Lawyers play a crucial role in upholding the principles of justice and ensuring everyone's access to legal representation. Their profession is firmly rooted in ethical standards, and they are duty-bound to assist anyone seeking legal aid. The contempt authority, as determined by the courts, exists to safeguard the integrity of the legal system and the administration of justice, rather than to shield individual judges from personal affronts. Several landmark cases in India's legal history have significantly influenced the nation's legal landscape.

These cases, adjudicated by the Supreme Court of India, have had profound implications and have addressed fundamental issues within the country's legal framework. They have also intersected with key provisions of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and The Advocates Act, 1961. This article delves into the details of these pivotal cases, analysing their context, legal arguments, and, most importantly, their significant judgments.
Here is an overview of some of these cases:

1. In re, Vinay Chandra Mishra (AIR 1995 SC 2348)
2. Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (AIR 1998 SC 1875)
3. In re, Ajay Kumar Pandey (AIR 1997 SC 260)
4. In re, Arundhati Roy (AIR 2002 SC 1375)
5. Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1991 SC 2176)
6. E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar (AIR 1970 SC 2015)
7. P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker (AIR 1988 SC 1208)
8. M. Veerabhadhra Rao v. Tek Chand (AIR 1985 SC 28)
9. Shambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry (AIR 2001 SC 2508)
10. Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 22)

Vinay Chandra Mishra (Air 1995, Sc 2348) Judges

1. J. Kuldip Singh
2. J. J.S. Verma
3. J. P.S. Sawant

Parts Of The Case

1. The Bansal Forgings Ltd took a loan from the UP Financial Corporation and it made default in payment of installment of the same.
2. The company proceeded against the corporation under section 29 of the UP Financial Corp Act and it also filed an application for grant of temporary injunctions.
3. The counsel for the corporation put appearance in the matter before the trial court and prayed for a reply.
4. The trial court passed an order on the said date that the corporation will not seize the factory of the company.
5. The company shall pay the amount of installments and it will furnish also security for the disputed amount.
6. An appeal was filed and arguments have been advanced that the court has no jurisdiction to pass the order for installments of the loan and further no security could have been ordered.
7. Justice S.K. Kashote against whom the contempt was committed wrote a letter to the acting chief justice of Allahabad High Court narrating the event and requiring suitable action. In his letter, he said that the advocate used very abusive language and it is not the question of insulting a judge of this institution but it is an insult of the institution as a whole.
8. The acting Chief Justice Shri V.K Khanna forwarded the said letter to the Chief Justice of India in his letter of 5th April 1994.
9. The court took a view that there was a prima facie case of criminal contempt of court committed by Shri Vinay Chandra Mishra and issued a notice against him to show cause why contempt be not initiated against him.

Contentions Forwarded By The Contemner:
The contemnor pleaded that:

1. An appeal was filed against order of trial court and the said appeal came for preliminary hearing before Hon'ble Justice and the applicant of this petition.
2. When the matter was called on board, the applicant took charge of the court proceedings and virtually foreclosed the attempts made by the senior judge to intervene. The applicant judge inquired from me as to under which the law the impugned order was passed to which I replied that it was under various rules of order under order 39, CPC.
3. I politely brought to the notice of the applicant judge that being the appellant I had the dominion over the case and it could not be made worse just because I had come to the High Court.
4. The applicant judge apparently lost his temper and told me in no uncertain terms that he would set aside the order in total disregarding what I had said, finding it necessary to mention that the exchange which took place between me and the applicant judge got a little heated up.

Issues:

1. Whether Article 129 vests the Supreme Court with the power to punish only for the contempt itself and not of the High Court.
2. Whether the contemner has been punished for contempt proceedings.

Judgement:
While dealing with the preliminary object raised by the contemner and the Bar Council that This court cannot take cognizance of the contempt of the High Court. The contentions ignores that the Supreme Court not only the highest court of record but under various provisions of the Constitution is also charged with the duties and responsibilities of correcting the lower courts and of protecting them from whose misconduct tends to prevent the due performance of their duties. The Supreme Court has made it clear that it can take cognizance of the contempt of the High Court.

Being the court of record, the Supreme Court has powers to punish for the contempt of the courts subordinate to it. While discussing the another issue in this case, the court found the contemner guilty of the offence of criminal contempt of the court for having interfered with and obstructing the course of justice by trying to threaten and overbear the court by using insulting, disrespectful and threatening language.

The contemner was punished with six week imprisonment. The sentence will remain suspended for a period of 4 years and may be activated in case the contemner is convicted of any other offence of contempt of court and the contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an advocate for a period of three years and all elective and nominated posts at present held by him in his capacity as an advocate shall stand vacated by him forth will.

Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union Of India

Citation: AIR 1998 SC 1895 Date of judgment - 17 April 1998
Facts of the Case:
The contemner, an attorney, was found guilty of criminal contempt of court for interfering with and "obstructing the process of justice by attempting to frighten, overawe, and overbear the court by using rude, contemptuous, and threatening words." He was condemned to simple jail for six years and barred from practising as an advocate for three years.

The sentence of confinement was suspended for four years and would be activated if he was convicted of any other act of contempt of court during that time. Dissatisfied with the decision to bar the defendant from practising as an advocate for three years, the Supreme Court Bar Association, through its Honorary Secretary, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, seeking:
An appropriate writ, direction, or declaration declaring that the disciplinary committees of the Bar Councils established under the Advocates Act, 1961, have sole authority to investigate and suspend or bar an advocate from practising law for professional or other misconduct arising out of a punishment imposed for contempt of court or otherwise; and A statement that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court, acting within its inherent jurisdiction, has no original jurisdiction, power, or authority in this matter.

Issues:
Can the Supreme Court, in exercising its powers under Article 129, read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, punish an advocate for committing proven contempt of court by suspending his licence for a defined term and barring him from practising law?

Judgement:
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction to penalise for contempt of court is nonetheless restricted, and it cannot be enlarged to include the ability to evaluate whether an advocate is also guilty of "professional misconduct" in a summary way, bypassing the Advocates Act's procedure.

While the power to do complete justice under Article 142 is a corrective power that favours equity over the law, it cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of due process under the Advocates Act, 1961, by suspending his licence to practise in a summary manner while dealing with a contempt of court case. Article 142's curative powers cannot be understood as allowing the court to disregard a litigant's substantive rights when dealing with a case before it.

This authority may not be utilised to "supplant" substantive law that applies to the matter or cause before the court. Even with its breadth, Article 142 cannot be used to construct a new tower where none previously existed by ignoring explicit statutory provisions dealing with a subject and achieving something indirectly that cannot be attained directly.

Punishing a contemnor advocate by suspending his licence to practise while dealing with a contempt of court case, a power otherwise statutorily available only to the Bar Council of India, on the basis that the contemner is also an advocate, is thus not permissible in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The salutary goal of Article 142, namely, to do complete justice between the parties, must be operationally informed by its interpretation. It can't be any other way. The contemner and the court are not litigating parties in a case of contempt of court.

A complaint of professional misconduct is investigated by the Bar Council's disciplinary committee, much like a court of law investigates a criminal case, and an advocate may be punished based on the evidence presented to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council after being allowed to be heard. The offending advocate may be removed from the Advocates' Rolls or subjected to any other sanction permitted by the Act. As a result, the Supreme Court cannot penalise an advocate for "professional misconduct" while exercising appellate authority by changing itself into a statutory body with "original jurisdiction."

Indeed, if the concerned Bar Council does not take any action against an advocate after being informed of their willful and blameworthy conduct by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, in exercising its appellate powers under section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961, read with Article 142 of the Constitution, may well have the jurisdiction to proceed suo motu and send for the records from the Bar Council and pass appropriate orders. If a case is pending before the relevant Bar Council and the Bar Council "does not act," the Supreme Court may sometimes consider exercising appellate jurisdiction suo motu. The superior court's contempt jurisdiction is not founded on legislation but rather on the fact that it is a court of record, which gives it that power. The Supreme Court and High Courts have the power of contempt since the Constitution considers them courts of record.

In Re: Ajay Kumar Pandey

Citation: AIR 1997 SC 260

• Facts:
  1. Ajay Kumar Pandey, an advocate, issued a notice to two Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court, demanding apology and compensation.
  2. The notice was related to alleged derogatory remarks made by the Judges towards Pandey during court proceedings on December 15, 1995.
  3. Pandey accused the Judges of making false statements with the intention to waste time and harass him.
  4. He threatened to initiate criminal proceedings against the Judges if they did not apologise.
  5. Pandey later filed a complaint against the Judges, branding their conduct as "goondaism."
  6. The notice formed the basis of Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 55/96, while the complaint filed against the Judges formed the basis of Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 56/96.
• Issues:
  1. Whether Pandey's actions constituted criminal contempt of court.
  2. Whether the notice and complaint filed by Pandey interfered with the administration of justice.
  3. Whether Pandey's apology was genuine and sufficient to mitigate his contemptuous conduct.

Relevant Laws:

• Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, defines criminal contempt as any act or publication that scandalises the court, interferes with judicial proceedings, or obstructs the administration of justice.
• Article 129 of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court the power to punish for contempt of itself.
• Judicial Officers (Protection) Act and Judges (Protection) Act provide statutory protection to judges and magistrates against threats and prosecutions.

