One of the main reasons parties in international conflicts select arbitration as a means of conflict settlement over other forms is prevention of public broadcast of information and negative publicity. However, in case of international commercial arbitration (ICA), the conventional assumption that it is confidentiality attracts parties to arbitration might be contested since confidentiality has not been statutorily imposed in various countries globally.

Furthermore, lacking explicitly from the UNCITRAL model law establishing the fundamental basis of many domestic governments is arbitration procedures meant to guarantee secrecy. While nations like Sweden, United Kingdom, USA, etc. have kept silent on specifically offering a provision of confidentiality, India and some arbitral organisations like LCIA and SIAC have advised that arbitral proceedings shall remain confidential.

Moreover, privacy is often used together with confidentiality although the two terms carry an entirely mean differently in the arbitration set-up as privacy would mean that no third party other than the arbitrator and the parties in dispute can attend the arbitration proceedings whereas confidentiality would mean non-disclosure of information to the third party without consent.

This paper will concentrate on stressing the reality of the presumption of confidentiality in the international commercial arbitration system by means of an exploration of the lack of consistency in the international principle of confidentiality in the laws of arbitration and the degree and scope of protection of confidence if any, to be maintained by the parties in the international context.

Introduction
"Though confidentiality still remains a key attraction of arbitration ...the once general confidentiality of arbitral proceedings has been eroded in recent years."-- Redfern and Hunter[1]

Arbitration's many advantages are including secrecy and confidentiality, have reportedly helped businesses from all around the globe to settle cross-border economic conflicts.[2]

Privacy refers to the right of those other than the arbitrators, parties, and their necessary representatives and witnesses to show up to the arbitration hearings.

Confidentiality is the obligation of the parties and the arbitrators to keep knowledge regarding the topic of the arbitration private. Confidentiality protects both the arbitration procedure and any generated or distributed documentation during it.[3] Researchers and judges have embraced two quite different points of view on secrecy. One point of view holds that should confidentiality be a component of arbitration; it should be stated either in the relevant arbitration regulations or the arbitration agreement itself.

The second perspective holds that, depending on the conditions of the arbitration agreement, secrecy is an implied clause in every one of them.
When looking at comparative law, one finds that there are notable variations rather than a consistent approach to the issue since many national legislatures make no reference of secrecy at all, while others do so in a quite broad sense. Exceptionally, some statutes contain broader regulations. Even in fields where it is accepted, the extent and content of diversity differ substantially. Though one assumes there is a legal basis for the obligation of confidentiality, usually there is none.

The UNCITRAL Model Law or national arbitration laws of most significant economic countries state, "Arbitration is not secret". This is the reason certain legal systems including those in the United Kingdom, Korea, Japan, the Federal Arbitration Act in the United States, and Swiss law do not have any specific requirements. Some arbitral bodies, such the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)[4] and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC)[5], however insist that proceedings be kept private. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) rules let the arbitral tribunal, upon a party's request, mandate the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings or of any other matter pertaining to the arbitration and may act to safeguard trade secrets and confidential information.[6]

Entitled to attend the hearings are persons including the parties, his agent or advocate, witnesses, shorthand writer, and arbitrator himself.[7]This should be kept apart from the secrecy obligation, which bans talking about the arbitration processes with any other party without their consent. This is essentially always true. Confidentiality with regard to arbitration proceedings and any documents created or disclosed covered a topic never explored for a very long time at least not until the 1990s.[8] In this sense, however, the position of law has been found to be diverse depending on the different policies followed by different countries.

This paper will concentrate on offering a liberal, strict and balanced approach on the subject of maintaining confidentiality of the arbitral process, analyses the approaches of the English courts of UK that follow the view that confidentiality is an implied term in all arbitration agreements, position of law upheld by the Australian Courts being serving as a polar opposite view in contrast to that of the UK as The silence was broken [9] and that of Sweden that stands strong on the point that confidentiality may not be implied unless it has been specifically agreed upon when the High Court of Australia refuted the generally held belief that there is a universal obligation of confidentiality in arbitration procedures.

Comparative study along with the author suggesting the most suitable mechanism that is needed to be adopted by countries in order to promote the way forward for arbitration to be the most preferred mode of alternative dispute resolution will help to analyse the contradicting arguments suggested by different scholars together with the precedents that have led to the debate.


