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Causes of conflict between India And China

The aim of this research paper is to critically examine the timeline-based relationship of two of the most well-established Asian nations, namely India and China. The paper lays emphasis on tracing the controversial bond of these two nations post the attainment of their respective independence.

The paper discusses the wide-ranging reasons that have caused a fracture in the diplomatic relations of these two nations.

The research-based paper inculcates the key events that shaped the twisted relation between the two.

Yet surprisingly for 2 states of such growing importance and with an upscale and sometimes fractious history, their relationship seems to an out of doors eye largely reactive and, more broadly, adrift.

However, this may require careful management of bilateral irritants and potential regional crises. A more systematic dialogue process, going well beyond high-level visits, that acknowledges their differences rather than emphasising imagined similarities could lay the foundations for a stronger understanding of the domestic compulsions that drive each nation's policy.

The relationship that the two of the most influential Asiatic nations, India and China share are not a subject of no disclosure. People all over the globe are aware of the relationship between the two.

Although, the relationship between them is transparent and visible to the world, yet the information regarding the events that influenced or affected the relations are not much publicized.

The paper aims at briefly discussing these events and analyse the situation post the attainment post respective independence.

The two world powers bully off against each other along their disputed border within the Himalayan region.

The root cause is an ill-defined, 3,440km (2,100-mile)-long disputed border.

The military stand-off is mirrored by growing political tension, which has strained ties between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Though both countries profess a desire to work closely to resolve disagreements, have rapidly expanding economic relations, and often engage in strategic cooperation.

While promising a healthy bilateral relationship and peaceful rise together on a worldwide stage, enhancing engagement between China and India also faces a variety of strategic challenges.

Irrespective of the character of the bilateral relationship, the strategic discord between India and China do and can produce uncertain geopolitical consequences at both bilateral and regional levels.

China informed India that it should be "happy" with what has been achieved regarding the disengagement in the Pangong Tso area.

The Timeline
The Sino-Indian relations were not always such twisted and controversial. Historical traces of the Indus Valley excavations have proved that both the nations took part in active cultural exchanges and were sort of allies. Examples of cultural exchanges could be the transmission of Buddhism into China and mentions of pre existing Chinese states in Indian epics like Mahabharata and Arthshastra�(Tansen Sen (January 2003). Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations. University of Hawaii Press)

Economic activities were conducted as well between the nations via the famous Silk Road. The route was also used for inflow of scholars and traders into each others' territories.

It was the colonial era where relations between the two took a turn. The British oppressors appointed Indians as their foot soldiers to represent them in the war against China's Qing dynasty. � (The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (January 1960), pp. 96-125). Although the Indians were not fighting willingly, yet the Chinese perceived this move as intruding. This instance laid the foundation for sour relations between the two.

Fast forward to the post independence era, India attained independence from British colonial rulers on 15 August 1947 whereas, The People's Republic of China was formed on 1 October 1949 after a successful communist revolution.

India established relations with the People's Republic of China on 1 April 1950 and became the first non communist or socialist nation to do so in the continent of Asia.

The relations began on a peaceful and optimistic note.

India, in order to prove itself as an ally, even condemned The United Nations' resolutions in 1950 which showcased China as an aggressor in the Korean War.

October 1950 brought about a change as the Chinese troops began circling around the Sino-Tibetan border. This went on until May 1951 and then China directly asked for full suzerainty over Tibet from its governor. India being a democratic nation expressed its concern over China's move to boss around Tibet.

However, moving forward, on 15 May 1954, Then Indian Prime Minister Mr Jawaharlal Nehru and The Chinese Premier Mr Zhou Enlai came together to sign the Panchsheel document (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence). These five principles were mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. They were even added in the preamble of the Chinese constitution for highlighting the significance of the document. � (Paranjpe V.V.2004-06-26). "Panchsheel: The untold story". Hindustan Times.)

The principles of the document were respected and followed by both the nations until March when India protested the inclusion of a piece of its northern frontier on China's official map, claiming it violates the document of Panchsheel.

