Sir James Stephen defined confession: As an admission[1]made at the
time by a person charged with the crime stating or suggesting the inference that
he committed a crime.[2]Confession to a Police officer is not admissible in the
court of law despite being a relevant fact pertaining to the fact in
issue.[3]Sections from 24 to 27 deal with confession to a police officer.
Section 24 rejects the admissibility of the confessions in a criminal
proceeding, which appears to be the result of inducement, threat or
promise.[4]Section 25 bars the confession made to the police
officer.[5]Section 26 further clarifies and makes the confession made to the
police officer, while being in the custody, inadmissible.[6]
If confessions to police were allowed to be proved in evidence, the police would
torture the accused and thus force him to confess to a crime which he might not
have committed. The Hon'ble Supreme court has observed that in the case ofDagduv.State
of Maharashtra[7]
The archaic attempt to secure confessions by hook or by crook seems to be the
be-all and end-all of the police investigation. The police should remember that
confession may not always be a short-cut to solution. Instead of trying to start
from a confession they should strive to arrive at it….
Admissibility of confession in criminal proceeding will have severe impacts and
the law protector will ultimately become the law violators.[8]Despite its
non-admissibility as an evidenceper se, a part of a confession, hit by Sections
25 and 26 of Evidence Act, may still be proved against the accused if it
distinctly leads to discovery of any fact during the course of investigation by
virtue of section 27.[9]
Section 27 is also called as doctrine of confirmation by subsequent
events[10]because every part of the statement, made at the instance of the
accused, in a police custody should necessarily be confirmed by the subsequent
events of discovery, to make it admissible in court. The provision is couched in
the form of a proviso, an exception, though it is not clear from its terms as to
which provisions it qualifies.[11]The Judiciary was of the contrasting
opinions, as to the nature of the section. The Question was whether it is it is
an exception to section 25 and 26 or it is applicable to section 24 as well.[12]
This paper will try to shed light on the admissible part of section 27 with the
latest developments in the law. The paper is divided in several parts; after the
introduction Second part focuses on the admissibility of confession in the light
of section 27 explaining its ingredients thoroughly. Third part deals with the
analysis of the latest developments in the law. The last part will conclude the
discussion regarding confession as a whole.
Doctrine of Confirmation by Subsequent Facts
The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of
confirmation by subsequent events.[13]The doctrine is founded on the principle
that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength of any
information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the
information supplied by the prisoner is true.[14]The theory of confirmation by
subsequent facts means the statements made in custody are admissible to the
extent they can be proved by the subsequent discovery of facts.[15]
It is quite possible that the content of the custodial statement could directly
lead to the subsequent discovery of relevant facts rather than their discovery
through independent means. Hence, such statements could also be described as
those which furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed for successful
prosecution.[16]The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in
nature, but if it results in discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable
information.[17]
Section 27 is as follows:
How much of information received fromaccusedmay be proved.—Provided that, when
any fact is deposed to asdiscovered in consequence ofinformation receivedfrom
a person accusedof any offence, in the custody of a police officer,so much of
such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not,asrelates
distinctly to the factthereby discovered, may be proved.
Section 27 has been crafted very meticulously and each and every phrase needs
utmost attention and has also been subject to various interpretation by the Apex
Court. Following are the essential ingredients of the section:
2.1 The person giving the information must be accused of any offence;
The expression accused of any offence is descriptive of the person against whom
evidence relating to information alleged to be given by him is made provable by
this section.[18]It does not predicate a formal accusation against him at the
time of making the statement sought to be proved, as a condition of its
applicability.[19]
The Patna High Court has held that the statements must be of a person who was
then an accused. If at the time when the confession was made, the person making
it was not an accused person; the statement would not be admissible.[20]The
Bombay high court has dissented this view and has held that
The words information received from a person accused of any offence cannot be
read to mean that he must be an accused when he gives the information but would
include a person if he becomes subsequently an accused person, at the time when
that statement is sought to be received in evidence against him. Where a person
goes to a police officer and makes a statement which shows that an offence has
been committed by him, he accuses himself and though he is formally not
arrested, since he is not free to move wherever he likes after disclosure of the
information to the police he must be deemed to be in custody of the police
within this section.[21]
2.2 He must be in custody of a police officer;
This section does not apply to information given to police by an accused person
who was not in custody at the time it was given.[22]The submission of a person
to the custody of a police officer within the terms of Sec. 46(1)[23]of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is ‘custody’ within the meaning of this
section.[24]The word ‘custody’ in this section does not mean physical custody
by arrest.[25]As soon as the accused or the suspected person comes into the
hands of police officer, he is, in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, no longer at liberty, and is therefore in custody within the meaning
of Sec. 26 and 27.[26]
Custody, connotes some idea of restrain on the on the movement of person whether
byword or action and does not means custody after formal restraint.[27]Even
indirect control over the movements of the suspect by the police would amount to
police custody.[28]Custody, does not necessarily mean detention or confinement.
