The term 'Interpretation' originates from the Latin word 'interpretari', which
denotes the act of explaining, expounding, understanding, or translating. In the
legal context, interpretation refers to the process of ascertaining the true and
accurate intention of the law-making body, as expressed in the form of statutes.
This facilitates the identification of the author's intent.
Interpretation of data involves analyzing the available information and arriving
at a definitive and lucid opinion. This enhances an individual's capacity to
comprehend and articulate the data in their own manner. It also enables the
interpreter to uncover alternative meanings of the statute, leading to a novel
interpretation that deviates from the conventional understanding.
The primary function of a court is to interpret the law. When a dispute arises,
the court is tasked with interpreting the legislature's intent as expressed in
the statute. To achieve this, the court must determine the legislature's
intention in the language used in the statute. However, the court is not at
liberty to interpret the law arbitrarily. Instead, certain principles, known as
rules of interpretation, have evolved through the continuous exercise of the
courts.
The terms interpretation and construction are often used interchangeably,
although they may have different meanings in jurisprudence. Interpretation
refers to the process of determining the true meaning of an enactment by giving
the words their natural and ordinary meaning. On the other hand, construction
involves drawing conclusions based on the true spirit of the enactment, even if
this is not apparent from the words used in the statute.
A mandatory statute is a legal provision that requires the execution of specific
actions or mandates that a particular task must be performed in a particular
manner or format. On the other hand, a directory statute merely provides
guidance or permission for a task to be carried out without mandating its
execution. In certain instances, the conditions or formats stipulated by the
statute have been deemed crucial to the Act or task regulated by it, and their
omission has been deemed detrimental to its validity. In other cases, such
requirements have been viewed as mere guidelines, and their disregard results in
nothing more than a potential penalty for violating the law. A mandatory
provision must be strictly adhered to, while substantial compliance with a
directory provision is sufficient.
The Need Of Interpretation of Penal Statutes
Ambiguity of the words used in the statute: Sometimes there will be words that
have more than one meaning. And it may not be clear which meaning has to be
used. There could be multiple interpretations made out of it.
Change in the environment: It is widely acknowledged that societal norms and
values are subject to change over time, and new developments may arise that have
not been accounted for. This can result in a lack of predictability regarding
future events.
Complexities of the statutes: Statutes are typically intricate and extensive,
consisting of intricate terminology, jargon, and technical language that can be
challenging to comprehend. This level of complexity can result in confusion.
When legislation doesn't cover a specific area: Legislations often exhibit
limitations, leaving certain areas unaddressed and creating ambiguous spaces. In
such instances, interpretation plays a crucial role in bridging these gaps and
providing clarity.
Drafting error: The drafting process may be undertaken without adequate subject
knowledge, potentially resulting in the omission of essential words and the use
of incorrect grammar. Consequently, the resulting draft may lack clarity and
introduce ambiguity into the legislative framework.
Incomplete rules: There exist a limited number of unspoken rules and
regulations, as well as certain unmentioned powers and privileges, which are not
explicitly outlined in the statute. When these aspects are inadequately defined
within the statute, it results in a state of ambiguity.
General Rule of Interpretation of Penal Statutes
Penal statutes are defined as legislative enactments that impose criminal
liability on individuals found guilty of committing an offense. The term "penal"
denotes the imposition of punishment by the State against the offender.
According to Halsbury's Laws of England, a penal statute is one that is
primarily intended to be enforced through the imposition of fines, imprisonment,
or other forms of punishment. A statute is considered penal if it imposes a
fine, penalty, or forfeiture, except for liquidated damages or other civil
remedies.
When interpreting a provision in a penal statute, any reasonable doubt or
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the individual who would be subject to
the penalty. If a penal provision can reasonably be interpreted in a way that
avoids punishment, it must be construed in that manner. In cases where there are
two reasonable interpretations of a penal provision, the more lenient
interpretation should be applied. Punishment can only be imposed on an
individual if the plain words of the penal provision clearly include that
person. It is not permissible to extend the meaning of the words to impose a
penalty. Furthermore, a penalty cannot be imposed solely based on the desired
objective of a statute.