After series of legal and official negotiations, India formally transferred control of all communication services in Tibet to China through a protocol signed in Lhasa on 1 April 1955.

Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Nehru together promoted the Bandung Spirit of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation in 1955 at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, which had 29 participating nations.

In November 1956, the Chinese premier came to India with a goodwill mission. He assured the Indian Prime Minister on the note of following the Panchsheel principles and to stay fair.

Within the span of a month after the goodwill mission, Chinese nationals were detained while illegally entering into the Indian territory in Ladakh. As a gesture of peace, they were respectfully returned back to their nation.

Indian Vice President, Mr S Radhakrishnan went to china in the autumn of 1957 to meet Chairman Mao. Both the leaders proceeded to appreciate each other but the meeting took on a sour note when Vice President broke every protocol requirement. Mao received a pat on the right cheek. The Chairman was surprised. Everybody there froze. Twelve words from Dr. Radhkrishanan eased the stress. "Don't panic, Mr. Chairman. I treated Stalin the same way.

The Vice President was treated with the utmost respect and courtesy. His papers were well-known among academics in China. By all accounts, the visit was a success.

Yet, three years later when the Chinese Prime Minister came to Delhi to meet the Indian Prime Minister, he called out the Indian Vice President's move and felt it was not a formal thing to do.

The inclusion of a sizable portion of Northern Assam and NEFA in the China Pictorial, a publication that represents the Chinese People's Republic, had drawn official opposition from India in the month of September in 1958.

On 23 January 1959, the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, spelled out against India and claimed over 40,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and NEFA as their own.

Such a statement from the premier himself worsened the situation between the two nations.

The situation was further complicated when the Dalai Lama escaped China occupied territory and moved into India with his disciples and followers. India granted them asylum. China condemned that India gave protection to a man and community stated as wanted in China. China wanted to exercise control over the Dalai Lama in order to gain power over the Tibetan community and when India interrupted by providing asylum to these people, China decided to turn on the principles of Panchsheel.

Furious with India's decision to grant asylum to Dalai Lama, China adopted a strategic warfare program. With Zhou Enlai claiming that China was not a party to the 1842 Peace Treaty between British India and England, China refused to accept the Mc Mohan Line. Beijing had asserted sovereignty over about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Bhutan and Sikkim in 1959.

Zhou Enlai and Nehru's meeting in New Delhi to discuss the boundary issue came to a stalemate in April 1960.

Further in February 1961, China refused to discuss the Sino-Bhutanese and Sino-Sikkimese boundary disputes and further occupied 12,000 square miles in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border.

To stop the Chinese forces at the border from advancing, India implements the Forward Policy. It creates symbolic outposts in Ladakh with the intention of reclaiming land and preventing further intrusion. However, arrangements and execution of this policy were not much adequate on the ground level and;

The communist regime-based government of China did not stop here. They took things much farther from mutual and peaceful co-existence when in October 1962, Chinese forces shelled the Chushul airport and attacked Tawang, Walong, and Rezang La in the western sector. Bomdila was captured by Chinese forces in the NEFA region.

India never had any reason to believe that China would ever attack, yet it did. On October 20, 1962, India was attacked, beginning the infamous Sino-Indian War of 1962. The Indian army was unable to prepare since it believed it would never be attacked by China, which led to a standoff between 10,000-20,000 Indian troops and 80,000 Chinese troops. After nearly a month, the battle came to an end on November 21 when China issued a truce.
⁴ (

The former Prime Minister Mr Jawaharlal Nehru was bashed left and right by defence experts who have had warned him about China's intentions. He was blamed for being unaware, ignorant and blindly trusting towards China.

He was criticized as well for not properly using the arms and ammunition available once the war was declared by China's end.

He tried to hold on a defensive position instead of going offensive and reverted from using the Air Force which could have assisted the army and foot soldiers.

The 1962 border dispute had a significant effect on the two nations' relationship. Even though their diplomatic ties were still intact, India and China both withdrew their ambassadors and shuttered the General Consulate.

Economic, cultural, and non-governmental exchanges of any type between the two nations were halted. A protracted and tense period began in India-China ties.

