v State of UP[2]
This marked the initial instance in which the inquiry emerged as to whether the right to privacy could be inferred from the prevailing Fundamental Rights, specifically Article 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e), and 21. Empirical evidence: Several police laws, lacking legal basis, granted officers the authority to conduct surveillance on individuals whose names were listed on the "history-sheet" maintained as a record of persons who had previously committed or were anticipated to engage in repeated offences.

The definition of surveillance under the contested regulation encompassed clandestine picketing of the residence, extended stays during the night, regular inquiries regarding the individual, monitoring his movements, and similar activities.

The petitioner contended that the restriction in question infringes upon his right to personal liberty, as stipulated by Article 19(1)(d) and Article 21. The court's interpretation of the matter is as follows: During the process of delineating the parameters of article 21, the court was also confronted with the task of interpreting the presence of the right to privacy. The majority court observed that the Constitution does not explicitly provide any similar constitutional protection. Js. Subba Rao, the judge who expressed a minority opinion, said that the right to privacy may be deduced from the phrase 'personal liberty' as stated in Article 21.

The observer noted that the right to personal liberty encompasses not just the freedom from limitations on one's travels, but also the freedom from intrusions into one's private life. While it is accurate that our constitution does not explicitly recognise the right to privacy as a Fundamental Right, it is widely acknowledged that this right is a crucial component of human liberty. In democratic nations, the institution of home life is highly revered and held in high regard. The decision in this case has been overturned to the degree that it fails to respect the constitutional protection of the right to privacy.

Relevant Case Laws:

Gobind v State of Madhya Pradesh [3]
Facts: The petitioner is charged with a range of offences between 1960 and 1969. Some of them, he claimed, are false. He was found guilty of trespassing in 1962 and house breaking the following year. In the meantime, the M.P. Government introduced two regulations, 855 and 856 of the "Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations," which required the names of people suspected of criminal activity to be entered in a register and kept under surveillance, leading to irregular visits to the homes of those on the list. Govind was consequently marked as a "habitual criminal" and put under observation. He alleged that during these visits, officers would beat him.[4]

He challenged the validity of the regulations and contested that they breach his right to privacy. Decision: His petition was rejected. According to the court, article 21 was not violated by the impugned regulations as they follow the "procedure established by law." However, court accepted a limited Fundamental Right to Privacy "as an emanation from art 19(1)(a),(d) and art 21." Privacy is subjected to reasonable restrictions in the interest of the public.

Js. Mathew observed : "The right to privacy in any event will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by case development. Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterize as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute." He further stated4 : "Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right, that fundamental right must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest."
R. Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu[5]
Facts: A prisoner named Shankar, sentenced to death penalty, was prevented from publishing his autobiography. The state assumed that it contains information regarding several incidents that may expose the wrongdoings of the state and cause damage to its reputation. Shankar's wife gave the book to petitioners, a Tamil Weekly Magazine "Nakkheeran" for publication. The IG of Prisons sent a letter to the petitioners claiming that the autobiography is false and the same should not be published violation of which would compel them to take legal action against the publishers. 3 4 Ibid, at 1386. 13 Issue with respect to article 21 was "whether a state has a right to prevent the publication of the book if it causes any infringement to the state's right to privacy." [6]

Decision: "The court took this opportunity to assert that right to privacy has acquired constitutional status. A citizen has the right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. No one can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent without his consent whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory and critical. Exception may be made if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into a controversy or any of these matters becomes part of public records or relates to an action of a public official concerning the discharge of his official duty."
People's Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India[7]
Facts: Section 5(2) of the "Indian Telegraph Act, 1885" was under challenge. The petitioner reported incidents of telephone tapping of politicians by Central Bureau of Investigation. It was disclosed that MTNL has lapsed in maintain records of phone interception. Several other agencies were also not maintaining proper records. Under the impugned section, CBI authorizes central agencies to intercept messages for the interest of public safety.

Issues:
1. Whether Section 5(2) of the Act was used to infringe the right to privacy; and
2. Whether there was a need to read down Section 5(2) of the Act to include procedural safeguards in order to preclude arbitrariness and prevent indiscriminate phone tapping.
Decision:
The court ruled that telephone communication is encompassed under the right to privacy. The assertion that the right to engage in a telephone conversation within the confines of one's residence or workplace without external interference can be seen as a manifestation of the right to privacy is indeed valid. Telephone conversations frequently exhibit a personal and confidential nature. The utilisation of telephone communication has become an integral aspect of contemporary human existence.