A person who makes a statement to a police officer voluntarily confessing that
he had committed an act which the penal law regards as an offence submits
himself to the custody of the said officer is within the meaning of this
section.[29]
2.3 The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the
issue;
The ‘fact’ must be a ‘relevant fact’. The fact said to have been discovered in
consequences of information received from a person accused of an offence must be
of a kind which such information really helps to bring the light and which it
would be difficult to find out otherwise before it can be treated as of any
substantial probative value.[30]
The fact discovered must be in consequences of the information received from the
accused, and the fact should not have been already within the prior knowledge of
the police. The information should be free from any element of
compulsion.[31]Though the fact, of which the discovery is being done, is
relevant; but the connection between the offence and the thing discovered may be
established by evidence other than the statement leading to the discovery.[32]
2.4 Such information…as relates distinctly to the fact…discovered
The word
distinctly, means
indubitably,
strictly and
unmistakably.[33]The Apex Court has decided that information under section
27 would be every statement made by the accused to the police officer and the
Police is precluded from proving that information or any part of that unless it
fits in the section 27.[34]If the information had already been given by the
main accused in his discloser statement the statement of the other accused
persons were not admissible in evidence because at the best they were leading to
the rediscovery of a fact already disclosed and capable of discovery.[35]
The information which distinctly relates to the fact discovered is only
admissible.[36]But the statement should not be so truncated as to make it
insensible.So much of the information as strictly relates to the discovery of
facts is admissible even though the confession is elicited by improper
inducement.[37]Information must be recorded and, it’s not recorded the exact
information must be adduced through evidence.[38]No such statements relating to
a relevant fact is admissible under the section if it is made after the
discovery of that fact or if it does not relate distinctly to the fact
discovered.[39]
Latest Developments
The Apex Court has recently laid down certain judgments which either lays down
new interpretation or substantiate the existing pronouncements. Following are
some of the judgements which are important to discuss in order to understand the
concept into:
3.1 Silash Singh v. State[40]
In this case of a murder where no eye witness was there and the case was only
based on the circumstantial evidences, but recovery of weapon and evidence on
the basis of disclosure of the accused were there. The apex court said that
recovery of weapon and evidence on the basis of disclosure of the accused alone
would not automatically lead to the conclusion that the offence was also
committed by the accused.
In fact, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish close link between
discovery of the material objects and its use in the commission of the offence
and what is admissible undersection27of the Act is the information leading to
discovery and not any opinion formed on it by the prosecution.The Supreme Court
said that,
With regard toSection27of the Act, what is important is discovery of the
material object at the disclosure of the accused but such disclosure alone would
not automatically lead to the conclusion that the offence was also committed by
the accused. In fact, thereafter, burden lies on the prosecution to establish a
close link between discovery of the material objects and its use in the
commission of the offence.What is admissible underSection27of the Act is the
information leading to discovery and not any opinion formed on it by the
prosecution.
3.2 Navaneethakrishnan v. The State by Inspector of Police[41]
In this case, the phones along with other materials were discovered at the
instance of the information given by the accused. Those recoveries did not have
any connection with the crime committed and the fact of which the discoveries
were made, could not be proved be a relevant one. The Apex Court observed that
in the absence of any connecting link between the crime and the things
recovered, the recovery on the behest of accused will not have any material
bearing on the facts of the case.
The Court held,
….no evidence has been adduced or produced by the prosecution as to how these
objects have a bearing on the case. In fact, none of the witnesses have
identified the camera or stated the belongings 18 of John Bosco. The said
statements are inadmissiblein spite of the mandate contained in Section 27 for
the simple reason that it cannot be stated to have resulted in the discovery of
some new fact. The material objects which the police is claimed to have
recovered from the accused may well have been planted by the police.
3.3
Charandas Swami v. State of Gujarat[42]
In this case, the Apex Court decided on following issues which defined and
expanded the scope of the section to even mental state of the accused.[43]The
court decided upon the following issues:
(i) Whether the discovery of fact referred to in Section 27 should be confined
only to the discovery of a material object and the knowledge of the accused in
relation thereto or the discovery could be in respect of his mental state or
knowledge in relation to certain things- concrete or non-concrete.
