Our constitution gave wide powers to its citizens under article 19 [1]when it
was being made but soon after its implementation government realized that the
power under article 19 must be restricted to some extent which resulted into the
very first amendment of the constitution in 1951 by adding the world
"reasonable" before restriction and "public order" to keep a check on the
fundamental rights
In 1963 the National Integrity and Regionalism Committee was setup by National
Integration Council (NIC). On the recommendation of this committee constitution
was amended for the 16th time in 1963 and article 19(2) was being amended again
and towards "the sovereignty and integrity of India" were added to it in order
to handle the domestic crises and the need to limit citizens' fundamental
rights. As at the point of time we were facing internal and external aggression
(i.e., demand to make Tamil Nadu a separate country and Indo- Chian war)
The 16th amendment act 1963 imposed three reasonable restriction which are as
follows:
- Freedom of speech and expressions
- Right to assemble peacefully
- Right to form association and union
After this amendment due to immense need of national security, "The Unlawful
Activities Prevention Act 1967" was brought into force. This act gave vast
powers to the authorities to take action against the organisations working
against the association of India.
TADA
At that point of time our country was facing major security and terrorist
issues. Due to Punjab terrorist activities TADA [Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act] was introduced in 1985. The act defined what
terrorist act and disruptive activities mean and put restrictions to grant bail.
The law gives wide power to law enforcement agencies for dealing with "socially
disruptive" and national terrorist actions. A detainee was not required to be
brought before a magistrate within 24 hours by the police. The accused person
might spend up to a year in jail. In a court of law, confessions made to police
officials were acceptable as evidence, with the onus of proof resting with the
accused to establish his innocence. Courts were established specifically to hear
cases and provide rulings involving those charged under this Act.
The witness
identities might be kept secret, and the trials could take place behind closed
doors. Police officials were also given the authority to seize the accused's
property under Section 7A of the Act. Police are not permitted to administer
third-degree or harassed everyone who wanted to speak, under the statute.
Criticism
Since the Act had clauses that violated human rights, it received harsh
criticism from these organisations. The criticism concentrates on the following
facts: Under this Act, anyone who advocates for cession or secession in any
region of India, whether directly or indirectly, is punishable. A person may be
detained for a maximum of a year under the Act without being formally charged or
placed on trial.
According to Section 20 of the Act, a detainee may spend up to
60 days in police custody, which increases the possibility of torture. The
detainee may also appear before an executive magistrate rather than a judicial
magistrate, who is a member of the police and administration service and is not
answerable to the high court. The trial can be held secretly at any place and
also keeps the identity of the witness's secret violating international
standards of fair trial.
The accused person is no longer presumed innocent under
the Act. According to Section 21 of the Act, a person is suspected of committing
a terrorist act if weapons and explosives were found, they confessed to someone
other than a police officer, they gave money to commit the act, or there is
reason to believe they have the necessary funds or weapons to commit the act of
the terrorist act or by suspicion that the person has arms or explosives or
financial assistance to commit the act.
Unless the opposite can be demonstrated,
anyone accused of a terrorist act will be assumed guilty. Confessions made to a
police officer with a level higher than superintendent of police may be used
against the individual making them as evidence. Section 19 of the Act bars
persons accused under this Act to appeal except the Supreme Court
POTA
After the Gandhar Hijack and The Parliament attack POTA (Prevention of Terrorism
Act) 2002 was introduced. In order to boost counterterrorism efforts, the Indian
Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA) in 2002. The Act
was passed as a result of multiple terrorist assaults occurring in India,
particularly in retaliation for the attack on the Parliament.
The Act, which was
supported by the government's National Democratic Alliance, replaced the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) (1985-1995) and the
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) of 2001. In 2004, the United
Progressive Alliance coalition abolished the Act. The Act gave the designated
investigating agencies special powers and defined what constituted a "terrorist
act" and what a "terrorist" was. Certain safeguards were incorporated within the
Act to make sure the investigative agencies' discretionary powers weren't abused
and human rights abuses weren't committed.