Judgment:

1. The Court held that Pandey's actions amounted to criminal contempt as he attempted to threaten and overawe the Court with insulting language and by issuing notices and launching criminal prosecution against the Judges.
2. Pandey's notice and complaint interfered with the administration of justice and undermined the authority of the Court.
3. Although Pandey tendered an unconditional apology, the Court found it lacked genuine remorse and thus refused to accept it.
4. The Court emphasised its independent jurisdiction under Article 129 of the Constitution, allowing it to impose any punishment necessary to uphold the dignity and authority of the judiciary.
5. Pandey was convicted of contempt of court for obstructing the course of justice and attempting to intimidate the Court. This case highlights the importance of maintaining dignity and decorum in court proceedings and the serious consequences of threatening or insulting the judiciary.

Arundhati Roy Case

Facts of the case:
This case concerns a Suo-moto contempt petition (that is, a petition initiated by the Court on its own motion) against the Respondent, Arundhati Roy, a Booker-prize winning author. During the course of a writ petition by grassroots-movement Narmada Bachao Andolan, the Court addressed issues of environmental damage and displacement of marginalised communities due to the development of a reservoir dam on the river Narmada.

Following a Supreme Court order that allowed for the height of the dam to be increased, the Respondent wrote an article criticising this decision. Subsequently, protests were staged in front of the gates of the Supreme Court by Narmada Bachao Andolan and the Respondent. This led to contempt proceedings based on a complaint lodged with the police. During the proceedings, all Respondents denied the allegations concerning specific slogans and banners and the proceedings were dropped.

On the basis of the above averments, Suo moto contempt proceedings were initiated against the Respondent for imputing motives to the Court. In her reply affidavit to the contempt notice, the author reiterated her stance and stressed her continuous dissent against the decision of the Supreme Court. She further noted that she believed this to be a matter of her right to express her opinions as a citizen as well as a writer.

Issues Raised:

1. Whether it would be permissible to initiate contempt proceedings for scandalising the court where the contents of an affidavit cause no contempt to any Judge personally but the action tried to cast an injury to the public by creating a wrong impression in the mind of the people regarding integrity, ability and fairness of the judiciary?
2. Extent to which and circumstances in which fair criticism of Judge, court or its functioning would be permissible under Article 19(1) (a) and (2)?
3. Whether freedom of press is guaranteed separately from and is the same as freedom of expression under Article 19(1)?
4. How should the court deal with a case when a contemnor does not show any repentance or remorse but persistently and consistently tried to justify the prima facie contemptuous action and to frustrate the contempt proceedings?

Rules Section 2(c), The Contempt of Courts Act 1971 Section 12, The Contempt of Courts Act 1971 Section 14, The Contempt of Courts Act 1971 Section 15, The Contempt of Courts Act 1971 Indian Penal Code, 1860, Article 129, The Constitution of India 1950 Article 19(1)(a), The Constitution of India 1949. Judgment The preliminary argument of the Respondents seeking recusal of the judges who issued notice of contempt in the instant matter was rejected by the Court.

The Court opined that contempt proceedings were initiated for comments made against the integrity of the judicial institution as a whole and not the judges in particular, who issued the notice. The decision of denying recusal appears to be fallacious as it goes against the law laid down under Section 14 of the Act. Principle of natural justice, due process requirement after the decision in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, and ordinary notions of justice demanded the judge to refuse to hear the matter and to recuse from the Bench.

There is a tendency to inherit bias in contempt proceedings initiated by the court suo-motu, thus creating a scope of injustice and violation of the cherished freedoms of the contemnor. The Court stated that freedoms of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution were subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law, one of these being the Contempt of Courts Act which, amongst other objectives, was directed at maintaining the dignity and the integrity of the courts and the judiciary.

It dismissed as irrelevant the Respondent's argument that the issue of whether truth could be pleaded as a defence to contempt proceedings had to be determined. Contempt proceedings had been initiated against on the basis of the offending and contemptuous part of the reply affidavit which made wild allegations against the court, thereby scandalising its authority. There was no point or fact in those proceedings which required to be defended by pleading the truth.

The Court stated that the purpose of the contempt proceedings was to maintain public confidence in the judicial system. In order to be considered fair criticism, the Court said that the statement "must be made in good faith and in the public interest, which is to be gauged by the surrounding circumstances including the person responsible for the comments, his knowledge in the field regarding which the comments are made and the intended purpose sought to be achieved."

Further, the Court distinguished the instant case from that of P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker where the SC considered criticisms of the judiciary made by a person who used to be a part of the Judiciary. Thus, liability in contempt cases will differ depending upon the person who makes criticism of the judicial system. Such a view is highly skewed, discriminating between two categories of the citizens and violating the right to equality guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Constitution.

The Court also relied on decisions in Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of India (1996), In Re: S. Mulgaonkar (1978), and E.M Sanakran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar. (1970)

The Court considered that the Respondent's statement was not based on any understanding of the law or the judicial system. Her statements alleging the judiciary's willingness to issue notice on "an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated petition" whilst exhibiting a lack of willingness to entertain a case concerning "national security and corruption in the highest places" and its intention to silence criticism along with her lack of remorse, made it difficult "to shrug off or to hold the [unsubstantiated] accusations made as comments of [an] outspoken ordinary man".