In December 1962, The Colombo proposal was endorsed. In a meeting in Colombo, six non-aligned countries�Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana, and Indonesia�developed these recommendations. Negotiated between Zhou Enlai and Nehru, the proposals called for a 20-kilometer Chinese withdrawal from the historic customary lines, as claimed by China, without a comparable Indian withdrawal. Nehru refused to comment upon the situation and later on justified his act by saying that it was not very rational to trust the Unconditional proposal of China.

In the March of 1963, China signed a boundary settlement with India's arch nemesis Pakistan.

Situation stayed neutral until 1965 where China again provoked India by accusing it to cross the Sikkim-China border whereas Chinese troops themselves intruded into the northern Sikkim and NEFA region once again. China was trying to play hypocritical diplomacy at that moment of time.

Subsequently China gave Pakistan $60 million in 1965 along with military hardware including tanks and aircraft as a financial aid to make up for Pakistan's war losses. China's assistance to Pakistan during the Indo-Pak War in 1965 ultimately strengthened ties between the two countries. ⁵ (

Ultimately, China siding with Pakistan during the war further worsened its ties with India.

India Pushes China Back: 1967
Tensions came to a head again in 1967 along two mountain passes, Nathu La and Cho La, that connected Sikkim � then a kingdom and a protectorate of India � and China's Tibet Autonomous Region.

A scuffle broke out when Indian troops began laying wire along what they recognized as the border. The scuffles soon escalated when a Chinese force began firing artillery shells at the Indians. Within the following conflict, quite 150 Indians and 340 Chinese were killed.

The Indian Army decided to put an end to the daily nuisance by erecting an iron fence on the Sikkim border. The Chinese opened artillery fire, killing dozens of unprepared Indian soldiers who were busy constructing the fence in an open area. Satisfied, the Chinese thought they had taught the Indians another lesson. This bravado stemmed from a notion that India could be bullied because it had lost the 1962 war and was forced to fight another one by Pakistan in 1965.

This was a rude shock to the Chinese. They realized that it was not 1962.Moreover, the country has strengthened infrastructure on the borders.

The clashes in September and October 1967 in those passes would later be considered the second all-out war between China and India.

But India prevailed, destroying Chinese fortifications in Nathu La and pushing them farther into their territory near Cho La. The change in positions, however, meant that China and India each had different and conflicting ideas about the situation of the road of Actual Control.

The fighting was the last time that troops on either side would be killed � until the skirmishes within the Galwan Valley on Tuesday. Indian news outlets reported that Chinese soldiers had also been killed, but Beijing was tight-lipped.

China is worried also because India has reportedly carried out exercises on the border. Not satisfied with just the DSDBO road, India is constructing an alternative route to Karakoram Pass to keep an eye on Chinese activities. Experts say that this access to the borders, and the capacity to move men and materials quickly, has rattled China.

Border Issue

Beijing and New Delhi have found it difficult to secure substantial progress in setting their Road tractor border dispute.

The interaction on the issue proceeds at a glacial pace and test of reciprocal patience.

This dispute is increasingly important given that both countries are emerging superpowers with modern militaries and nuclear weapons. Further, the two countries account for 35 percent of the global population and 21 percent of the global GDP.

To some extent, Beijing's ination on pushing for an early settlement is attributed to New Delhi's inflexibility and intransigence in negotiations.

A variety of domestic political conferences also call into question the capital of India's ability to practise 'Give-and-Take' formula. New Delhi's announcement of an extra deployment of troops and complex SU-30 KM Combat aircraft along the Himalayan Line of Actual Control(LAC) in 2009, in addition to stern exchanges and heightened, hawkish rhetoric , Continue to remind the general public of putting up with tensions along the border and of daunting obstacle in moving towards a reputable partnership.

The border itself is divided into three sections and constitutes one of the longest contested borders in the world:
  1. This section stretches east of Bhutan, where the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is claimed by the Chinese to be part of southern Tibet.
  2. This section is a narrow 50-mile stretch of land that spans between Nepal and Bhutan. This border region is small but strategically important to India in that it connects India's far eastern states with the bulk of the country. Parts of this region are claimed by Bhutan in addition to China and India.
  3. This section runs north of Tibet and borders the Indian territory of Ladakh and the Chinese region of Aksai Chin.

Bloodless Clashes:1987

The two countries have fought only one war, in 1962, when India suffered a humiliating defeat.

But simmering tensions involve the risk of escalation - and that can be devastating given both sides are established nuclear powers. There would also be an economic fallout as China is one of India's biggest trading partners.

It would be 20 more years before India and China clashed again at the disputed border.

In 1987, the Indian military was conducting a training operation to determine how briskly it could move troops to the border. The massive number of troops and material arriving next to Chinese outposts surprised Chinese commanders � who responded by advancing toward what they considered the road of Actual Control.

Realizing the potential to inadvertently start a war, both India and China de-escalated, and a crisis was averted.

The border dispute between India and China is one that is very important, given the role that both countries play in the region and globally. The combination of mistrust, a desire to exude dominance, and an ambiguous border has the potential to eventually lead to a war. However, in the meantime, India and China will likely maintain the standoff with little resolution.

Push Comes to Shove in Daulat Beg Oldi: 2013

Cat-and-mouse tactics unfolded on each side.

The strategically important road will pass through the Karakoram Wildlife Sanctuary. Fifty-five hectares of the sanctuary will be used for building the road while protecting wildlife. The wildlife board gave its go ahead for road construction on March 25 on condition that an annual compliance report would be submitted. The green signal was officially announced only this week though.

The new alignment to be developed by the Border Roads Organisation in challenging terrain, for which a series of forest and wildlife clearances have been sought on high priority, starts from Sasoma off the base of the Siachen Glacier.

While a road from Sasoma to Saser La is under development and allows military vehicles from Murgo off Depsang plains already, the stretch between Saser La to Saser Brangsa has to be trekked on foot. Though a tunnel has been approved here by the defence ministry, it will take a few years to be completed.

While an all-weather linkage is there between Leh and Sasoma, tunnels are planned along the route to make it road worthy even in winters. One such tunnel is expected to come up from Saser Brangsa.

After decades of patrolling the border, a Chinese platoon pitched a camp near Daulat Beg Oldi in April 2013. The Indians soon followed, putting in their own base fewer than 1,000 feet away.

The camps were later fortified by troops and heavy equipment.

By May, the edges had agreed to dismantle both encampments, but disputes about the situation of the road of Actual Control persisted.

Bhutan Gets Caught in the Middle: 2017

With tensions still high along the India-China border, landlocked Bhutan is struggling to both maintain its territory and keep both Asian powerhouses happy.

As Bhutan prepares for border talks with Beijing, the Himalayan kingdom has indicated to India that it won't recognise China's claims to the Doklam plateau in the discussions, people familiar with the situation said.

In June 2017, the Chinese set out to build a road within the Doklam Plateau, a section of the Himalayas controlled not by India, but by its ally Bhutan.

The plateau lies on the border of Bhutan and China, but India sees it as a buffer zone that's near other disputed areas with China.

Indian troops carrying weapons and operating bulldozers confronted the Chinese with the intention of destroying the road. A standoff ensued, soldiers threw rocks at one another, and troops from each side suffered injuries.

Bhutan, however, is wary of doing anything that could prompt it to get caught in the middle of a conflict between India and China, the people added. The nation plans to offer Beijing the prospect of eventual full diplomatic relations in return for demarcating the northern border, they said, allowing it to sidestep the issue of Doklam while stopping Chinese encroachment in other areas.

"China's interests lie in settling the dispute with Bhutan as soon as possible so that it can use it to leverage its position in the future negotiations between India and China," said Sana Hashmi, a visiting fellow at The Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. "For Bhutan, giving concessions to China on the trijunction is not beneficial."

Still, India in some ways has pushed Bhutan to seek closer relations with China. Ties came under strain earlier this year when Modi's government stopped vaccine exports to Thimphu as Covid infections exploded within its borders.