The act of intercepting telephone communications is a significant infringement against an individual's right to privacy. The right to privacy include the protection of telephone conversations conducted inside the confines of one's residence or workplace. This implies that the conduct of telephone tapping would be a violation of Article 21, unless it is authorised in accordance with the legally established procedure. The method must adhere to principles of justice, fairness, and reasonableness.

The act of a husband recording conversations between his wife and others with the intention of presenting them as evidence in court might be seen as a violation of the wife's right to privacy, as protected by Article 21.
Rayala M. Bhuvneswari v. Nagaphomender Rayala[8]
The petitioner initiated legal proceedings by filing a divorce petition in the Court against his spouse. In order to support his claims, he requested to present a hard disc containing recorded conversations of his wife with individuals in the United States. The individual refuted several aspects of the dialogue. The Court ruled that the husband's behaviour of covertly intercepting his wife's conversations with others by tapping was deemed unlawful and constituted a violation of her right to privacy as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.

Even if these discussions are factually accurate, they cannot be considered admissible as proof. The spouse cannot be compelled to perform a voice analysis test, and afterwards requested the expert to compare the section of speech that she has disputed with her acknowledged vocal recordings.

The Court noted that the fundamental foundation of marriage lies in the purity of the bond between spouses. The spouse surreptitiously recorded the individual's telephone conversations with their friends and parents in India, unbeknownst to the individual. The aforementioned action constitutes a blatant violation of the wife's right to privacy. If a husband possesses such characteristics and lacks trust in his wife, even about her communication with her parents, then the institution of marriage itself loses its purpose.
Mr. X v. Hospital Z[9]
Facts: A man was supposed to marry his fianceé but it was called off since he was diagnosed as an HIV positive patient and his doctor disclosed this fact to his fianceé. The man contended that the respondent hospital and doctor had breached their duty under medical ethics by disclosing the information.

Decision: It was held that where there is a clash of two fundamental rights, as in the instant case, namely, the appellant's right to privacy as a part of right to life and other person's right to lead a healthy life which is her fundamental right u/a 21, the right which would advance the public morality or public interest, would alone be enforced through the process of Court, for the reason that moral consideration cannot be kept at bay and judges are not expected to sit as mute structures of clay as in Hail, known as Courtroom but have to be sensitive, "in the sense that they must keep their fingers firmly upon the pulse of the accepted morality of the day".
State of Maharashtra vs Madhulkar Narayan[10]
Facts: The Respondent, a police officer, reportedly forced sexual contact with Banubi in her hutment. She refused and subsequently filed a formal complaint against the Respondent, who claimed he was conducting a prohibition raid at her home and found booze near her flat. After Banubi complained, a departmental inquiry was held. The Respondent was accused of attempting forcible sexual contact with Banubi and fabricating records to cover up his prohibition raid. Banubi confessed to cheating while married during the probe. The departmental inquiry found the Respondent guilty of "perverse conduct" and fired him. The Respondent filed a petition with the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, which overturned the deportation order due to Banubi's questionable morality. Supreme Court reviews High Court order.

Issues:
1. Whether the High Court had a good reason to not believe Banubi's statement when deciding that the Respondent was guilty; and
2. Whether the Respondent had enough evidence to defend himself against the charges.
Decision: Upon careful examination of the case history, the Supreme Court discovered compelling evidence and logical arguments that substantiated the decision to enforce the order of removal. Notably, the Court considered the credibility of Banubi, whose questionable reputation rendered it improbable for them to fabricate a complaint against a law enforcement official and then face retribution from the police. The available evidence corroborated Banubi's testimony, whereas the Respondent's case exhibited notable deficiencies, such as inconsistencies in the statements provided by two police constables who allegedly participated in the raid.

The Court observed that the cross-examination of Banubi and her husband did not show any significant vulnerabilities. The Court held a contrary position to that of the High Court, holding that the evidence presented was not inadequate in establishing the guilt of the Respondent. The Supreme Court determined that the High Court engaged in a reassessment of the evidence, notwithstanding its lack of jurisdiction over the matter.

The Court asserted that everyone, regardless of their moral character, had the right to privacy, emphasising that even a woman who engages in promiscuous behaviour is entitled to this fundamental right, and any infringement upon her private is unconstitutional. The High Court rendered Banubi's evidence inadmissible based on her perceived lack of chastity, which led to doubts regarding her credibility in damaging the career of a public servant. However, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Banubi had demonstrated honesty in disclosing her background. Notwithstanding the directive from the High Court, the Supreme Court reinstated the termination of the Respondent.

End Notes: