The aim of this research paper is to critically examine the timeline-based
relationship of two of the most well-established Asian nations, namely India and
China. The paper lays emphasis on tracing the controversial bond of these two
nations post the attainment of their respective independence.
The paper discusses the wide-ranging reasons that have caused a fracture in the
diplomatic relations of these two nations.
The research-based paper inculcates the key events that shaped the twisted
relation between the two.
Yet surprisingly for 2 states of such growing importance and with an upscale and
sometimes fractious history, their relationship seems to an out of doors eye
largely reactive and, more broadly, adrift.
However, this may require careful management of bilateral irritants and
potential regional crises. A more systematic dialogue process, going well beyond
high-level visits, that acknowledges their differences rather than emphasising
imagined similarities could lay the foundations for a stronger understanding of
the domestic compulsions that drive each nation's policy.
Introduction
The relationship that the two of the most influential Asiatic nations, India and
China share are not a subject of no disclosure. People all over the globe are
aware of the relationship between the two.
Although, the relationship between them is transparent and visible to the world,
yet the information regarding the events that influenced or affected the
relations are not much publicized.
The paper aims at briefly discussing these events and analyse the situation post
the attainment post respective independence.
The two world powers bully off against each other along their disputed border
within the Himalayan region.
The root cause is an ill-defined, 3,440km (2,100-mile)-long disputed border.
The military stand-off is mirrored by growing political tension, which has
strained ties between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President
Xi Jinping.
Though both countries profess a desire to work closely to resolve disagreements,
have rapidly expanding economic relations, and often engage in strategic
cooperation.
While promising a healthy bilateral relationship and peaceful rise together on a
worldwide stage, enhancing engagement between China and India also faces a
variety of strategic challenges.
Irrespective of the character of the bilateral relationship, the strategic
discord between India and China do and can produce uncertain geopolitical
consequences at both bilateral and regional levels.
China informed India that it should be "happy" with what has been achieved
regarding the disengagement in the Pangong Tso area.
The Timeline
The Sino-Indian relations were not always such twisted and controversial.
Historical traces of the Indus Valley excavations have proved that both the
nations took part in active cultural exchanges and were sort of allies. Examples
of cultural exchanges could be the transmission of Buddhism into China and
mentions of pre existing Chinese states in Indian epics like Mahabharata and
Arthshastra¹(Tansen Sen (January 2003). Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The
Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations. University of Hawaii Press)
Economic activities were conducted as well between the nations via the famous
Silk Road. The route was also used for inflow of scholars and traders into each
others' territories.
It was the colonial era where relations between the two took a turn. The British
oppressors appointed Indians as their foot soldiers to represent them in the war
against China's Qing dynasty. ² (The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P.
Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (January
1960), pp. 96-125). Although the Indians were not fighting willingly, yet the
Chinese perceived this move as intruding. This instance laid the foundation for
sour relations between the two.
Fast forward to the post independence era, India attained independence from
British colonial rulers on 15 August 1947 whereas, The People's Republic of
China was formed on 1 October 1949 after a successful communist revolution.
India established relations with the People's Republic of China on 1 April 1950
and became the first non communist or socialist nation to do so in the continent
of Asia.
The relations began on a peaceful and optimistic note.
India, in order to prove itself as an ally, even condemned The United Nations'
resolutions in 1950 which showcased China as an aggressor in the Korean War.
October 1950 brought about a change as the Chinese troops began circling around
the Sino-Tibetan border. This went on until May 1951 and then China directly
asked for full suzerainty over Tibet from its governor. India being a democratic
nation expressed its concern over China's move to boss around Tibet.
However, moving forward, on 15 May 1954, Then Indian Prime Minister Mr
Jawaharlal Nehru and The Chinese Premier Mr Zhou Enlai came together to sign the
Panchsheel document (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence). These five
principles were mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual
non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and
cooperation for mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. They were even added
in the preamble of the Chinese constitution for highlighting the significance of
the document. ³ (Paranjpe V.V.2004-06-26). "Panchsheel: The untold story".
Hindustan Times.)
The principles of the document were respected and followed by both the nations
until March when India protested the inclusion of a piece of its northern
frontier on China's official map, claiming it violates the document of
Panchsheel.
After series of legal and official negotiations, India formally transferred
control of all communication services in Tibet to China through a protocol
signed in Lhasa on 1 April 1955.
Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Nehru together promoted the Bandung Spirit
of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation in 1955 at the Asian-African
Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, which had 29 participating nations.
In November 1956, the Chinese premier came to India with a goodwill mission. He
assured the Indian Prime Minister on the note of following the Panchsheel
principles and to stay fair.
Within the span of a month after the goodwill mission, Chinese nationals were
detained while illegally entering into the Indian territory in Ladakh. As a
gesture of peace, they were respectfully returned back to their nation.
Indian Vice President, Mr S Radhakrishnan went to china in the autumn of 1957 to
meet Chairman Mao. Both the leaders proceeded to appreciate each other but the
meeting took on a sour note when Vice President broke every protocol
requirement. Mao received a pat on the right cheek. The Chairman was surprised.
Everybody there froze. Twelve words from Dr. Radhkrishanan eased the stress.
"Don't panic, Mr. Chairman. I treated Stalin the same way.
The Vice President was treated with the utmost respect and courtesy. His papers
were well-known among academics in China. By all accounts, the visit was a
success.
Yet, three years later when the Chinese Prime Minister came to Delhi to meet the
Indian Prime Minister, he called out the Indian Vice President's move and felt
it was not a formal thing to do.
The inclusion of a sizable portion of Northern Assam and NEFA in the China
Pictorial, a publication that represents the Chinese People's Republic, had
drawn official opposition from India in the month of September in 1958.
On 23 January 1959, the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, spelled out against India
and claimed over 40,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and NEFA as
their own.
Such a statement from the premier himself worsened the situation between the two
nations.
The situation was further complicated when the Dalai Lama escaped China occupied
territory and moved into India with his disciples and followers. India granted
them asylum. China condemned that India gave protection to a man and community
stated as wanted in China. China wanted to exercise control over the Dalai Lama
in order to gain power over the Tibetan community and when India interrupted by
providing asylum to these people, China decided to turn on the principles of
Panchsheel.
Furious with India's decision to grant asylum to Dalai Lama, China adopted a
strategic warfare program. With Zhou Enlai claiming that China was not a party
to the 1842 Peace Treaty between British India and England, China refused to
accept the Mc Mohan Line. Beijing had asserted sovereignty over about 50,000
square miles of Indian territory in Bhutan and Sikkim in 1959.
Zhou Enlai and Nehru's meeting in New Delhi to discuss the boundary issue came
to a stalemate in April 1960.
Further in February 1961, China refused to discuss the Sino-Bhutanese and Sino-Sikkimese
boundary disputes and further occupied 12,000 square miles in the western sector
of the Sino-Indian border.
To stop the Chinese forces at the border from advancing, India implements the
Forward Policy. It creates symbolic outposts in Ladakh with the intention of
reclaiming land and preventing further intrusion. However, arrangements and
execution of this policy were not much adequate on the ground level and;
The communist regime-based government of China did not stop here. They took
things much farther from mutual and peaceful co-existence when in October 1962,
Chinese forces shelled the Chushul airport and attacked Tawang, Walong, and
Rezang La in the western sector. Bomdila was captured by Chinese forces in the
NEFA region.
India never had any reason to believe that China would ever attack, yet it did.
On October 20, 1962, India was attacked, beginning the infamous Sino-Indian War
of 1962. The Indian army was unable to prepare since it believed it would never
be attacked by China, which led to a standoff between 10,000-20,000 Indian
troops and 80,000 Chinese troops. After nearly a month, the battle came to an
end on November 21 when China issued a truce.
⁴ (https://www-indiatoday-in.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/www.indiatoday.in/amp/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/india-china-war-of-1962).
The former Prime Minister Mr Jawaharlal Nehru was bashed left and right by
defence experts who have had warned him about China's intentions. He was blamed
for being unaware, ignorant and blindly trusting towards China.
He was criticized as well for not properly using the arms and ammunition
available once the war was declared by China's end.
He tried to hold on a defensive position instead of going offensive and reverted
from using the Air Force which could have assisted the army and foot soldiers.
The 1962 border dispute had a significant effect on the two nations'
relationship. Even though their diplomatic ties were still intact, India and
China both withdrew their ambassadors and shuttered the General Consulate.
Economic, cultural, and non-governmental exchanges of any type between the two
nations were halted. A protracted and tense period began in India-China ties.
In December 1962, The Colombo proposal was endorsed. In a meeting in Colombo,
six non-aligned countries—Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana, and
Indonesia—developed these recommendations. Negotiated between Zhou Enlai and
Nehru, the proposals called for a 20-kilometer Chinese withdrawal from the
historic customary lines, as claimed by China, without a comparable Indian
withdrawal. Nehru refused to comment upon the situation and later on justified
his act by saying that it was not very rational to trust the Unconditional
proposal of China.
In the March of 1963, China signed a boundary settlement with India's arch
nemesis Pakistan.
Situation stayed neutral until 1965 where China again provoked India by accusing
it to cross the Sikkim-China border whereas Chinese troops themselves intruded
into the northern Sikkim and NEFA region once again. China was trying to play
hypocritical diplomacy at that moment of time.
Subsequently China gave Pakistan $60 million in 1965 along with military
hardware including tanks and aircraft as a financial aid to make up for
Pakistan's war losses. China's assistance to Pakistan during the Indo-Pak War in
1965 ultimately strengthened ties between the two countries. ⁵ (https://moderndiplomacy-eu.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/09/27/chinas-role-in-1965-indo-pak-war)
Ultimately, China siding with Pakistan during the war further worsened its ties
with India.
India Pushes China Back: 1967
Tensions came to a head again in 1967 along two mountain passes, Nathu La and
Cho La, that connected Sikkim — then a kingdom and a protectorate of India — and
China's Tibet Autonomous Region.
A scuffle broke out when Indian troops began laying wire along what they
recognized as the border. The scuffles soon escalated when a Chinese force began
firing artillery shells at the Indians. Within the following conflict, quite 150
Indians and 340 Chinese were killed.
The Indian Army decided to put an end to the daily nuisance by erecting an iron
fence on the Sikkim border. The Chinese opened artillery fire, killing dozens of
unprepared Indian soldiers who were busy constructing the fence in an open area.
Satisfied, the Chinese thought they had taught the Indians another lesson. This
bravado stemmed from a notion that India could be bullied because it had lost
the 1962 war and was forced to fight another one by Pakistan in 1965.
This was a rude shock to the Chinese. They realized that it was not
1962.Moreover, the country has strengthened infrastructure on the borders.
The clashes in September and October 1967 in those passes would later be
considered the second all-out war between China and India.
But India prevailed, destroying Chinese fortifications in Nathu La and pushing
them farther into their territory near Cho La. The change in positions, however,
meant that China and India each had different and conflicting ideas about the
situation of the road of Actual Control.
The fighting was the last time that troops on either side would be killed —
until the skirmishes within the Galwan Valley on Tuesday. Indian news outlets
reported that Chinese soldiers had also been killed, but Beijing was
tight-lipped.
China is worried also because India has reportedly carried out exercises on the
border. Not satisfied with just the DSDBO road, India is constructing an
alternative route to Karakoram Pass to keep an eye on Chinese activities.
Experts say that this access to the borders, and the capacity to move men and
materials quickly, has rattled China.
Border Issue
Beijing and New Delhi have found it difficult to secure substantial progress in
setting their Road tractor border dispute.
The interaction on the issue proceeds at a glacial pace and test of reciprocal
patience.
This dispute is increasingly important given that both countries are emerging
superpowers with modern militaries and nuclear weapons. Further, the two
countries account for 35 percent of the global population and 21 percent of the
global GDP.
To some extent, Beijing's ination on pushing for an early settlement is
attributed to New Delhi's inflexibility and intransigence in negotiations.
A variety of domestic political conferences also call into question the capital
of India's ability to practise 'Give-and-Take' formula. New Delhi's announcement
of an extra deployment of troops and complex SU-30 KM Combat aircraft along the
Himalayan Line of Actual Control(LAC) in 2009, in addition to stern exchanges
and heightened, hawkish rhetoric , Continue to remind the general public of
putting up with tensions along the border and of daunting obstacle in moving
towards a reputable partnership.
The border itself is divided into three sections and constitutes one of the
longest contested borders in the world:
- This section stretches east of Bhutan, where the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is claimed by the Chinese to be part of southern Tibet.