"Even though India continues to be a far more important partner in the region, it has to find a way to counter China's increasing footprints in its neighborhood," Hashmi said. "To start with, investing in infrastructure development, keeping its promises, and convincing that India treats its South Asian neighbors as equal partners are the three most effective ways."

Brawls Break Out: 2020

In May, melees broke out several times. In one clash at the glacial lake Pangong Tso, Indian troops were badly injured and had to be evacuated by helicopter. Indian analysts said Chinese troops were injured as well.

As of the end of 2021, both India and China have handled the situation on the Line of Actual Control with a great deal of discretion. To start with, China's 2020 operation was carefully crafted: it either targeted unheld areas on the LAC, or resorted to blockades to prevent India patrolling the border up to its claimed line. Strong Chinese forces were deployed to back up this operation, but not strong enough to undertake a broad attack on Indian positions.
(Reference:-The NewYork Times)

For India, China is the long-standing cordial play partnership with Pakistan and has been and remains a major obstacle in the way of improving its ties with Beijing.

Many Indians believe that it is Beijing's endorsement and support that has emboldened Islamabad to challenge its preeminence in South Asia, which the core of Sino-Pak strategic partnership is exclusively against India. Beijing repeatedly denies this allegation and is vocal about its interest in nurturing panelled relationships with both Islamabad and New Delhi, despite the actual fact that the tangible substantial in its partnership with India is somewhat limited .

For China, Pakistan is strategically important as a low-cost sustainable option to contain India and also the US expansion in the region. China's thinking has been to militarily strengthen a military-run but insecure state (Pakistan) which would keep India perpetually distracted and slow down India's growth. Although Beijing has maintained a No First Use nuclear doctrine, it supplied complete nuclear weapon technology and delivery systems to Pakistan. Islamabad has been more confident in conducting the covert war against India after it acquired nuclear weapons (1987), and it continues to rationalise the First Use nuclear doctrine and project a low nuclear threshold.

While Pakistan will continue to try to intensify its proxy war and anti-India propaganda, at this point, it is likely to be inclined to exercise three options:
  1. Pakistan would highlight its posture of victimhood and strengthen the narrative of its capability and willingness to defeat India's strategy.
  2. Pakistan is likely to push for more Chinese equipment in the coming times despite its economic challenges.
  3. Pakistan will continue to escalate the nuclear threat to push for the Kashmir agenda and attract global attention.
Moreover, China and India have been involved in a fierce contest for their relations with smaller countries in the region, such as Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.

The US factor in Sino - Indian engagement

The United States has developed complex relationships with both Beijing and New Delhi . It is arguably believed that the strategic links of China in India with Washington create a zero-sum effect on their bilateral strategic interaction.
  1. First of all, the US Input has affected the trajectory Of China's ties with India.
  2. Secondly, few Chinese analysts doubt that upgrading Indo - US strategic ties will produce geopolitical consequences dis favouring Beijing.
Beijing is concerned about any US driven strategic initiatives excluding China and involving India in Asia and the Pacific region. As an often-cited example, The Chinese media gave its strong reaction to the consignee formula of an ' Asian-Nato' in 2003 and lashed out at a quadrilateral joint naval exercise that involved The US, India, Japan, Australia in April 2007.

Following President Barack Obama's visit to China in November 2009, New Delhi became emotionally discontent with a reference to, in a joint statement, US endorsement of China's role in facilitating the South Asian peace process and diffusing Indo -Pak conflict. For both India and China , there is no doubt that the perceived zero -sum effect of US diplomacy and security strategy on them has to be moderated before this to rising powers can move toward more stable relationship

The deepening of Indo-US ties through the nuclear deal, strategic military agreements, supply of advanced military hardware, and Washington's Indo-Pacific Strategy (which seeks to anchor India in its posture), have together strengthened Beijing's distrust of New Delhi.

Trade fractions and economic impediments

While keeping a steady increase, the bilateral trade and economic ties between the two nations have begun to experience some unfavourable challenges.