Provisions Compared to TADA
The statute allowed for the detention of a suspect for up to 180 days without
the submission of a chargesheet with a court, which is similar to the provisions
in TADA. Nonetheless, a very significant difference was made since, unlike TADA,
this act did not contain a clause that permitted preventative detention. Second,
there is the issue of the accused's police admissions. Yet, under POTA,
admissions given to a police officer were acceptable as evidence in court.
The
ordinary law in India does not recognise confessions made to police as evidence
admissible in court and allows a person to dispute such confessions in court.
Law enforcement organisations were also permitted to hide the identities of
witnesses under POTA Anti-Terrorism Day is observed annually on May 21. The POTA
statute did, however, include some protections. A division bench of the relevant
High Court will consider the appeal. Any decision on bail petitions or the
judgement of the special courts established under this Act may be appealed.
But due to wide scale misuse of these act, TADA was repealed in 1995 and POTA
was repealed in 2004
Now to fulfil the vacuum created by the repealing of these two acts, the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 2004 was being introduced and some of the
provisions of the POTA were soaked in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
2004. That's why UAPA is also known as POTA 2.0
WHAT IS UAPA?
UAPA is an antiterror legislation and NIA is informant body of it which is
counter terrorism agency of the country. The main purpose of the act deals
directly with the "Unlawful activity" This amendment gave the new definition of
terrorist organisation and "terrorist act" from the POTA. The concept of
"Terrorist gang" was also introduced.
This amendment gave the new definition of "terrorist gang" which empowered the
authorities to investigate and arrest a group of people who are involved in
unlawful activities and the central government terms them as terrorist gang
After this in 2008 again the act was amended and the major change was increased
into the time period of the custody of accused without a charge sheet. If any
person is being arrested then can be detained for 180 days which may extend
further and till then his right to bail doesn't arise which is in direct
conflict with sec. 167 of CrPC as under this provision the maximum time period
for filling charge sheet is 90 days and after 90 days accused have rights to
bail and cannot be detained further.
Sec.43 D of UAPA says that if the investigation is incomplete with 90 days then
accused custody will extend automatically for another 90 days as compared to
section 167 of CrPC and resulting into non arise of mandatory bail.
The act was again amended and added offences that threaten the country's
economic security in the definition of the terrorist act by reusing the fund
from legitimate or illegitimate sources. This was added to fulfil the obligation
of FATF
The most recent amendment of UAPA was did in 2019 which gave rise to many
controversies as the amendment gave direct power to government to control,
monitor and grab any decent. The amendment included 'individuals' in the meaning
of the 'unlawful activities' as given in sec 35 of chapter 6 of UAPA-19.
UAPA defines as any activity of individual or organisation which intends to
bring cession or separation or disrupt or question the sovereignty/ territorial
integrity of India. Under this amendment the government has been given "Power"
to designate an organisation as a terrorist organisation and individual as well:
- If commit or participates in acts of terrorism
- Prepares or promotes terrorism
- Otherwise involve in terrorism
On all these grounds an organisation or individuals can be designated as
terrorist:
- The reason for changing the definition was that as soon as an organisation is being identified or banned by the government as a terrorist, then the members of that organisation start forming new organisation or start functioning individually.
- Second major change is the detention period, under new UAPA 2019 if a person is being arrested by the authorities, then the minimum period for which he can be detained until the chargesheet is filed is 180 days which may extend further and till then his right to bail doesn't arise. Sec 34D of UAPA says that if the investigation is not complete within 90 days and his right to bail would not arise under section 167 of CrPC.
- In third major change is the addition of 4th schedule in the UAPA. This schedule gave power to govern terrorist to any individual or organisation. The new amendment does not contain any due process of law, which gave rise to new controversies. The only remedy available is an appeal to government within 45 days for the decodifying of the name from the list (notification).
Case Laws
Shri Indra Das v. State of Assam[2]
The case's facts state that Anil Kumar Das vanished on the evening of November
6, 1991, and his body was found in the river Dishang on January 19, 1992, two
months later. The appellant was one of five people accused of causing his death.
The FIR did not name the appellant. No witness for the prosecution has
implicated the appellant in any way. Charges were framed more than four years
after the charge sheet was filed, which was filed in this case nine years after
the date the offence was committed. Other than the confessional statement, there
is no proof against the appellant. The appellant later denied making the
purported confession.