Research Objective

1. How far is confidentiality regarded as a basic concept in international arbitration, and how does it run counter to the openness and publicity guidelines enforced by courts, arbitrators, and parties?
2. How do the main justifications for and against an obligation of confidentiality in international arbitration affect the efficiency of arbitration as a means of resolving conflicts?
3. What lessons about the worldwide approach to confidentiality in arbitration processes may judicial precedents in the UK, Australia, and Sweden offer? How have they affected the application of secrecy in international arbitration?

Research Problem
Different approaches of the presumption of confidentiality in arbitration Apart with enforcement and part, control, confidentiality and privacy should be traits of arbitration.[10] Arbitration is usually of a private nature therefore. In at least the absolute meaning most people understand it, the notion that a duty of confidentiality exists is really more of a truism than a truth. Furthermore, highly divisive are fundamental questions regarding the nature and applicability of the idea as a legal principle as well as its presentation as an arbitral procedure rule.

Actually, "there have been varying judicial attitudes shown and no consensus of doctrines."[11] Furthermore, courts usually fall short of, or even reject, the expectations of parties about the privacy and confidentiality of their arbitration procedures.[12] "In light of judicial sentiment, current institutional guidelines, national statutes, contract law standards, and practical considerations, the extent to which various elements of the arbitration process can be and are protected by a duty of confidentiality will be the main focus of this article."

Research Questions

1. Whether implicit confidentiality is the standard everywhere in ICA?
2. What are the many national perspectives on ICA confidentiality?
3. Does the public interest make it difficult to resolve the issue of confidentiality in ICA?

Research Methodology
This paper is completely based on the secondary method of research approach where the data used are collected and analysed from the legal documents w.r.t the Confidentiality vs. Transparency in commercial arbitration: a myth or reality and other related document and other legislative texts and existing literature from a selected website such like Jstor etc. Confidentiality vs. Transparency in commercial arbitration: a myth or reality The research is carried out in such a way that it offers a thorough knowledge of Commercial Arbitration and its implications on confidentiality and relateddifficulties and the effectiveness of arbitration in making effective to reduce the disparities.

Literature Review
Ending Blind Spot Justice: Broadening The Transparency Trend In International Arbitration By Brook. J. INT'L L.[13] The book addresses the idea of "Ending Blind Spot Justice" in international arbitration, contending that the present system of blind spot justice is impeding development of openness. established to increase openness and confidentiality in international arbitration, the Transparency Rules for Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (UNCITRAL) are established by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.

Protecting public interests—including democratic deficit concerns, public purse and taxpayer concerns, claims of government misbehaviour, and "profoundly important" public policy issues the Transparency Rules seek to safeguard In the framework of international arbitration, the book also defines privacy, secrecy, and openness suggesting that the Supreme Court's decision in the Mitsubishi Motors case should eliminate blind spot justice. The book exhorts UNCITRAL to enact a rule mandating the disclosure of unsensitized arbitral rulings in order to safeguard public interests and advance the integrity of international commercial arbitration.

Need For Implied Transparency In Investment Arbitration By Ritika Bansal[14] With investment arbitration being under regulation by specialised treaties, globalisation has resulted in more corporate transactions and cross-border conflicts. States cannot offer fair and reasonable treatment to investors without transparency. Although some nations enforce an implicit obligation of secrecy via their domestic legislation, the requirement of openness in international commercial and investment arbitration is divisive. Revised versions of the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention) now have clauses encouraging more openness. The ICSID Reform proposal calls for parties to make proceedings documentation publicly accessible, therefore enhancing openness. This may guarantee responsibility, reduce inconsistency in decision-making, and provide more rewards access.

According to Mary Zhao's Paper "Transparency In International Commercial Arbitration: Adopting A Balanced Approach,"[15] investor-[16]state arbitrations' transparency requirements need to be adopted by international commercial arbitration. The paper questions the conventional wisdom that public interests are limited to conflicts between investor-states and suggests a compromise between openness and anonymity.

Generally speaking, public disclosure is advised when presenting evidence or sensitive information; as a specific first step towards meeting more transparency criteria, systematic publishing of arbitral rulings is advised. Entering into effect in 2017, the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention) marks a turning point in world attempts to solve openness in international arbitration. Transparency upholds public access to information in conflicts affecting public interests, therefore strengthening the legitimacy of the system. The paper also addresses how openness more especially, the disclosure of arbitral rulings—fits in international commercial arbitration.