Strict Rule of Interpretation of Penal Statutes
It is a fundamental principle that penal enactments should be interpreted
strictly and not expanded beyond their intended scope. According to Crawford,
criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, meaning they cannot be
enlarged or extended through inference, implication, or equitable
considerations. In other words, the language of the statute cannot be stretched
beyond its ordinary meaning in order to achieve the general purpose for which it
was enacted.
The rule of strict construction requires that the language of a
statute be interpreted in a way that no case should be considered within its
scope unless it falls within a reasonable interpretation of the statute. It has
also been established that when interpreting a penal statute, the principle of
favorability to the subject should be applied in cases of doubt.
However, these
rules do not undermine the fundamental principles of interpretation, which state
that the primary criterion is the language used in the Act, and when the words
are clear and unambiguous, the court is obligated to uphold the expressed
intention of the legislature.
Basis of Strict Rule of Interpretation of Penal Statutes
The principle of strict construction of penal statutes is rooted in the law's
concern for protecting individual rights and the fundamental principle that the
authority to define a crime and establish its punishment lies with the
legislature, not the judiciary. It is reasonable to expect that the legislature
will clearly express its intent in penal statutes. It is not within the court's
jurisdiction to create an offense through interpretation, as this could
potentially ensnare unsuspecting and uninformed individuals and jeopardize the
rights of the general public. The rule of strict construction in penal statutes
originated in England during a time when English law imposed excessively severe
penalties and extreme sentences for minor offenses.
For example, pickpocketing
was punishable by public hanging, cutting down a cherry tree in an orchard was a
capital offense, and flicking a handkerchief could result in deportation to
Australia. The purpose of strict construction was to mitigate the severity of
such harsh sentences and broad condemnations. Although the circumstances that
necessitated this rule have changed over time, the distinction in approach
between penal statutes and other statutes remains. However, the application of
this rule is now limited and only comes into play when there are two or more
reasonable interpretations to choose from.
According to Maxwell, the rule of strict construction of penal statutes
manifests itself in four ways:
- Express language is necessary for the creation of criminal offenses, therefore, no act is to be deemed criminal unless it is clearly made so by words of the statute concerned. However, it is not necessary that a particular penalty be specified in order that an act or omission may constitute an offense.
- The words setting out the elements of an offense are to be strictly construed. And if there is any reasonable doubt or ambiguity it will be resolved in favour of the person charged. A reasonable interpretation that will avoid the penalty must be adopted. If there are two reasonable constructions, the court must give the more lenient one. The court must always see that the person to be penalized comes fairly and squarely within the plain words of the enactment.
- Punishments can be imposed only if the circumstances of the case fall clearly within the words of the enactment.
- Similarly, statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedure are, if they relate to the infliction of penalties, strictly construed.
The principle mandating the strict construction of all penal statutes has
been elucidated by Lord Justice James in a case representing the Privy Council:
The Court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain
meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words on any notion that
there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omissus; that the thing is so
clearly within the mischief that it must have been included if thought of. On
the other hand, the person charged has the right to say that the thing charged,
although within the words, is not within the spirit of the enactment. \
But where
the thing is brought within the words, and within the spirit , there a penal
enactment is to be construed, like any other instrument , according to fair
common sense of the language used, and the court is not to find or make any
doubt or ambiguity which would clearly is not to find or make any doubt or
ambiguity which would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any
other enactment" (
London Railway Co. v Be& N. Eastern Berriman, 1946 , I ALL ER
255, p 270 HL)
Procedure of Strict Rule of Interpretation of Penal Statutes
The principle of strict construction of a penal statute dictates that it should
be interpreted narrowly, with a bias towards the person being prosecuted. This
rule reflects a preference for protecting the individual's freedom when there is
ambiguity in the language of the statute. It is a well-established principle
that if the words used in a criminal statute can reasonably be interpreted in
two ways, the interpretation that benefits the accused should be favored.