- This section is a narrow 50-mile stretch of land that spans between Nepal and Bhutan. This border region is small but strategically important to India in that it connects India's far eastern states with the bulk of the country. Parts of this region are claimed by Bhutan in addition to China and India.
- This section runs north of Tibet and borders the Indian territory of Ladakh and the Chinese region of Aksai Chin.
Bloodless Clashes:1987
The two countries have fought only one war, in 1962, when India suffered a
humiliating defeat.
But simmering tensions involve the risk of escalation - and that can be
devastating given both sides are established nuclear powers. There would also be
an economic fallout as China is one of India's biggest trading partners.
It would be 20 more years before India and China clashed again at the disputed
border.
In 1987, the Indian military was conducting a training operation to determine
how briskly it could move troops to the border. The massive number of troops and
material arriving next to Chinese outposts surprised Chinese commanders — who
responded by advancing toward what they considered the road of Actual Control.
Realizing the potential to inadvertently start a war, both India and China
de-escalated, and a crisis was averted.
The border dispute between India and China is one that is very important, given
the role that both countries play in the region and globally. The combination of
mistrust, a desire to exude dominance, and an ambiguous border has the potential
to eventually lead to a war. However, in the meantime, India and China will
likely maintain the standoff with little resolution.
Push Comes to Shove in Daulat Beg Oldi:
2013
Cat-and-mouse tactics unfolded on each side.
The strategically important road will pass through the Karakoram Wildlife
Sanctuary. Fifty-five hectares of the sanctuary will be used for building the
road while protecting wildlife. The wildlife board gave its go ahead for road
construction on March 25 on condition that an annual compliance report would be
submitted. The green signal was officially announced only this week though.
The new alignment to be developed by the Border Roads Organisation in
challenging terrain, for which a series of forest and wildlife clearances have
been sought on high priority, starts from Sasoma off the base of the Siachen
Glacier.
While a road from Sasoma to Saser La is under development and allows military
vehicles from Murgo off Depsang plains already, the stretch between Saser La to
Saser Brangsa has to be trekked on foot. Though a tunnel has been approved here
by the defence ministry, it will take a few years to be completed.
While an all-weather linkage is there between Leh and Sasoma, tunnels are
planned along the route to make it road worthy even in winters. One such tunnel
is expected to come up from Saser Brangsa.
After decades of patrolling the border, a Chinese platoon pitched a camp near
Daulat Beg Oldi in April 2013. The Indians soon followed, putting in their own
base fewer than 1,000 feet away.
The camps were later fortified by troops and heavy equipment.
By May, the edges had agreed to dismantle both encampments, but disputes about
the situation of the road of Actual Control persisted.
Bhutan Gets Caught in the Middle: 2017
With tensions still high along the India-China border, landlocked Bhutan is
struggling to both maintain its territory and keep both Asian powerhouses happy.
As Bhutan prepares for border talks with Beijing, the Himalayan kingdom has
indicated to India that it won't recognise China's claims to the Doklam plateau
in the discussions, people familiar with the situation said.
In June 2017, the Chinese set out to build a road within the Doklam Plateau, a
section of the Himalayas controlled not by India, but by its ally Bhutan.
The plateau lies on the border of Bhutan and China, but India sees it as a
buffer zone that's near other disputed areas with China.
Indian troops carrying weapons and operating bulldozers confronted the Chinese
with the intention of destroying the road. A standoff ensued, soldiers threw
rocks at one another, and troops from each side suffered injuries.
Bhutan, however, is wary of doing anything that could prompt it to get caught in
the middle of a conflict between India and China, the people added. The nation
plans to offer Beijing the prospect of eventual full diplomatic relations in
return for demarcating the northern border, they said, allowing it to sidestep
the issue of Doklam while stopping Chinese encroachment in other areas.
"China's interests lie in settling the dispute with Bhutan as soon as possible
so that it can use it to leverage its position in the future negotiations
between India and China," said Sana Hashmi, a visiting fellow at The Taiwan-Asia
Exchange Foundation. "For Bhutan, giving concessions to China on the trijunction
is not beneficial."
Still, India in some ways has pushed Bhutan to seek closer relations with China.