The International Arbitration In Times Of Change (EULEX)[17] organization faces challenges in Kosovo due to segregation, corruption, high unemployment, and financial embezzlement. To enhance its legitimacy, EULEX must subject itself to greater scrutiny than UNMIK and ensure appropriate budget planning to prevent fraud and corruption. The unstable political, social, and legal environment presents unique challenges for EULEX, and change must come from within Kosovo.

Foreign investors' choice of international arbitration can create problems such as lack of coherence, discrimination, and concerns about transparency and fairness. The article discusses potential solutions to protect third parties' legal interests and public interest in investor-state arbitration, proposing top-down and bottom-up approaches.

Ethical Investing: Ethical Investors And Managers By Richard Hudson Ethical investing involves choosing financial securities based on ethical actions of companies, aiming to fulfill duties such as not profiting from immoral business activities and punishing good firms. The ability of ethical investors to fulfill their duties depends on how stock prices and returns react to making corporate practices more ethical.

A theoretical argument suggests that ethical trading activities will not affect share price or return, and empirical studies show that ethical stocks yield market returns. Ethical investors may face costs such as diversification, research into the corporation's ethicality, and trading more than other investors if the corporation's level of ethicality is not stable. Ethical investors' actions do not have any effect on corporate behavior or fulfill any duties.

Analysis
The subject matter goes beyond whether or not there is a confidentiality duty because, even in circumstances where the responsibility is accepted, their nature and application vary.
The substantial extent of the party's pleadings and memorials, provided documentation, or other evidence—such as expert reports or witness statements—as well as information included in such filings might all cover the award and other arbitration rulings.

Furthermore, the contents of the arbitration files might be quite important as they can include sensitive business information such profit margins, production costs, pricing strategies, know-how, or trade secrets that might be detrimental to one or both parties in an ICA.[18] Keeping in mind the safeguarding of trade secrets in this sense, Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement should also be taken into account.[19] Furthermore, it might expose the financial situation of a corporation or the availability of a defective product, circumstances that can tarnish its public image and advantage competitors.

Reality of Arbitration as a Private Conflict Resolution System
As is already well known, the engagement of national courts in arbitral procedures cannot be totally avoided even if arbitration belongs to the category of out-of-court alternative dispute resolution system. Actions like looking for temporary fixes, among the few events that lead to judicial involvement are award execution and stay of awards. This obviously provides a logical exception to the rule of secrecy.

In instances of public interest as well, regulatory agencies may step in and the parties can be obliged to provide material pertaining to the arbitration.

While various laws, arbitration rules, or case law in some nations have also accepted them as exceptions to the need of secrecy, there are additional situations that do not fit the above specified inevitable ones. This is the case, for instance, when revealing the existence of the arbitration is reasonably necessary to protect one party's legitimate interests in regard to third parties or to defend or enforce a right against a third party acting as a plaintiff or defendant defined as a matter of procedural public order. It has also been considered that there is no violation of the requirement of secrecy even if certain information related to the arbitration is given but there is a good reason to do so.

Among other interested parties, a parent business, shareholders, corporate auditors, an insurance company, and even a party interested in buying a firm needing due diligence have rights to know the presence and result of the arbitration.

Unless specifically forbidden by the relevant legislation or arbitration rules, or by agreement between the parties, the parties may therefore disclose information about their own arbitration, even to interested third parties, provided there are good faith explanations for doing so.

National Laws and Arbitration Policies Related to confidentiality
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996[20] has just seen a major change. The Act now explicitly requires secrecy. This change came forth in the 2019 Amendment.
Unless publication of an arbitral decision is necessary for the implementation and execution of an award, the newly added Section 42A of the Act[21] mandates that all arbitral processes shall be kept secret by the parties, arbitrators, and arbitral institution.

The limited exemption to the confidentiality rule that of implementation and execution of an award allows the arbitral process great challenges as well. It thereby raises the possibility of legal confidentiality duties being violated. For example, the clause does not reflect that, should a party seek interim protections or in line with other judicial procedures pertaining to the arbitration, disclosure of the arbitral proceedings may be required. Disclosure may also be required when outside funding is needed, experts recruited to assist with a dispute call for disclosures pertinent to an arbitration, or applicable law calls for disclosures. Although the newly adopted regulation requires secrecy for arbitrators, parties, and arbitral institutions, it leaves quiet on the obligations of lawyers, witnesses, stenographers, the tribunal secretary, etc.