Nothing else in the record supported the supposed
confession. In Arup Bhuyan's case (above), we determined that confessions are a
very flimsy kind of evidence and that it is risky to convict someone on their
basis without sufficient corroborating evidence. There is no corroborative
evidence in the current situation. Nonetheless, the appellant has been found
guilty in accordance with Section 3(5) of TADA, which makes even being a member
of a prohibited organisation a crime, and has been given a five-year harsh jail
sentence and a Rs. 2000 fine.
In this Supreme Court stated that on a plain language of provision mere
membership of a banned organisation criminal has to be read down and we have to
deport from the literal rule of interpretation in such cases otherwise their
provision will become unconstitutional as violation of article 19 and 21 of the
Indian Constitution. It is true that ordinary we should follow the literal rule
of interpretation while constructing a statutory provision but if the literal
interpretation makes the provision but if the literal interpretation made the
provision unconstitutional, we can depart from it so that the provision becomes
constitutional. The Act defines the term "membership".
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India Writ Petition [3]
To decide whether privacy is a virtue that is protected by the constitution, the
Supreme Court's nine justices convened. The issue reaches out to the foundation
of a constitutional culture based on the protection of human rights and enables
this Court to revisit the basic ideas on which our Constitution has been formed
and their ramifications for a way of life it aspires to defend. Challenges to
constitutional interpretation are presented by this case. Our ideas of liberty
and the entitlements that follow from its protection would be significantly
redefined if privacy were to be viewed as a protected constitutional asset.
The International Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 expressly states in
Article 12 that the right to privacy is one of the fundamental human rights. "No
one should be the object of wilful intrusion into his or her private life,
family, home, or communications, or of attacks on his or her honour or
reputation. Everyone is entitled to legal protection from these types of
intrusions or assaults.
The following points were highlighted by the Court in its ruling:
It was decided that as both state and non-state entities might now, thanks to
technology, cause privacy problems, both of them can be accused of violating
people's privacy. The Court further ruled that, in the internet age,
informational privacy is not a fundamental right and that, when a person
exercises his right to data control, it may materially violate his right to
privacy. Additionally, it was stated that the Supreme Court judges' agreement
throughout the years has caused the scope of Article 21 to continually expand,
giving rise to a multiplicity of rights has been included with in article 21
On August 24, 2017, a 9-judge Supreme Court bench issued its decision in this
historic case, affirming the basic right to privacy derived from Article 21. The
right to privacy is an inherent and essential component of Part III of the
Constitution, which protects fundamental rights, according to the court. The
dispute in this area mostly emerges between a person's right to privacy and the
government's legitimate desire to enforce its policies, and while doing so, a
balance needs to be maintained.
Additionally, the SC ruled that the right to privacy is not a given and that any
invasion of private by state or non-state actors must pass the three criteria
listed below:
- Legality Legitimate
- Goal
- Proportionality
Akhil Gogoi v. the State (National Investigation Agency) and ors.[4]
Gogoi, an independent legislator representing Assam's Sibsagar and President of
Raijor Dal party was arrested in December 2019 when the protests against the
Citizenship Amendment Act were at their peak.
He was booked under various
provisions of UAPA. Subsequently even while incarcerated he contested and won
the assembly elections in 2021, defeating BJP's Surabhi Rajkonwari. He was
subsequently released after spending one and half year in detention for his
alleged role in anti- CAA agitation when a special NIA court discharges him and
three other persons on the ground of the non- availability of material on record
on basis of which charges could be framed.
The arguments raised above cause this appeal to be rejected. No intervention is
necessary with regard to the contested order, issued by the learned Special
Judge Assam, Guwahati resulting from Special NIA which denied the bail request.
This Court upholds the aforementioned order because the charge sheet against the
appellant contains sufficient evidence, and as a result, the Court does not see
any flaws in the conclusion made by the learned Special Judge (NIA) that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the allegations of offences punishable
under Chapters IV and VI of the UA(P) Act against the appellant are true on
their face.
The appellant cannot be freed on bail due to the express bar imposed by section
43D (5) of the UA(P) Act. Hence, the Court grants the following order:
For the aforementioned causes, the current appeal is rejected since it lacks any
merit.