This verdict of the Court reflects that exercising of fundamental rights would require formal learning and can be a prerogative of few elites well versed with the legal conundrums thus, making the right illusory.

Further, the observation of the SC to the effect that the law "punishes the archer as soon as the arrow is shot no matter if it misses to hit the target" reflects another anomaly in the law (as interpreted) to the requirement of mens rea in a charge of contempt. The Court ultimately found the Respondent guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced her to "symbolic" imprisonment of one day and imposed a fine of Rs. 2000 with the proviso that if she failed to pay the fine, she would be imprisoned for three months.

Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat,

Citation: AIR 1991 SC 2176
Facts:
In Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat, Inspector S.R. Sharma was stationed at the Nadiad (Kheda), Gujarat police headquarters. In October 1988, N.L. Patel assumed the position of Chief Judicial Magistrate of Nadiad, where he observed a lack of cooperation from the local police in serving summons, warrants and notices to accused individuals. This non-cooperation resulted in frequent adjournments during trial proceedings.

Despite complaints to higher authorities, including the Director General of Police (D.G.P.), no significant action was taken. In April 1989, CJM Patel filed complaints against Inspector Sharma and other Nadiad police officers for causing adjournments in court-related procedures. On July 25, 1989, Patel instructed the police to initiate a criminal case against 14 individuals impeding judicial proceedings, later directing the Police Inspector to drop the cases against them. Responding strongly to CJM Patel's directive, Inspector Sharma filed a complaint against the CJM with the Administrator of the Supreme Court and approached the District Superintendent of Police.

On September 25, 1989, Inspector Sharma invited CJM Patel to discuss a case regarding Jitu Game, expressing that Patel's visit to the police headquarters could pacify police officials. At 8:35 PM, a police Jeep was sent to Patel's residence and Patel visited the police headquarters. Once inside Sharma's chamber, Patel was coerced into consuming liquor against his resistance. Subsequently, he was assaulted, handcuffed and tied with a rope by Inspector Sharma and other police personnel.

In response to these events, the Supreme Court appointed Justice R. to investigate. The 140-page detailed report submitted by Justice R. was contested by the accused police officers, but the Supreme Court found no merit in their objections. The Court accepted the report's findings, proceeding with the case against the police officials.

The Supreme Court also determined complicity on the part of the District Superintendent of Police, who was accused of supporting Inspector Sharma. Both were convicted and Inspector S.R. Sharma and the District Superintendent of Police were sentenced to six months of simple imprisonment.

The Supreme Court disapproved of CJM Patel's conduct in visiting the police headquarters at Inspector Sharma's invitation, issuing strict guidelines for police actions in detaining and arresting judicial officers.

Issues Raised:
The issues raised in Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat were:
Contempt of Court by Police Arrest:
The primary issue in Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat concerns whether the arrest conducted by the Police Inspector amounts to contempt of court. This involves an examination of the actions taken by Inspector S.R. Sharma and their implications on the dignity and functioning of the court.

Supreme Court's Interference in Subsidiary
Court Decisions: The second issue revolves around the authority of the Supreme Court to intervene in decisions made by subordinate courts and whether such intervention is permissible, particularly in cases involving contempt.

Insecurity of Judicial Officers, Judges and Magistrates:
The broader question addresses in Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat the reasons behind the perceived insecurity of judicial officers, judges and magistrates nationwide. Understanding the factors contributing to this insecurity is crucial for ensuring the proper functioning of the judiciary.

Role of Supreme Court in Contempt Cases: An important consideration is whether the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to take cognisance in cases involving contempt. This includes an exploration of the constitutional provisions and legal framework governing the Supreme Court's involvement in matters of contempt.

Bar Associations' Resolutions and Strikes:
The final issue in Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat involves the response of various Bar Associations, such as the Delhi Judicial Service Association, All India Judges Association, Bar Council of UP, Judicial Service of Gujarat, etc. Their approach to the Supreme Court through telegrams and petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution raises questions about safeguarding the dignity and honour of the judiciary and the appropriate legal recourse in such situations.

Relevant Sections:

• The sections involved in this case are:
  • Section 129 of the Indian Constitution
  • Section 136 of the Indian Constitution
  • Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution

Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat Judgment

• The Supreme Court treated Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat with utmost seriousness, prompted by widespread public concern and numerous petitions filed by lawyers seeking the removal of the involved police officers. Upon taking cognizance of the situation, the Supreme Court ordered the immediate removal of the Police Inspector and five other officers from their positions.
  