Applicable to both domestic and international arbitral proceedings, the national arbitration legislation of New Zealand includes a secrecy provision.[22] It is claimed that the clause was meant to circumvent the Esso precedent[23] as established in Australia that will be covered below. Though questionable judicial tendencies may be seen that will be discussed later, most of the other jurisdictions essentially do not expressly include a clause in this respect.

Conversely, rules on arbitration established by Arbitral Institutions have included specific clauses. Although there are more specialised rules or codes of ethics for arbitrators or certain recommendations, they do not usually impose a requirement of secrecy on the parties. This is the situation with the ICC Rules, wherein Articles 1 of Appendix II and Article 6[24] of Appendix I just set responsibilities on Not on the parties, seven arbitrators and the International Court of Arbitration's staff follow Article 22.3, which lets the Arbitral Tribunal grant confidentiality orders upon a party's request.[25]

Similar to this, item 37.1 of the ICDR rules of the AAA merely requires the Administrator and arbitrators to keep anonymity; article 37.2 indicates that the tribunal may impose instructions about confidentiality.[26] It further states "the arbitrator shall maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the law provides to the opposite."[27]

Conversely, item 30 of the LCIA Rules[28] precisely controls the obligation of secrecy.
Although article 34.5 seems to recognise an implied secrecy of the award by requiring both parties' permission before it may be made public, the subject is not particularly addressed in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.[29]

Judicial Perspectives
United Kingdom: Arbitration agreement implied obligation of confidentiality

Based on the case Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel v. Steuart J. Mew[30], English law might be seen as the conventional or traditional perspective on the matter. Based on his choice, Mr. Justice Coleman stopped the plaintiff from revealing the material. The argument that revealing the relevant records would breach a confidentiality agreement helped the Judge to reach his finding. The court decided that the implicit term must be founded on customary or commercial efficacy by basing its conclusion on the Dolling-Baker case[31] wherein the general duty of secrecy about the inferred requirement was applied.

Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co v. Active Building & Civil Construction[32] from 1994 offers greater support for the stance adopted in the previously cited decisions. Justice Philips LJ's decision in that case states that anybody who gets confidential information about an arbitration under English law is liable for the same secrecy requirements as the participants of the arbitration. He decided that

"The English authorities demonstrate that the nature and extent of the duty of confidentiality applicable to documents and information obtained in arbitration proceedings is by no means fully charted. It is not clear whether the duty of confidentiality arises out of a contractual term or by virtue of the relationship between the parties. It is clear that a duty of confidentiality must be subject to limits or restrictions…."

This implies that the English courts were moving from a strict rule prohibiting disclosures under all circumstances to one more accommodating.

Finally, in Ali Shipping Corporation v. Shipyard Trogir[33], the Court of Appeal gave a precise rationale on the nature, extent and application of exceptions, therefore offering a superb study of English common law pertaining to arbitration.[34] Potter LJ made a reference to Lord Bridge's decision in Scally v. Southern Health and Social Services Board[35], in which it was noted that the particular character of "the implied term of confidentiality" differed:

"Between the searches for an implied term necessary to give business efficacy to a particular contract and the search, based on wider considerations, for a term which the law will necessarily imply as a necessary incident of a definable category of contractual relationship."

Moreover, Justice Potter LJ said that it was not necessary or even advisable to restrict exclusions to circumstances of "reasonable necessity". He agreed with Coleman J[36] that a disclosure had to be required rather than just useful.

Australia: Rejection of implied confidentiality in arbitration agreement
With its decision in Esso/BHP v. Plowman[37] whereby main judge, Marks J, rejected the English legal position that there is a universal requirement of secrecy and that it is an assumed condition in arbitration agreements,

"That the mere fact that parties to a dispute agree impliedly or expressly to have it arbitrated in private does not import any legal or equitable obligation not to disclose to third parties any information at all which may be said to have been obtained by virtue of or in the course of the arbitration."

The appellate division later maintained this, and Justice Mason CJ wanted to have this preferred:
"Describe the private character of the hearings as something that inheres in the subject matter of the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration…"[38]

And therefore held that:
Confidentiality was not an essential attribute of arbitration in Australia.