However, it is important to consider the context in which the relevant words are
used when constructing their meaning.
In the absence of clear language within a statute indicating criminality, it
shall not be interpreted as such. In instances where the wording outlining the
elements of an offense is ambiguous, creating doubt as to whether the act or
omission in question falls within the statutory language, any such ambiguity
will be resolved in favor of the accused. The court will only impose punishment
upon an individual when the circumstances of the case unambiguously align with
the letter of the law.
In
Seksaria Cotton Mill Limited Company v State of Bombay, (AIR 1953 SC 278)
In accordance with a notification issued under the Essential Supplies Act 1946,
it was mandatory for every manufacturer to provide accurate and truthful
information regarding their transactions. Furthermore, the act defined delivery
as the physical transfer of goods. In this case, the appellant had sold some
bales to a purchaser who, due to a dispute with the appellant, did not take
physical possession of the goods.
Instead, the appellant instructed their agent
to store the bales in a warehouse until the dispute was resolved. However, the
appellant recorded these bales as delivered in their return book. As a result,
the High Court convicted the appellant for failing to provide actual physical
delivery.
However, upon appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
appellant. The Supreme Court stated that when a penal statute allows for
multiple reasonable interpretations, the one that favors the accused should be
adopted. In this instance, it was determined that since the goods were indeed
physically delivered to the appellant's agent, the requirements of the Act were
satisfied without distorting the language.
Beneficial Construction
In cases where there are two potential constructions, the court is obligated to
consider the interpretation that exempts the individual from penalty, rather
than the one that imposes penalty in situations where ambiguity exists and the
legislature has not clearly expressed itself. The code demonstrates a preference
for the freedom of the individual and resolves any doubts in favor of the
individual. The court is not authorized to expand the meaning of an expression
to include situations that would not have been reasonably interpreted under the
provision.
In
M.V. Joshi v M.U.Shimpi (AIR 1961 SC 14940)-,
The appellant was found guilty under section 16 of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act 1954 for the sale of adulterated butter. The appellant argued
that the product sold did not fall under the definition of butter as per the
rules established under the Act, as butter is defined as a product made from
milk, whereas the appellant had sold butter made from curd. Additionally, the
appellant contended that as the Act is a penal statute, the term butter must be
strictly interpreted in favor of the accused.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's argument, stating that the strict
construction of a penal statute requires that the conduct of the accused must
fall within the plain words of the statute without distorting their natural
meaning.
If the conduct does not fall within the plain meaning of the words
used, and there are two reasonable interpretations, the interpretation that is
more lenient towards the accused must be accepted. In other words, the court
must ensure that the conduct charged is an offense within the plain meaning of
the words used, without distorting the words. The principle of strict
construction dictates that the language of a statute should be interpreted in a
manner that excludes any case that does not reasonably fall within its scope.
Furthermore, it has been established that when interpreting a penal statute, a
key principle is to favor the subject in cases of uncertainty.
However, these
rules do not undermine the fundamental principles of interpretation, which
assert that the primary criterion is the language employed in the Act. When the
words are unambiguous, the court is obligated to uphold the expressed intention
of the legislature. In the present case, the term "butter" is unequivocal and
does not admit multiple interpretations. Therefore, there is no need to consider
an interpretation in favor of the subject.
The appellant's argument that butter
made from curd is not covered by the rules established under the Act is
unfounded, as butter remains butter regardless of whether it is made from milk
or curd. The legislature's intention is evident from the language used, leaving
no room for doubt.
Purposive Interpretation of Penal Statutes
It is not imperative for courts to consistently favor interpretations that are
advantageous to the accused rather than the prosecution. Instead, they may opt
for interpretations that align with the objectives outlined in the law.
In
Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra, (1977 SCR (1) 1)
When addressing the provisions of the Food Adulteration Act, it was emphasized
that the interpretative process should be guided by the social mission of food
laws. This approach ensures that legal measures are effectively applied to all
individuals involved in adulteration practices. It is important to discourage
any narrow, pedantic, literal, or lexical interpretations that may create
loopholes for these dangerous criminals to evade legal consequences. The new
criminal jurisprudence must deviate from the old principles that favor accused
individuals and hinder the enforcement of criminal statutes designed to
safeguard public health and national wealth.