Ties came under strain earlier this year when Modi's government stopped vaccine
exports to Thimphu as Covid infections exploded within its borders.
"Even though India continues to be a far more important partner in the region,
it has to find a way to counter China's increasing footprints in its
neighborhood," Hashmi said. "To start with, investing in infrastructure
development, keeping its promises, and convincing that India treats its South
Asian neighbors as equal partners are the three most effective ways."
Brawls Break Out:
2020
In May, melees broke out several times. In one clash at the glacial lake Pangong
Tso, Indian troops were badly injured and had to be evacuated by helicopter.
Indian analysts said Chinese troops were injured as well.
As of the end of 2021, both India and China have handled the situation on the
Line of Actual Control with a great deal of discretion. To start with, China's
2020 operation was carefully crafted: it either targeted unheld areas on the
LAC, or resorted to blockades to prevent India patrolling the border up to its
claimed line. Strong Chinese forces were deployed to back up this operation, but
not strong enough to undertake a broad attack on Indian positions.
(Reference:-The NewYork Times)
PAKISTAN FACTOR AND INDO-PAK EQUATION
For India, China is the long-standing cordial play partnership with Pakistan and
has been and remains a major obstacle in the way of improving its ties with
Beijing.
Many Indians believe that it is Beijing's endorsement and support that has
emboldened Islamabad to challenge its preeminence in South Asia, which the core
of Sino-Pak strategic partnership is exclusively against India. Beijing
repeatedly denies this allegation and is vocal about its interest in nurturing
panelled relationships with both Islamabad and New Delhi, despite the actual
fact that the tangible substantial in its partnership with India is somewhat
limited .
For China, Pakistan is strategically important as a low-cost sustainable option
to contain India and also the US expansion in the region. China's thinking has
been to militarily strengthen a military-run but insecure state (Pakistan) which
would keep India perpetually distracted and slow down India's growth. Although
Beijing has maintained a No First Use nuclear doctrine, it supplied complete
nuclear weapon technology and delivery systems to Pakistan. Islamabad has been
more confident in conducting the covert war against India after it acquired
nuclear weapons (1987), and it continues to rationalise the First Use nuclear
doctrine and project a low nuclear threshold.
While Pakistan will continue to try to intensify its proxy war and anti-India
propaganda, at this point, it is likely to be inclined to exercise three
options:
- Pakistan would highlight its posture of victimhood and strengthen the narrative of its capability and willingness to defeat India's strategy.
- Pakistan is likely to push for more Chinese equipment in the coming times despite its economic challenges.
- Pakistan will continue to escalate the nuclear threat to push for the Kashmir agenda and attract global attention.
Moreover, China and India have been involved in a fierce contest for their
relations with smaller countries in the region, such as Nepal, Bangladesh,
Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.
The US factor in Sino - Indian engagement
The United States has developed complex relationships with both Beijing and New
Delhi . It is arguably believed that the strategic links of China in India with
Washington create a zero-sum effect on their bilateral strategic interaction.
- First of all, the US Input has affected the trajectory Of China's ties with
India.
- Secondly, few Chinese analysts doubt that upgrading Indo - US strategic ties
will produce geopolitical consequences dis favouring Beijing.
Beijing is concerned about any US driven strategic initiatives excluding China
and involving India in Asia and the Pacific region. As an often-cited example,
The Chinese media gave its strong reaction to the consignee formula of an '
Asian-Nato' in 2003 and lashed out at a quadrilateral joint naval exercise that
involved The US, India, Japan, Australia in April 2007.
Following President Barack Obama's visit to China in November 2009, New Delhi
became emotionally discontent with a reference to, in a joint statement, US
endorsement of China's role in facilitating the South Asian peace process and
diffusing Indo -Pak conflict. For both India and China , there is no doubt that
the perceived zero -sum effect of US diplomacy and security strategy on them has
to be moderated before this to rising powers can move toward more stable
relationship
The deepening of Indo-US ties through the nuclear deal, strategic military
agreements, supply of advanced military hardware, and Washington's Indo-Pacific
Strategy (which seeks to anchor India in its posture), have together
strengthened Beijing's distrust of New Delhi.
Trade fractions and economic impediments
While keeping a steady increase, the bilateral trade and economic ties between
the two nations have begun to experience some unfavourable challenges.