  Additionally, the Apex Court issued guidelines governing the arrest of judicial officers, which are now mandatory to follow. The Police Inspector in Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat was sentenced to six months of simple imprisonment and fined 2,000 rupees. The other officers received penalties of 1,500 rupees and imprisonment for 15 and 3 months, respectively.
  
  The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 129 is confined to contempt of itself, lacking the authority to indict individuals for contempt of lower courts. The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, enacted by Parliament under Entry 77 of List I, with Entry 14 of List III, empowers this Court solely for contempt against itself. High Courts, under Sections 11 and 15 of the Act, retain the primary jurisdiction for contempt of subordinate courts.

Guidelines Mandated by the Apex Court:

• If a judicial officer is to be arrested, prior intimation must be given to the District Judge or the High Court.
• In cases requiring immediate arrest, formal or technical arrest procedures should be adhered to.
• Adequate records of the arrest must be promptly communicated to the Session Judge or the District Judge.
• The arrested judicial officer should not be taken to the police station without prior orders from the District/Session Judge.
• All communications should be provided to the judicial officer for liaison with family, attorney and the District/Session Judge.
• No punchnama or medical examinations should be conducted unless in the presence of legal counsel.
• Handcuffing of the judicial officer is prohibited, except in cases of imminent danger to the individual.

EMS Namboodiripad v. T. Narayana Nambiar,

Citation : AIR 1970 SC 2015
Facts

1. EMS Namboodaripad, the Chief Minister of Kerala, made remarks during a press conference that were critical of the judiciary.
2. Namboodaripad accused the judiciary of being biased towards the rich and against the poor, workers, and peasants.
3. He stated that judges were influenced by class hatred, class interest, and class prejudice, portraying the judiciary as an instrument of oppression.

Issues:

1. Whether EMS Namboodaripad's remarks amounted to contempt of court
2. Whether criticizing the judiciary in such a manner constitutes a violation of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution.

Judgment:

1. The Supreme Court held that EMS Namboodaripad's remarks indeed amounted to contempt of court.
2. While acknowledging the freedom of speech and expression, including press freedom, as guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution, the Court emphasized that these freedoms are not absolute and can be restricted by the state.
3. Contempt of court is one of the grounds specified in Clause 2 of Article 19, allowing the state to impose restrictions on freedom of speech and expression.
4. The Court noted that Namboodaripad's statements had the effect of lowering the prestige of judges and courts in the eyes of the people, regardless of whether he intended such a result or not.
5. The Court observed that Namboodaripad's remarks distorted the teachings of Marx and Engels and had a detrimental impact on public perception of the judiciary.
6. Consequently, the Court found EMS Namboodiripad guilty of contempt of court under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act and imposed punishment accordingly.

Key Points:

• The case underscores the principle that freedom of speech and expression is not absolute and can be restricted if it amounts to contempt of court.
• Criticizing the judiciary in a manner that undermines its authority and prestige can constitute contempt of court.
• Intentions behind the statements may be considered in determining the punishment, but they do not serve as a justification for contemptuous remarks.
• Public confidence in the judiciary is crucial, and actions or statements that erode this confidence may be punishable as contempt of court.

The sections involved in this case are:

• Section 129 of the Indian Constitution
• Section 136 of the Indian Constitution
• Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution

Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat Judgment

The Supreme Court treated Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat with utmost seriousness, prompted by widespread public concern and numerous petitions filed by lawyers seeking the removal of the involved police officers. Upon taking cognisance of the situation, the Supreme Court ordered the immediate removal of the Police Inspector and five other officers from their positions. Additionally, the Apex Court issued guidelines governing the arrest of judicial officers, which are now mandatory to follow.

The Police Inspector in Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat was sentenced to six months of simple imprisonment and fined 2,000 rupees. The other officers received penalties of 1,500 rupees and imprisonment for 15 and 3 months, respectively. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 129 is confined to contempt of itself, lacking the authority to indict individuals for contempt of lower courts.

The Contempt of Courts Act 1971, enacted by Parliament under Entry 77 of List I, with Entry 14 of List III, empowers this Court solely for contempt against itself. High Courts, under Sections 11 and 15 of the Act, retain the primary jurisdiction for contempt of subordinate courts. Guidelines Mandated by the Apex Court:

• If a judicial officer is to be arrested, prior intimation must be given to the District Judge or the High Court.
• In cases requiring immediate arrest, formal or technical arrest procedures should be adhered to.
• Adequate records of the arrest must be promptly communicated to the Session Judge or the District Judge.
• The arrested judicial officer should not be taken to the police station without prior orders from the District/Session Judge.
• All communications should be provided to the judicial officer for liaison with family, attorney and the District/Session Judge.
• No punchnama or medical examinations should be conducted unless in the presence of legal counsel.
• Handcuffing of the judicial officer is prohibited, except in cases of imminent danger to the individual.
   