(ii) Whether it is necessary that the discovery of fact should be by the person
making the disclosure or directly at his instance. The subsequent event of
discovery by the police with the aid of information furnished by the accused —
whether can be put against him under Section 27.
This Court has restated the legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory
and the word fact as contemplated by Section 27 is not limited to actual
physical material object. It further noted that the discovery of fact arises by
reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the
knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a
particular place. A discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place
from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its
existence.’[44]
3.4
Md. Kamrulv. The State of Bihar[45]
This case discusses the issue of the statement and the discovery of fact out of
it. Patna HC said that it is not necessary to physically point out the place
where the discovery should be made to make it come under section 27.
Following is the relevant excerpt from the case:
There is one more point which we would like to discuss i.e. whether pointing out
a material object by the accused furnishing the information is a necessary
concomitant ofSection27. We think that the answer should be in the negative.
Though in most of the cases the person who makes the disclosure himself leads
the police officer to the place where an object is concealed and points out the
same to him, however, it is not essential that there should be such pointing out
in order to make the information admissible underSection27.
3.5 Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra[46]
In this case, the issue of validity of two simultaneous and separate statements
by two accused, came into consideration. The Apex Court held that if two or more
accused, when inquired separately and simultaneously, give the same information
leading to the discovery of the fact, it does not affect the applicability of
section 27. Following is the relevant excerpt from the case:
This Court has held that a joint disclosure or simultaneous disclosures, per se,
are not inadmissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. A person accused need
not necessarily be a single person, but it could be a plurality of the accused.
The Court held that a joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because two or
more accused persons would not have uttered informatory words in chorus. When
two persons in custody are interrogated separately and simultaneously and both
of them may furnish similar information leading to the discovery of fact which
was reduced into writing, such disclosure by two or more persons in police
custody do not go out of the purview of Section 27 altogether.
Conclusion
A statement of an accused or part thereof as made admissible in evidence by
section 27 assumes a great significance both because it provides for a well
justified relaxation to the total exclusion rule in case of confirmation of the
statement be subsequent facts and also may, more so, because this is one
provision which is susceptible to the most blatant misuse by the
police.[47]Both the aspects of the section are of utmost importance, one is
providing the speedier leeway for the judicial machinery to arrive at conclusion
and the other one is significant from the point of view of human rights that may
be violated grossly in the process.
The section is drafter very meticulously but at the same time, subjected to very
interpretations and criticisms. Law commission Reports have even recommended to
re-draft the whole section and to make it even wider to include the statements
not given in custody to a police officer.[48]Over the time, with the
development of judicial pronouncements, the concepts under section 27 are being
refined and it is better not to accept the recommendation of the 185th Law
Commission Report. Otherwise it would become even more vulnerable and
exploitable section which will totally be in the hands of the Police on which
much reliance cannot be placed.
However, with the recent judgements, on the admissibility of even the mental
state of the accused giving the information, as a relevant fact; the scope of
the section not only gets wider but also gets very tough and complicated to
decide upon. This section allows the information received by improper means also
as far as those pieces of information are corroborated and substantiated by the
discovery of fact.[49]This makes it even more vulnerable because it gives
unfettered freedom in the hands of the police to implicate someone, if they
manage to implant the prerequisites in the eyes of law.
End-Notes
[1]§17 defines the term admission. According to the definition an admission: (i)
is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, (ii) which
suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and (iii) which
is made by any person under the circumstances hereinafter mentioned. Such
circumstances as hereinafter mentioned have been mentioned in Sections 18 to 30
of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
[2]Article 21, Sir James Stephen, Digest of the Law of Evidence, p. 52,
https://ia802304.us.archive.org/24/items/chasedigestoflawof00step/chasedigestoflawof00step.pdf
[3]§§ 25-26, Indian Evidence Act, 1872; §§ 161-162, Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.
[4]§ 24, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
[5]§ 25, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
[6]§ 26, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
[7]AIR 1977 S.C. 1579
[8]Looking at the past experiences of atrocities done by the Police, it would
not be unreasonable to say that too much liberty and unaccountability in the
hands of the police will significantly affect the judicial sanctity.