New Delhi complains that Beijing has become the real beneficiary of expanding
trade because the benefits mainly go to China rather than India. Even the trend
of bilateral trade indicates a continued broadening of this gap in the years to
come. The mounting anxiety of trade in balance urged The Indian government to
officially present a demarche to China during the bilateral Joint Economic group
meeting in Beijing in the early 2010.
As of now The total trade between China and India in 2021 stood at USD 125.66
billion, up 43.3 per cent from 2020, state-run Global Times reported, quoting
data from the General Administration of Customs.
China's exports to India from January to December rose 46.2 per cent to USD
97.52 billion, while India's exports to China grew by 34.2 per cent to USD 28.14
billion.
The trade deficit for India grew to USD 69.38 billion in 2021.
India has been highlighting its concerns over the growing trade deficit with
China for over a decade and calling on Beijing to open its markets for India's
IT and pharmaceutical products.
Observers say much of China's exports increase this year to India was attributed
to the import of medical products and raw materials for India's burgeoning
pharmaceutical industry due to the massive second wave of COVID-19 and recurring
bouts of the virus in the country.
The origins of widening disparity are multidimensional. According to Chinese
analysts, the prevailing trading problem primarily results from an M balanced
composition of trade and comparative disadvantages of Indian commodities.
On the other hand, New Delhi attributes the problem to restricted access to the
Chinese domestic market and China's less liberal trade policy and non-tariff
barriers.
Last but not least, there comes a pressing necessity to breathe more substance
into the existing framework of Sino Indian strategic partnership. So far, an
Institutionalised regime of strategic engagement and cooperation between China
and India has yet to be credibly established.
In such circumstances, it becomes highly necessary for both sides to activate
their multilayer strategic consultation and to reciprocate political Goodwill in
order to deepen strategic engagement in a constructive, credible and substantial
way. It is such an institutionalised engagement that can secure a healthy,
stable and constructive bilateral relationship between them. Achieving this goal
requires and deserves a concerted endeavour.
Conclusion:
Thoughts of policy:
In order to move the Sino Indian partnership forward and make it more credible,
major endeavours have to be made by both Beijing and New Delhi to produce
tangible results.
- Given that the unsettled border dispute is an outstanding issue in the way of bilateral relations, the political leadership of the two nations should seek an early settlement of the problem.
- At the operational level, there should be some key steps taken. To fulfil An early settlement, both governments have to preset calibrated policy directions objectives for the ongoing special Representatives dialogue on border issues, design a reasonable time frame and a clear-cut roadmap and perhaps more immediately, secure a reversible progress through negotiations.
- Given the fact that China and India have been engaging each other in South Asia, central Asia, ASEAN and the Indian Ocean, it is extremely important for both sides to reconcile their regional strategies in order to serve constructive purposes.
- There's an increase in net for China and India to devise an accommodative and non-confrontational regional agenda in their shared peripheries And in broader neighbourhoods.
- Promoting CBMs reciprocal has proven extremely helpful for Beijing and NewDelhi and removing misperceptions and miss readings of each other's strategic intentions.
As a result of a series of military and diplomatic talks, the two sides
completed the disengagement process in the Gogra area in August and in the north
and south banks of the Pangong lake in February.
The two sides held the 14 round of Corps Commander-level talks on January 12 to
resolve the standoff in the remaining areas and agreed to hold a new round of
talks soon.
Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) in the mountainous sector.
Neither side has a definitive advantage in technology that could provide them an
edge in a war. It would be a gruesome battle of attrition, which both sides
would naturally want to avoid.
Although the overall outcome of this dispute is uncertain, it will likely
continue for some time. Both sides appear to be using this border dispute to
create a sense of nationalism and restore faith in the federal government,
following poor responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Media agencies in both
countries are pushing out questionable reports about the actions of the opposite
country and glorifying their own responses. China has elevated Qi Fabao, a PLA
commander injured at the melee with Indian forces in 2020, to being a national
icon, including carrying the Olympic torch.
Meanwhile, the Indian film industry has launched several television shows and
movies centered around the 1962 Sino-Indian war.
Written By:
- Suvena Tomar, Amity Law School Noida
- Gargi Vishwakarma, Amity Law School Noida
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