EMS Namboodiripad v. T. Narayana Nambiar,

Citation : AIR 1970 SC 2015

• Facts
  1. EMS Namboodaripad, the Chief Minister of Kerala, made remarks during a press conference that were critical of the judiciary.
  2. Namboodaripad accused the judiciary of being biased towards the rich and against the poor, workers, and peasants.
  3. He stated that judges were influenced by class hatred, class interest, and class prejudice, portraying the judiciary as an instrument of oppression.
• Issues
  1. Whether EMS Namboodaripad's remarks amounted to contempt of court
  2. Whether criticising the judiciary in such a manner constitutes a violation of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution.
• Judgment
  1. The Supreme Court held that EMS Namboodaripad's remarks indeed amounted to contempt of court.
  2. While acknowledging the freedom of speech and expression, including press freedom, as guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution, the Court emphasised that these freedoms are not absolute and can be restricted by the state.
  3. Contempt of court is one of the grounds specified in Clause 2 of Article 19, allowing the state to impose restrictions on freedom of speech and expression.
  4. The Court noted that Namboodaripad's statements had the effect of lowering the prestige of judges and courts in the eyes of the people, regardless of whether he intended such a result or not.
  5. The Court observed that Namboodaripad's remarks distorted the teachings of Marx and Engels and had a detrimental impact on public perception of the judiciary.
  6. Consequently, the Court found EMS Namboodiripad guilty of contempt of court under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act and imposed punishment accordingly.
• Key Points
  1. The case underscores the principle that freedom of speech and expression is not absolute and can be restricted if it amounts to contempt of court.
  2. Criticising the judiciary in a manner that undermines its authority and prestige can constitute contempt of court.
  3. Intentions behind the statements may be considered in determining the punishment, but they do not serve as a justification for contemptuous remarks.
  4. Public confidence in the judiciary is crucial, and actions or statements that erode this confidence may be punishable as contempt of court.

P.N.Duda v/s V.P.Shiv Shankar and others

Citation Of The Case

• 1988 AIR 1208 Dated:- 15th April,1988
• Court:- Supreme Court of India
• Name of the Judges: S.Ranganathan, Sabyasachi Mukherjee
• Name of the Parties:
• Petitioner: P.N.DUDA
• Respondent: V.P.SHIV SHANKAR & OTHERS
• Laws Involved:
• Contempt of Court Act, 1971 - Praying for initiation of proceedings for contempt of Supreme Court Under Section 15(1), (a) and (b) of Read with Rule 3(a), (b) and (c) Supreme Court Contempt of a speech delivered at a meeting of Bar Council, reported in newspapers.

Facts Of The Case

1. The facts of the Case involved that the Respondent No.1, Shri P.Shivshankar, Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs at the relevant time, delivered a Speech at a Meeting of the Bar Council of Hyderabad.
2. It was alleged by Petitioner that in that Speech Respondent.No.1 made Statements derogatory to the dignity of the Supreme Court, Attributing to the Court partiality towards affluent people and using extremely intemperate and undignified language, and that the speech contained slander cast on this court both in respect of the judges and the working of the Court.
3. The Attorney General and the Solicitor General of India were approached by Petitioner to give their consent for initiating Contempt proceedings but they have declined to deal with this prayer of petitioner.
4. In the meantime, Shri R.N.Trivedi, Advocate, filed an Application Claiming right to be impleaded as a party, stating that the Attorney General and The Solicitor General should not have been made parties to the Contempt Petition and that the alleged non-exercise of the jurisdiction by the Attorney-General and Solicitor General had not Constituted Contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act.
5. The Court declined to initiate the Contempt proceeding, dismissed the petition and disposed of the application filed by Shri. R.N.Trivedi.
6. It is mentioned that any Criticism about the Judicial System or the Judges which hampers the administration of Justice or which erodes the faith in the objective approach of Judges and brings administration of justice into ridicule, must be prevented. Faith in the administration of Justice is one of the pillars through which democratic institutions function and sustain.
7. An Application for initiation of contempt under Section 15 (1),(a) and (b) of the Act read with Explanation (1) and Rule 3 (a),(b) and (c) of the Contempt of Supreme Court Rules,1975 Was made, where in Shri P.shivShankar, The Attorney General and The Solicitor General were made parties.
8. The Respondent No.1, filed an Affidavit in response to the notice issued by Court. He Stated that, he had delivered the speech on the subject of accountability of the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary and had made Comments on the accountability of the Three Organs and the theoretical implications Thereof.
9. He also Stated that he had intended no disrespect to any of the institution or its functionaries, much less the Supreme Court.
10. It was further Stated that the Contempt petition was not maintainable without the Consent of the Attorney General or The Solicitor General.
11. It is provided that in the free marketplace of Ideas, Criticism about the Judicial System or Judges should be welcomed, So long as such criticisms do not impair or hamper the administration of Justice.
12. In this Case, the court had examined the entire speech. Shri P.Shiv Shankar had examined the Class Composition of the Supreme Court. His view was that the Class Composition of any instrument indicated this predisposition, prejudices. This is inevitable. The intuition more subtle than major premise, on which the decision will depend, is the pride the prejudice of a human instrument of a Judge through which objectively the Judge seeks to administer justice according to law.
13. It was pointed out by Sabyasachi Mukharji that there were passages in the Speech, which torn out of context might be liable to be misunderstood, by reading the speech as a whole and bearing in mind the selected audience to which it was addressed, his lordship agreed with Sabyasachi Mukharji, that no Contempt had been Committed.

