The doors of justice must remain open for all,” the Supreme Court once observed while expanding the scope of Public Interest Litigation (PIL). Designed as a revolutionary tool in Indian constitutional law, PILs have given voice to those who otherwise lack access to legal recourse – prisoners, laborers, women, and even the environment. Yet, in recent years, courts have grown increasingly wary of PIL misuse, especially when alternative statutory remedies exist.
In a notable instance from June 2025, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that filing a PIL was “inappropriate” where legislative remedies are clearly laid out – signaling a shift toward stricter procedural discipline. This raises a constitutional tension: should courts actively restrict PILs in favor of statutory processes, or does such restraint risk undermining access to justice for genuine public causes?
This article explores the delicate balance between PIL as a constitutional mechanism and the role of legislative remedies, drawing from key judgments, evolving judicial philosophy, and the current debate on judicial restraint.
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) emerged in India as a transformative judicial innovation during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Before this period, access to the courts was restricted by the doctrine of locus standi — only those directly affected by a matter could seek relief. This made the justice system largely inaccessible to the poor, unrepresented, or marginalized.
That changed with the judicial activism of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and Justice P.N. Bhagwati, who expanded the scope of constitutional remedies under Article 32 and Article 226. They argued that any concerned citizen could approach the court on behalf of those unable to do so themselves — even by writing letters or postcards.
Key Early Cases
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981): Recognized locus standi for public-minded individuals and lawyers. Justice Bhagwati stated that “any member of the public acting bona fide” can move the court for redressal of a public wrong.
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979): Triggered by a newspaper article, this case led to the release of thousands of undertrial prisoners who were incarcerated for years without trial — a major milestone in PIL history.
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982): Cemented the use of PIL for labor rights violations, especially in large-scale public projects like the construction for the 1982 Asian Games.
Through these rulings, the Indian judiciary redefined access to justice by relaxing procedural technicalities. PILs were no longer confined to legal injury, but also moral and constitutional injury to the public.
From Empowerment to Overreach: The Changing Face of PIL
While the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was initially a tool for empowering the voiceless, it gradually began to drift from its original purpose. As the judiciary opened its doors wider, the flood of PILs brought in not just genuine concerns, but also frivolous, politically motivated, and self-serving petitions.
Judicial Warnings Against Abuse of PIL: Rising Concerns and Doctrinal Restraint
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India began as a noble constitutional innovation—intended to democratize access to justice, especially for the underprivileged. However, over the past few decades, courts have grown increasingly wary of its misuse.
A pivotal judgment expressing judicial disquiet was State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402, where the Supreme Court acknowledged the growing trend of frivolous PILs being filed for “oblique motives.” The Court clarified that “PILs are not meant to advance personal or political interests but to uphold public interest and constitutional values.”
Similarly, the Madras High Court in K. Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 5275, coined the term “Publicity Interest Litigations” to describe petitions filed solely to attract media attention or political mileage.
Common Misuses of PIL
Repetitive litigation: Raising settled issues in the guise of PILs (e.g., Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., (2004) 3 SCC 349).
Media-triggered petitions: Demanding bans on movies, books, or artworks based on sentiment, not constitutional harm (e.g., Divya Pharmacy v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Utt 635).
Bypassing remedies: Using PILs to avoid statutory or appellate remedies by mislabeling personal grievances as public concerns.
These practices divert judicial attention from genuine constitutional crises and contribute to judicial backlogs.
Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies: An Evolving Jurisprudence
Indian courts have long maintained that PILs and writ petitions under Articles 32 and 226 must not substitute existing statutory frameworks. The doctrine of “alternative remedy” serves as a gatekeeping tool.
In State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86, the Supreme Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked where statutory remedies exist. This was reaffirmed in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, (1998) 8 SCC 1, which held that although the High Court’s jurisdiction is not ousted, it is restrained unless exceptions apply (e.g., violation of natural justice or fundamental rights).
In PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 310, the Supreme Court held that while alternative remedies do not bar jurisdiction, they serve as a “policy-based deterrent.” The rationale includes:
Judicial efficiency
Legislative deference
Procedural fairness
Exceptions still apply, such as in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation, (2003) 2 SCC 107, where remedies were found inadequate or illusory. Thus, the doctrine is flexible and guided by judicial prudence.
Case Study: Punjab & Haryana High Court on Judicial Restraint in PILs
In Anuj Malik & Ors. v. Union of India, decided on June 21, 2025 (Coram: C.J. Sheel Nagu and J. Sumeet Goel), the petitioners filed a PIL to restrain online platforms and advertising agencies from promoting betting activities. The state cited the Haryana Prevention of Public Gambling Act, 2025, enacted on April 9, 2025, as sufficient regulation.
The Court dismissed the PIL as “inappropriate and impermissible,” emphasizing that bypassing regulatory mechanisms disrupts administration and amounts to judicial overreach. It reaffirmed the need to exhaust statutory channels first.
This aligns with the Supreme Court’s stance in Union of India v. R. Gandhi, (2010) 11 SCC 1, cautioning against judicial interference in matters reserved for the legislature or executive.
A Constitutional Calibration: Not Rejection, But Refinement
The Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision is a recalibration of PIL boundaries, emphasizing remedy hierarchies and institutional coherence. Courts are sensitive to the overuse of PILs and its effect on legislative intent.
As noted in Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64, judicial review must be exercised with restraint and respect. This trend is not a rejection of PILs but a safeguard to their transformative purpose.
In Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 501, the Court reaffirmed PILs’ role in enforcing collective rights, while warning against abuse.
Conclusion: Toward a Balanced Future of PIL Jurisprudence
The journey of PIL in India reflects the judiciary’s constitutional imagination. From responding to inequities to becoming a tool for public accountability, its trajectory has evolved.
The 2025 Punjab & Haryana High Court decision marks a shift from unchecked activism to constitutional pragmatism. This is not regressive, but a necessary balance of judicial discretion and legislative respect.
PILs should not bypass regulation or chase media headlines. Their future lies in addressing genuine public wrongs where no alternative exists.
As scholars and practitioners, it is our duty to advocate for judicial integrity and legislative coherence, ensuring PILs continue their transformative role without undermining the rule of law.
2 Comments
yippie
great article very informative