Regarding the constitutionality of legislation, particularly Section 6 of the HMG Act, it should be noted that the validity of legislation is to be presumed. Law courts should make efforts to retain legislation in the statute book rather than scrapping it. Only in cases of gross violation of constitutional sanctions would law courts be within their jurisdiction to declare a legislative enactment invalid. It is with this perspective that the expressions used in Section 6 are analyzed.

The word "Guardian" and the meaning attributed to it by the legislature under Section 4(b) of the Act cannot be said to be restricted in any way. Thus, it would include both the father and the mother. This interpretation is reinforced by the meaning attributed to "Guardian" as a person having care of a minor's person or property. It is an axiomatic truth that both the mother and the father of a minor child are duty-bound to take due care of their child's person and property. Therefore, considering the meaning attributed to the word "Guardian," both parents ought to be treated as guardians of the minor.

If the word "Guardian" in the definition section implies both parents, the same meaning should be attributed to the word appearing in Section 6(a). From this perspective, the mother's right to act as a guardian does not stand obliterated during the father's lifetime. Reading the statute otherwise would amount to a violent departure from legislative intent. Section 6(a) itself recognizes that both father and mother ought to be treated as natural guardians, and the expression thereafter shall be read and interpreted in a manner that does not defeat the true intent of the legislature.

Father and mother are natural guardians in terms of the provisions of Section 6 read with Section 4(c). The father, by reason of a dominant personality, cannot be ascribed a preferential right over the mother in matters of guardianship since both fall within the same category.