New Delhi complains that Beijing has become the real beneficiary of expanding trade because the benefits mainly go to China rather than India. Even the trend of bilateral trade indicates a continued broadening of this gap in the years to come. The mounting anxiety of trade in balance urged The Indian government to officially present a demarche to China during the bilateral Joint Economic group meeting in Beijing in the early 2010.

As of now The total trade between China and India in 2021 stood at USD 125.66 billion, up 43.3 per cent from 2020, state-run Global Times reported, quoting data from the General Administration of Customs.

China's exports to India from January to December rose 46.2 per cent to USD 97.52 billion, while India's exports to China grew by 34.2 per cent to USD 28.14 billion.

The trade deficit for India grew to USD 69.38 billion in 2021.

India has been highlighting its concerns over the growing trade deficit with China for over a decade and calling on Beijing to open its markets for India's IT and pharmaceutical products.

Observers say much of China's exports increase this year to India was attributed to the import of medical products and raw materials for India's burgeoning pharmaceutical industry due to the massive second wave of COVID-19 and recurring bouts of the virus in the country.

The origins of widening disparity are multidimensional. According to Chinese analysts, the prevailing trading problem primarily results from an M balanced composition of trade and comparative disadvantages of Indian commodities.

On the other hand, New Delhi attributes the problem to restricted access to the Chinese domestic market and China's less liberal trade policy and non-tariff barriers.

Last but not least, there comes a pressing necessity to breathe more substance into the existing framework of Sino Indian strategic partnership. So far, an Institutionalised regime of strategic engagement and cooperation between China and India has yet to be credibly established.

In such circumstances, it becomes highly necessary for both sides to activate their multilayer strategic consultation and to reciprocate political Goodwill in order to deepen strategic engagement in a constructive, credible and substantial way. It is such an institutionalised engagement that can secure a healthy, stable and constructive bilateral relationship between them. Achieving this goal requires and deserves a concerted endeavour.

Thoughts of policy:
In order to move the Sino Indian partnership forward and make it more credible, major endeavours have to be made by both Beijing and New Delhi to produce tangible results.
  • Given that the unsettled border dispute is an outstanding issue in the way of bilateral relations, the political leadership of the two nations should seek an early settlement of the problem.
  • At the operational level, there should be some key steps taken. To fulfil An early settlement, both governments have to preset calibrated policy directions objectives for the ongoing special Representatives dialogue on border issues, design a reasonable time frame and a clear-cut roadmap and perhaps more immediately, secure a reversible progress through negotiations.
  • Given the fact that China and India have been engaging each other in South Asia, central Asia, ASEAN and the Indian Ocean, it is extremely important for both sides to reconcile their regional strategies in order to serve constructive purposes.
  • There's an increase in net for China and India to devise an accommodative and non-confrontational regional agenda in their shared peripheries And in broader neighbourhoods.
  • Promoting CBMs reciprocal has proven extremely helpful for Beijing and NewDelhi and removing misperceptions and miss readings of each other's strategic intentions.
As a result of a series of military and diplomatic talks, the two sides completed the disengagement process in the Gogra area in August and in the north and south banks of the Pangong lake in February.

The two sides held the 14 round of Corps Commander-level talks on January 12 to resolve the standoff in the remaining areas and agreed to hold a new round of talks soon.

Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the mountainous sector.

Neither side has a definitive advantage in technology that could provide them an edge in a war. It would be a gruesome battle of attrition, which both sides would naturally want to avoid.

Although the overall outcome of this dispute is uncertain, it will likely continue for some time. Both sides appear to be using this border dispute to create a sense of nationalism and restore faith in the federal government, following poor responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Media agencies in both countries are pushing out questionable reports about the actions of the opposite country and glorifying their own responses. China has elevated Qi Fabao, a PLA commander injured at the melee with Indian forces in 2020, to being a national icon, including carrying the Olympic torch.

Meanwhile, the Indian film industry has launched several television shows and movies centered around the 1962 Sino-Indian war.

Written By:
  • Suvena Tomar, Amity Law School Noida
  • Gargi Vishwakarma, Amity Law School Noida
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