It should be noted that the trial of the case will not be impacted by any
initial perspective or opinion given during the process of this judgement.
Waheed-Ur-Rehman Parra v. Union Territory of J&K[5]
Initial Report of Information A FIR was filed against Syed Naveed Mushtaq and
others at P.S. Qazigund on January 11, 2020, in accordance with Sections 18, 19,
20, 38, and 39 of the UAPA read with Sections 7/25 of the Arms Act, 1959
(hereinafter referred to as the "Arms Act").
The National Investigation Agency,
sometimes known as "NIA," began an investigation into this FIR in accordance
with Sections 6(4) and 8 of the NIA Act, and the FIR was subsequently
re-registered. The NIA filed the second supplemental chargesheet in the FIR
before the Court of the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu (Special Judge
NIA Act), arraying the appellant as accused in the case. The appellant was
arrested in the aforementioned FIR
The respondent in this case filed an application with the trial court under
Sections 44 of the UAPA and 173(6) of the Cr.P.C., seeking the designation of
five witnesses as protected witnesses and the exclusion of certain papers
identified as D-1 from the materials to be provided to the accused. The trial
court approved the application submitted by the respondent in this case by order
noting that given the sensitivity of the case, it appeared that the witnesses'
and their families' lives and property were in danger.
Therefore, the statements
of prosecution witnesses designated as A-1 through A-5 were retained in a sealed
cover in view of the scope and purpose of Section 44 of the UAPA. In addition,
the documents designated as D-1 (which were likewise in a separate sealed cover)
were set apart from other records and contained the testimony of protected
witnesses in a sealed cover.
We believe that the provisions of Section 173(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code
read with Section 44 of the UAPA and Section 17 of the NIA Act stand on a
different plane with different legal implications as compared to Section 207 of
the Criminal Procedure Code.
This is based on a conspectus of the aforementioned
legal position and the limited contours of the facts required for determination
of the issue. We say this since the first order was accepted at the door. The
accused was not given any notice. Protecting witnesses is the goal of Section
44, UAPA, Section 17, NIA Act, and Section 173(6).
They have the characteristics
of a legal witness protection. Such an order may be issued if the court
determines that disclosing the witness's identity and residence could jeopardise
both the witness and his or her family (2019 17 SCC 299). They also relate to
distinct rules established for crimes covered by unique laws. These factors were
taken into account by the trial court when it issued the ruling dated
01.06.2021, and even the appellant has no complaints about it.
UAPA is not the only act which has the provisions Maharashtra control of
organised crime act 1999 also has the provision where accused is not allowed to
get bail before 6 months
In
Shreya Singh v UOI[6] the supreme court had identified vagueness as one of
the grounds if the IT act the law imposed an unreasonable restriction on online
speeches
There is major problem with the new amendment in the UAPA as follows:
- If a person is being arrested under UAPA then there is no scope of bail until 180 days because his rights to bail won't arise before 180 days and this period may also extend by 180 days which is a clear violation of article 21 of the constitution
- To remove an individual name the one has to appeal to the same authority within 45 days who had included the name of that person in the list of terrorists. Which is a clear violation of the principle of natural justice "Nemo Iudex in Causa sua" and is an arbitrary act.
- Once a person is being declared as terrorist then no civil rights remain with him.
- The act does not specify what is terrorism or terrors act which is lack in
Conclusion:
The main purpose and aim of the government is to protect the rights of the
citizens and to provide security and safe environment. But on the name of
providing security taking away of fundamental rights is on unfair barter system.
Government before detaining someone under this act must provide conclusive
evidence as to why they think the individual or organisation is put in that
list.
Also, appeal shall lie to the court but not the same authority for a
transparent and unbiassed action could be taken. It is the legislature which
ultimately requires to replace the arbitrary and pseudo-democratic provisions
for the purpose of revamping the spirit of rule of law and participatory justice
in consistent with the Constitution of India.
End-Notes:
- Freedom of Speech and Freedom
- 2011 S.C.R 289
- (Civil) No. 494 of 2012
- Cr1.A /192/2020
- Crl.A-9031/2021
- Criminal no.167 of 2012
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