Although those disclosures were mandated by law, The Court of Appeal of New South Wales decided in the case of Australia v. Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd[39] that an arbitrator lacked the authority to issue a procedural directive imposing a confidentiality obligation that would prevent the government from disclosing information and documents to a state agency or the public. Drawing on the Esso case 38, Justice Kirby P concluded that:

"The set of confidentiality directions, extended to documents the Commonwealth wished to give to State Authorities. While this information was important for the public, it was urgent for public health and restoration agencies. The judge argued that there should not be a duty of confidentiality to a party's own documents prepared or arbitration, if they have a wider public interest."[40]

Consequently, he declined to accept that, depending on the public interest exemption, a private arbitration agreement might nullify or limit the Commonwealth's commitment to forward the public interests.

Sweden: Confidentiality is not a mandate unless expressly agreed

The Swedish Arbitration Act leaves no guidelines on secrecy. [41] Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that most of the current laws emphasise the need of the same notably in situations involving trade secrets of corporations.[42] This opinion was changed, however, in the Bulbank Case[43], when the Supreme Court decided that an arbitration agreement included no legal obligation of secrecy.

The Court held that: "Arbitration is based upon an agreement, whereby the proceedings are private and confirmed that arbitral proceedings are fundamentally private and that factor is one of the main advantages and reasons why companies choose arbitration."

Still, the Court distinguished privacy from secrecy. Arbitration processes are private, hence a prerequisite of secrecy does not always apply for the parties. Unlike court procedures, the true definition of privacy is that the public does not have the right to access records or show attendance at the sessions. The Court held that the parties' capacity to reveal material acquired throughout the proceedings does not contradict each other.

The Supreme Court observed the global landscape and concluded that views were split. On one hand, English and French opinions maintained the overall confidentiality in arbitration principle.[44] On the other hand, the Court quoted the High Court of Australia's ruling in Esso rejecting the obligation of confidentiality. [45]These facts led the Supreme Court to decide that, except from special agreement, a party engaged in an arbitration under Swedish law could not be bound by confidentiality.


Conclusion And Suggestions
Suggestions
Establishing a uniform worldwide framework that precisely determines the extent of confidentiality is one of the most efficient approaches to address the problem of confidentiality in international commercial arbitration (ICA). Like the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules for investor-state conflicts, a comparable worldwide tool needs to be established to provide consistency in ICA confidentiality criteria. This would guarantee that parties and arbitrators have clear instructions on the use of secrecy across many legal systems, therefore preventing jurisdictional discrepancies.

Parties could also specifically include confidentiality terms to their arbitration agreements. Parties should clearly specify the scope and restrictions of confidentiality in arbitration agreements rather than presuming it as an inferred condition. These clauses should make clear if the confidentiality duty covers pleadings, evidence, and arbitral rulings or merely the hearings. Through this, participants may avoid uncertainty and any conflicts on confidentiality throughout the procedures.

Arbitral organisations should also change their guidelines to include more exact secrecy clauses. Certain institutions, such the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) and the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), already have secrecy requirements; others let the tribunal decide on this matter. Major arbitration bodies should include a default secrecy provision so that parties may opt-out in case they would want openness.

Legislatively speaking, national arbitration rules need to be changed to provide more precise rules on secrecy. A positive first step is the 2019 amendment to the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act including Section 42A. On exceptions, including disclosures needed in legal procedures or regulatory enquiries, the clause is vague, nevertheless. Therefore, nations should pass laws defining their duties regarding secrecy as well as specifying reasonable exceptions to serve public interest.

A well-defined system should be created to control circumstances where disclosure is required in order to strike public interest against secrecy. Cases involving antitrust breaches, financial crimes, public health issues, or environmental problems might all fit here. Arbitration cases involving corporate fraud, monopolistic activities, or faulty goods, for instance, could call for disclosure to defend consumer, shareholder, or regulatory body rights. Arbitral courts and organisations should be able to evaluate whether, in some circumstances public interest exceeds the requirement for secrecy.