[9]§ 27, Indian Evidence Act, 1872
[10]State of Maharashtra v. Damu Gopinath Shinde, AIR 2000 SC 1691
[11]185th Law Commission Report, Government of India, Part I, p. 142,
http://10.21.88.204/lawcommissionofindia/reports/185thReport-PartI.pdf
[12]Id.
[13]State of Karnatakav.Davkd Razario,(2002) 7 SCC 728:AIR 2002 SC 3272
[14]Supra , 10.
[15]Sarkar, Law of Evidence, pp. 790, (19th Ed., Vol. 1)
[16]Selviv.State of Karnataka,(2010) 7 SCC 263
[17]Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam, (2013) 7 SCC 417
[18]Woodroffe and Amir Ali, Law of Evidence, pp.1470 (19th Ed., Vol. IV)
[19]State of U.P.v. Deoman, AIR 1960 S.C. 1125: (1960) Cr. L.J. 1504
[20]Sarabjit Singhv. State, (1998) Cr. L.J. 2231 (P&H), recovery made in
consequences of discloser statement made at a time when the maker of the
statement was neither accused of any offence nor under arrest, the statement and
recovery were held to be not admissible.
[21]Memon Mohmad,(1958) 61 Bom. L.R. 715; Bakshia Mukinda, (1959) 62 Bom. L.R.
80
[22]Chunda Murmuv. State of West Bengal, AIR 2012 S.C. 2160
[23]In making an arrest the police officer or other person making the same
shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless
there be a submission to the custody by word or action.
Providedthat where a woman is to be arrested, unless the circumstances indicate
to the contrary, her submission to custody on an oral intimation of arrest shall
be presumed and, unless the circumstances otherwise require or unless the police
officer is a female, the police officer shall not touch the person of the woman
for making her arrest.
[24]Anter Singhv. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 657
[25]State of Biharv. Madanlal, AIR 1967 Pat. 63
[26]Sanatan Naskarv. State of West Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 3570
[27]Hakamv. the Crown, (1940) 21 Lah. 242
[28]Paramhansav. State of Orissa,AIR 1964 Ori. 144
[29]Ashish Bathamv. State of M.P., AIR 2002 S.C.3206;Aghnoo Nageshiav.
State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119;State of Rajasthanv. Vinod Malhotra, 1997 CrLJ
1488, 1497
[30]Nga Shwe Tatv. Queen-Empress, (1897) 1 UBR (1897-1901) 152
[31]State (NCT) of Delhiv. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 S.C.C. 600: A.I.R. 2005
S.C. 3820
[32]Durga Burman (Roy)v. State of Sikkim, AIR 2014 SC 2993
[33]Jodha Khoda Rabariv. State of Gujrat, 1992 Cr. L.J. 3298 (Guj)
[34]Ramkishan Mithanlalv. State of Bombay, (1954) 57 Bom. L.R. 600, the court
can exhibit and look into only that portion of the statement which is related to
disclosure, and not the whole statement.
[35]Sukhvider Singhv. State of Punjab, (1994) 5 S.C.C. 152
[36]Palukuri Kotayya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67
[37]State of Rajasthanv. Bhup Singh, (1997)10 S.C.C. 675;Rv. Gould, (1840) 9
C&P 364).
[38]Bodhrajv. State of J&K, (2002) Cr. L.J. 4664, (S.C.)
[39]Paramsivamv. State through Inspector of Police, AIR 2014 SC 2936.
[40]2017 SCC Cal 18769
[41]AIR 2018 SC 2027
[42](2017) 7 SCC 177
[43]Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, 1976 1 SCC 828; Udai Bhan Rai v.
State of U. P. and others, AIR 1994 SC 1603; State of Maharashtra v. Damu
Gopinath Shinde and Ors, AIR 2000 SC 1691.
[44]Udai Bhanv.State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1116
[45]2017 SCC 1571
[46](2017) 3 SCC 760
[47]Vijay Singh v. State of M.P., 2005 Cr. L.J. 299 (M. P. High Court).
[48]185th Law Commission Report, Government of India, Part I, p. 142
http://10.21.88.204/lawcommissionofindia/reports/185thReport-PartI.pdf.
27. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 24 to 26,
when any relevant fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offence, whether or not such person is in
the custody of a police officer, the fact so discovered may be proved, but not
the information, whether it amounts to a confession or not:
Provided that facts so discovered by using any threat, coercion, violence or
torture shall not be provable.
[49]Statev. NMT Joy Immoculate, AIR 2004 S.C. 2282,State of Rajasthanv. Bhup
Singh, (1997)10 S.C.C. 675
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