Issues:

• Whether the Attorney General and the Solicitor General could be made parties to the Contempt application.
• Whether their action or inaction was justiciable at all in any proceeding.
• Whether the speech made by Shri P.Shiv Shankar had amounted to Contempt of the Court or in other words whether the speech and the effect of bringing the Court into disrepute.

Judgement:

1. The Court pointed out that the administration of Justice and Judges are open to public Criticism and Public Scrutiny. Judges have their accountability to the Society and their accountability must be judged by their conscience and oath of their office that is to defend and uphold the constitution and the laws without fear and favour.
2. Any criticism about the Judicial System or the Judges which hampers the administration of Justice or which erodes the torn out of context might be liable to be misunderstood, but by reading the speech as a whole and bearing in mind the select audience to which it was addressed, his Lordship agreed with Sabyasachi Mukharji.J, that no Contempt had been Committed.
3. The Affidavit of the Respondent should be accepted at its face value that the speech was only a theoretical dissertation and that he intended no disrespect to this Court or its functioning.

While discussing other issues the Court came into Conclusion that:

1. This petition, if treated as one filed under Section 15(1) read c. with rule 3(a) is not in proper form and, if treated as one filed under rules 3(b) and 3(c), is not maintainable as it is not filed by the Attorney General/Solicitor General or by any person with his consent.
2. In either event the petitioner should not have added to the petition, respondents other than the person alleged to be guilty of contempt of court and their names should be deleted from the array of the parties.
3. In this case, the Attorney General/Solicitor General refuses consent or declines to act, their decision is not judicially reviewable and petitioner's remedy is to approach the Court for action under rule 3(a).
4. In this case, the Attorney General/Solicitor General acted properly in declining to deal with the petitioner's application either way; and
5. The petition was nothing more than information under rule 3(a) on which this Court may or may not take suo motu action and there is no need to initiate proceedings against respondent No. 1 for contempt of court. Therefore, The Petition Was Dismissed.

M Veerabhadra Rao Vs Tek Chand

Citation: 1984 Air Sc 28 Court:
Supreme Court Of India Bench: Desai J, V. Balakrisnan, Khalid V
Acts: Bar Council Of India Rules, 1975, The Advocates Act,1961

Facts:
M Veerabhadra Rao was an advocate practising under senior M Ram Mohan Rao at Hyderabad. Tek Chand who was the owner of the house where M Ram Mohan Rao was the tenant and had Rs 17000 of arrear and also the owner filed suit for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent. The house was agreed to be sold for Rs 65000 to Premalatha and Rs 10000 was paid as advance and balance amount within 3 months' time. As the consideration for sale was exceeding Rs 50000, the sale deed could not be registered unless an income tax clearance certificate was produced under Section 230 of Income tax act,1961.

But the balance amount was not paid and the agreement was cancelled. The vendee wanted to grab the house without paying the balance amount. In order to get registered and get the income tax clearance, the vendee forged an affidavit and signature with the help of Tek Chand (Advocate) The respondent came to know of the fraud and filed a complaint under Section 35 of The Advocates Act,1961 before the Bar council of State of Andhra Pradesh.

Issues:

• Whether this forgery of document sufficient for the punishment under professional misconduct.
• What should be the adequate punishment that must be imposed upon the appellant?

Arguments:
APPELLANT, Filed a counter affidavit denying all the allegation by claiming that the income tax certificate was attested by him with the permission and presence of the respondent. The appellant had received Rs 300 from appellant for the attestation of affidavit. Appellant had produced a witness who was there at the time of attestation.

The respondent produced the affidavit which was forged and requested for the cross examination of the forged signature. The address of the application to which the income tax officer was requested to issue a tax certificate which was the appellant address. Provided evidence for proving that the respondent was not there physically in appellant office.

Understanding:
The State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh and Bar association of India has founded that the appellant is guilty of serious professional misconduct by attesting an affidavit (section 3(3) of the General Clauses Act,1897) which appears to be a forged one. The appellant had clear cut violation of Rule 34 and 40 of civil rules of practice framed by the Andhra Pradesh high court which explains the officers authorised to administer oath for the purpose of affidavit and should mention the date, place and sign at the end of the affidavit.