Arbitral organisations might post deleted copies of arbitral rulings to increase openness while maintaining anonymity. Eliminating private business data would allow these written accolades to serve as helpful legal precedents while preserving the anonymity of the parties engaged. Anonymised databases of arbitral rulings might help to shape international arbitration law even further and guarantee that private corporate data stays private.
Giving arbitrators, tribunal secretaries, witnesses, and outside funders confidentiality responsibilities is another vital step. Although certain arbitration rules mandate secrecy to arbitrators and institutional workers, they may ignore other parties with access to private information. Explicitly mandating that all arbitration participants maintain secrecy would help to greatly lower the possibility of leaks and illegal disclosure.

Furthermore, important in improving confidentiality in arbitration is technology. Document exchange and case management on encrypted digital platforms should help to stop illegal access. Blockchain technology's usage in arbitration records may also provide safe and tamper-proof storage, therefore guaranteeing that private data is only available to authorised parties.

Another approach to protect anonymity is by supporting optimal standards in arbitration practice. By means of training courses and professional rules of behaviour, arbitral institutions, law firms, and arbitration practitioners should raise knowledge of confidentiality requirements and best practices. These initiatives will assist to reduce conflicts on confidentiality and standardise expectations.
At last, it is advisable to promote judicial restraint and non-interference in issues of secrecy. Only when absolutely required should courts step in to resolve confidentiality conflicts in order to serve public interest or justice. This strategy will stop too much court investigation that may compromise the effectiveness and appeal of arbitration as a means of resolving conflicts.

ICA can keep its standing as a private and effective conflict resolution tool by putting these sensible, reasonable, and legally enforced measures into use, therefore resolving issues about openness and public interest. These steps will guarantee that, even with respect to legal process integrity, arbitration remains a desirable choice for companies.

Conclusion
The issue of whether we need secrecy as an explicit legislative duty or if we would be better off if the arbitral rulings were disclosed thereby increasing transparency of the process is still contested as the globe progresses towards openness.

Regarding international arbitration jurisprudence. The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-based Arbitration (2014) [46], which apply the "what to disclose" rather than "when or to whom to disclose," help to solve this issue. To further public interest and provide open access to "key documents" generated during the arbitration, the Rules advocate enhanced openness in investment arbitration. Simultaneously, under the exemption from the rules, private or protected information has been very safeguarded.

With respect to the pragmatic breadth of exceptions resulting from the various national policies, it is challenging to get exact findings.[47] Keeping in mind the conundrum of "public interest" cases that was presented before the High Court of Australia, a similar view to that of Esso case would have been held even if the English courts not considering all possible circumstances that could occur in the near future such as where one party to arbitration is seeking to release information obtained in arbitration to a third party for a purpose unrelated to the dispute. However, since Germany, France and Switzerland have adopted the English perspective, that confidentiality is an implied term in all arbitration agreements. The said view can thus also be considered as a rationally welcoming approach for private parties to participate in arbitral proceedings since it was found that 87% of respondents believed that confidentiality in international commercial arbitration is of importance for it is the confidentiality factor that is one of the biggest driving factors for people to opt for ICA.[48]

While arbitration in Australia is subject to confidentiality but not to privacy, the perspective in the United States of America is clearly comparable.[49] One of the main elements of the many points of view is the way individuals respect privacy, or the extent and influence of private.
Sweden has shown a balanced approach by changing its position in the Bulbank case[50], thereby stressing the point that, while parties do have the means at their disposal to guarantee secrecy if they so wish, it is not a self-evident component of arbitration. Arbitration is finally a voluntary, cooperative way to settle disputes.

References:

1. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=true&handle=hein.journals/amuilr16&div=24&start_page=969&collection=sccjournals&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults
2. https://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/lup/publication/1560727
3. https://www.mondaq.com/india/arbitration--dispute-resolution/880678/changing-landscape-of-confidentiality-in-international-arbitration
4. https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/09/23/confidentiality-in-international-commercial-arbitration-truth-or-fiction/
5. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1769047
6. ssrn-4720700.pdf

End-Notes:

1. Blackaby Nigel, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 6th edition (Oxford University Press 2015) pp. 30.
2. Ronald Bernstein, General Principles, Handbook of Arbitration Practice 9, Ronald Bernstein ed., 2d ed. (1993) 99-100 USA.
3. Jason A. Fry, Without Prejudice and Confidential Communications in International Arbitration (When Does Procedural Flexibility Erode Public Policy?), INT'L ARB. L. REV, 209 (1998).
4. Article 30 of the LCIA Rules, 2014.
5. Rule 39 of the SIAC Rules, 2016.
6. Article 22 (3) of the ICC Rules, 2017.
7. Bernstein Ronald, Tackaberry John, Marriott Arthur, Handbook of Arbitration Practice, 3rd ed. at 194, London, (1998).
8. Neill Patrick, Confidentiality in Arbitration, 12 Arbitration International, 287, (1996).
9. Esso/BHP v. Plowman, (1995) 128 A.L.R. 391.
10. L. Yves Fortier, The Occasionally Unwarranted Assumption of Confidentiality, 15 ARB. INT'L 131 (1999).
11. Tatsuya Nakamura, Confidentiality in Arbitration; SI EA Court of Appeal Decision - Is It Good News from Stockholm? 14 MLEALEY'S INT'L ARB. RLP. 24 (June 1999).
12. Robert D. Argen, Ending Blind Spot Justice: Broadening the Transparency Trend in International Arbitration, 40 BROOK. J. INT'l L. 207 (2014).
13. Ritika Bansal, Need for Implied Transparency in Investment Arbitration, 54 N.Y.U. J. INT'l L. & POL. 221 (Fall 2021).
14. Mary Zhao, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration: Adopting a Balanced Approach, 59 VA. J. INT'l L. 175 (2019).
15. Business Ethics Quarterly, Oct. 2005, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Oct. 2005), pp. 641-657 Published by: Cambridge University Press.
16. Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, International Arbitration in Times of Change: Fairness and Transparency in Investor-State Disputes, 104 AM. SOC'y INT'l L. PROC. 591 (2010).
17. Francois Dessemontet, Arbitration and Confidentiality, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 299 (1996).
18. Article 39, TRIPS, 33 I.L.M. 81, 98 (1994).
19. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No 26, Acts of Parliament, 1996 (India).
20. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, § 42A, No 26, Acts of Parliament, 1996 (India).
21. The New Zealand Arbitration Act, § 14, 1996.
22. David Williams, New Zealand: The New Arbitration Act, Adoption of the Model Law with Additions, 1(6) INT'L ARB. L. Rev 214, 216 (1998).
23. Article 6 of the ICC Rules, 2017.
24. Article 22.3 of the ICC Rules, 2017.
25. American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules Rule 25 (1993), Reprinted In Thomas Oehmkb, Commercial Arbitration, app.c 7 at 881 (Supp. 1994).
26. Article 34.5 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010.
27. Hassneh Insurance Co and others v. Steuart Mew, (1993) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243 (Q.B Com Ct.).
28. Dolling-Baker v. Merrett, (1990) 1 W.L.R. 1205 (C.A).
29. Insurance Co. v. Lloyd's Syndicate, (1995) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 272 (Q.B. Com. Ct.).
30. Ali Shipping Corporation v. Shipyard Trogir, (1998) 2 All. E.R. 136 (C.A. Civ. Div.).
31. Scally v. Southern Health and Social Services Board, (1992) 1 A.C. 294.
32. Commonwealth of Australia v. Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd., (1995) 36 NSWLR 662.
33. Swedish Arbitration Act, 1962, Lag (1999:116) Om skiljeförfarande.
34. SOU (1995:96), Näringslivets tvistlösning, at 185.
35. Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd. v. AI Trade Finance Inc, 2 Stockholm District Court, 1998-09-10, Case T 6-111-98.
36. The Supreme Court of Sweden, 2000-10-27, Case T 1881-99, at 10.
37. UNCITRAL brings in new transparency rules (April 1, 2014) in treaty-based investor-state arbitration, available on http://www.nishithdesai.com/information/research-and-articles/nda-hotline/nda-hotline-single-view/article/uncitral-brings-in-new-transparency-rules-with-effect-april-1-2014-in-treatybased-investor-state-a.html?no_cache=1&cHash=d1a716f314a5dc88c269b0a5f6eba054.
38. Gary B. Born, Confidentiality in International Arbitration, International Commercial Arbitration (Second Edition), 2nd edition, Kluwer Law International (2014), pp. 2784 and 2785.
39. International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration, conducted by White & Case and Queen Mary University of London, available on https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/qmul-international-arbitration-survey-2018-19.pdf (accessed on 28 November 2019).
40. Michael F. Hoellering, How to Draft an AAA Arbitration Clause, 7 Foreign Investment L.J. 141, 152 (1992).