Suppression of the Mischief
The language utilized in the penal statute may be subject to interpretation that
effectively addresses any gaps and thwarts any potential harm in accordance with
the principles established in Heydon's Case.(3 Co Rep 7a)
In
Igbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (AIR 2005 SC 2119)-
The Supreme Court has observed that Section 195(i)(b)(ii) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) is applicable only when the
offenses listed in the provision are committed in relation to a document after
it has been presented or submitted as evidence in a court proceeding,
specifically during the period when the document is under the custody of the
court. It is important to note that the principle of strict interpretation of
statutes that establish offenses or impose penalties is not universally
applicable and may not be necessary in every case. Instead, penal provisions
should be interpreted in a manner that suppresses any wrongdoing and promotes
the objectives intended by the legislature.
In
Lalita Jalan v Bombay Gas Company Ltd (AIR 2003 SC 3157)-
The Supreme Court has observed that according to section 630 of the Companies
Act 1956, the act of wrongfully withholding a company's property is subject to a
fine as punishment. However, it is only considered an offense when a court
orders the defaulter to return or refund the property, and if this court order
is not complied with. Consequently, this provision cannot be classified as a
penal provision since it lacks the typical elements of a crime and punishment.
Therefore, it should not be interpreted strictly.
Interpretation of Special Penal Statutes
In
Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v Jitendra Bhimraj-(1990) 4 SCC 76 )
The Court was deliberating on the application of the Terrorists and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 in relation to a dispute between two opposing
factions in a village. One of the parties had made references to gaining
dominance in the criminal underworld by eliminating their rival faction.
However, the Court dismissed the application of the TADA in this particular
situation and made the following observation:
"The utilization of the Act is unnecessary if the accused's activities can be
controlled and regulated under the existing laws of the country. The Act should
only be employed in cases where the law enforcement agencies find the ordinary
laws insufficient or ineffective in addressing the threat posed by terrorist and
disruptive activities. When invoking a criminal statute, such as the Act, it is
the duty of the prosecution to demonstrate, based on the case record and
collected documents during the investigation, that the facts presented prima
facie constitute an offense as defined by the law.
When a statute imposes
special or enhanced punishments compared to those prescribed for similar
offenses under the regular penal laws of the country, the judge bears a higher
responsibility and duty to ensure that there is prima facie evidence supporting
the charges brought by the prosecution. Therefore, when a law imposes severe
penal consequences on an individual, extra caution must be exercised to prevent
those whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the explicit language
of the statute from being implicated by stretching the interpretation of the
law.
However, this does not imply that the judicial officer tasked with
determining whether or not a case warrants framing charges under the Act should
adopt a negative stance. If the prosecution demonstrates that the material
presented on record and the relied-upon documents give rise to a strong
suspicion of the accused having committed the alleged crime, a charge should be
framed."
Therefore, even when considering a strict and literal interpretation of a penal
statute, it may not always be the preferred approach. Instead, the law should be
interpreted in light of the nature of the offense and the intended purpose of
the legislation. The purpose of the law is not to allow offenders to evade
punishment. Therefore, a penal statute can also be interpreted to fill any gaps,
prevent harm, and promote the intended remedy, as outlined in the rule in
Heydon's case. Additionally, a common-sense approach to determining the
applicability of a penal law is not prohibited by the principle of strict
construction. The court cannot limit the broad language used by the legislature,
which aligns with the objectives of the statute.
It has been noted that the responsibility of the court is to interpret the
statute to the best of its ability, recognizing that statutes are intended to be
effective rather than ineffective, and that only in cases of absolute
impossibility should a court deem a statute unenforceable.
It is evident that penal provisions cannot be impliedly extended to specific
cases or circumstances. There is no presumption of constructive commission of a
crime. Penal statutes typically have a prospective application. If there is a
reasonable interpretation that avoids a penalty, it must be accepted.