The State Bar association and Bar association of India by using the Section 35(3) of Advocate act,1961 which prescribes various punishment of misconduct suspended the advocate from practice for a period of 6 years. The appellant challenged the decision and went for appeal under Section 38 of Advocate act, 1961 to Supreme court.

Judgement:
The Supreme Court held that the appellant had violated his statutory duty and acted in an unjust manner which is against the noble profession. He has knowingly become a party to the forgery of a very valuable document and he has by his conduct facilitated this commission of a fraud which to some extent benefit his senior M Ram Mohan Rao. The court had suspended the advocate from practice for a period of 5 year and pay cost of the respondent of Rs 3000.

Shambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry,

Citation : AIR 2001 SC 2508

• Facts:
  1. Shambhu Ram Yadav filed a complaint against Hanuman Das Khatry, an advocate, before the Bar Council of Rajasthan.
  2. The complaint alleged that Das Khatry, while representing a client in a civil suit, wrote a letter to his client stating that the judge accepts bribes and suggested sending money to influence the outcome of the case.
  3. Das Khatry defended himself by stating that he was informing his client about the judge's conduct for the client's benefit, and he did not intend to bribe the judge.
  4. The State Bar Council suspended Das Khatry for two years for professional misconduct.
  5. Das Khatry appealed to the Bar Council of India, which enhanced the punishment by striking his name off the roll of advocates permanently.
  6. Das Khatry filed a review petition, which was accepted, and his punishment was reduced to a reprimand.
• Issues:
  1. Whether Daskhatry's conduct amounted to professional misconduct.
  2. Whether the punishment imposed on Das Khatry was appropriate.
  3. Whether the review petition was properly considered and decided.
• Relevant Laws:
  1. Advocates Act, 1961
  2. Principles of professional ethics governing lawyers' conduct
  3. Bar Council regulations regarding disciplinary proceedings against advocates
• Arguments:
  • Appellant (Shambhu Ram Yadav): Daskhatry's letter to his client suggesting bribing the judge constitutes professional misconduct and warrants severe punishment.
  • Respondent (Hanuman Das khatry): The letter was intended to inform the client about the judge's conduct and did not involve any intention to bribe. Daskhatry's long years of service and clean record should be considered in deciding the appropriate punishment.
• Judgment:
  1. The Supreme Court held that Daskhatry's conduct amounted to serious professional misconduct.
  2. The Court found that the punishment imposed by the Bar Council of India, striking Daskhatry's name off the roll of advocates, was appropriate given the gravity of the misconduct.
  3. The review petition was improperly considered and decided, as it failed to provide any new grounds or evidence that warranted a change in the original decision.
  4. The Court reinstated the original punishment of striking Daskhatry's name off the roll of advocates, emphasising the importance of maintaining high ethical standards in the legal profession.
  5. The Court also imposed costs on Daskhatry for the appeal.

Perspective Publication v. State of Maharashtra,

Citation: AIR 1970 SC 221
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: November 19, 1968
Judges: Chief Justice P.K. Sen, M. Hidayatullah, I.C. Chagla, N.L. Untwalia, and J.M. Shelat Facts:
The petitioner, Perspective Publications Private Limited, published an article in the Marathi weekly magazine "Maratha" criticising the conduct of a Bombay High Court judge in a particular case. The state government initiated contempt proceedings against the petitioner under Section 123(2) of the Indian Penal Code for "scandalising the court." The Bombay High Court found the petitioner guilty of contempt and sentenced the editor and manager of the magazine to imprisonment and a fine. Issue:

• Whether the published article constituted criminal contempt of court under Section 123(2) of the Indian Penal Code.

Arguments:

• State: The article directly attacked the judge's integrity and competence, tending to scandalise the court and interfere with the administration of justice.
• Petitioner: The article was fair criticism of the judge's actions in a specific case and did not intend to undermine the authority of the court.

Judgment:
The Supreme Court upheld the Bombay High Court's finding of contempt. The Court laid down the following principles: While fair criticism of judicial decisions is permissible, direct and scurrilous attacks on judges in their judicial capacity cannot be tolerated. The purpose and tendency of the publication will determine whether it amounts to contempt. Mere publication of a criticism, even if unfounded, may not be sufficient. The test is whether the publication creates a real and reasonable likelihood of interfering with the administration of justice. Rationale:
The Court recognized the need to balance the freedom of speech and expression with the need to maintain the dignity and authority of the judiciary. Unrestrained attacks on judges could erode public confidence in the judiciary and hinder the smooth functioning of the legal system.

Significance:
This case set an important precedent for the scope of criminal contempt of court in India, emphasising the distinction between fair criticism and scathing attacks on judges. It established a stricter test for contempt, requiring a real and reasonable likelihood of interference with justice rather than mere offensive language.

Written By:

• Niket Singh Kotwal and
• Gurpreet Singh Chand

E-mail: [email protected]