When a
provision can be reasonably interpreted in multiple ways, the interpretation
that causes hardship or injustice must be avoided. When interpreting a penal
statute, it must be remembered that punishment can only be imposed when the accused's conduct clearly falls within the letter of the law. The use of violent
language does not permit an enactment entailing penal consequences to be brought
within the express words of the Act.
However, a penal statute must not be
construed in a way that narrows down its words to exclude cases that would
ordinarily fall within its scope. An accused can argue that their conduct,
although falling within the express language of the statute, is against its
spirit. Nevertheless, if the conduct is both within the letter of the law and
its spirit, the court must interpret it like any other statute according to its
fair and common-sense meaning.
Thus the rule regarding the interpretation of penal statutes can be summarized
as follows:
- As a general principle, penal statutes ought to be interpreted strictly. In other words, if there are two plausible and rational interpretations of a penal provision, the court must favor the construction that absolves the individual from punishment, rather than the one that imposes it. It is not within the court's jurisdiction to expand the meaning of a term used by the legislature to fulfill the legislature's intent. The responsibility of defining a crime and prescribing its penalty lies solely with the legislature, not the court.
- In instances where a subsequent penal statute introduces a novel mode of punishment, such as the transformation of a fine into imprisonment, it is deemed that the two statutes operate in a cumulative manner.
- By substituting a distinct penalty, such as increasing a fine from its original amount, an implicit revocation of the preceding legislation is inferred.
- Where a later statute gives a new form of procedure, for example when the procedure for trial of a non-cognizable offence is altered to the procedure for trial of a cognizable one, the two Acts are considered as cumulative.
- In the event that a deviation occurs in the established procedure, such as the introduction of a right of appeal where none previously existed, it can be inferred that the earlier statute has been implicitly repealed.
- In cases where there is a modification in the significance or conditions of a preexisting offense, it can be inferred that the earlier statute is repealed.
- Section 26 of the General Clauses Act pertains to the regulation of offences that are punishable under multiple enactments. It stipulates that if an act or omission qualifies as an offence under two or more enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and penalized under any of those enactments, but shall not face double punishment for the same offence.
- In a contemporary welfare State, numerous statutes exist to prohibit specific actions. If the legislative body solely declares an act as invalid and offers compensation as a means of rectification for the affected individual, it will be categorized as a remedial statute. However, if the statute additionally includes penalties for non-compliance with the law, such as imprisonment or fines, it will be classified as a penal statute.
- A remedial statute should be interpreted in a broad and generous manner. In instances where there is uncertainty regarding its meaning, the interpretation should lean towards favoring the group of individuals intended to benefit from the statute. Conversely, a penal statute should be interpreted strictly. In situations where doubt arises, the interpretation should lean towards favoring the accused.
- A statute can possess both penal and remedial characteristics, and these aspects may be present within the same legislation. In such instances, the guiding principle of interpretation is as follows: it is important to remember that while the statute and its accompanying rules aim to provide protection for a specific group of individuals, any violation of these provisions will result in penal repercussions. Therefore, when penalties are imposed, it is not permissible to distort the language of the rule, regardless of its well-intentioned purpose, beyond its fair and ordinary meaning.
Conclusion
Previously, it was commonly held that penal statutes should be interpreted
strictly in favor of the accused. However, two opposing developments have since
influenced the interpretation of such statutes. Firstly, the reduction of
punishments has alleviated the pressure on courts to strictly construe statutes
in favor of the accused. Secondly, the modern imperative of crime control has
led to a legislative intention for rigorous implementation, prompting courts to
emphasize strict interpretation of statutes, regardless of whether it favors the
accused.The intention of the legislature is now recognized as the driving force
behind statutory interpretation.
References:
- GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, XIII Ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, 212 239-240
- Statute Interpretation: Everything important you should know about - written by Karunashankar K.N.
- The Interpretation Of Statutes - Prof. T. Bhattacharyya
- Maxwell Interpretation Of Statutes, 12th Edition
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